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CHAPTER I
.. DACKGROtJND

The gr0up ot islands formerl1 known as Netherlands India .forms a part

~r·the

·Malaran Archipelago and,

geographically speaking, links Australia with Asia and the
Pacific with the Indian Ocean.
consists primarily

or

While this terr1torr

t1ve large islands, the entire

archipelago is dotted with numerous·1slands or var71ng
sizes.

Under Dutch administration Netherlands India was

divided into the tollowing geographical d1v1a1ons1

Java

and Madura, Sumo.tra.Reglon, Dutch Borneo, Celebes Region,
end Moluccas, New Guinea, and Sunda IslandsJ the total area
'or this terr! tory is over 700 ~

000

square miles •1

When the Portuguese reached India in 1498, they ·
found that the chief l!Brket for spices was Malacca, located
in the. Malayan peninsula.

Consequentlr, in the interests o.f

increasing their trade, the Portuguese took over the citJ
after attacking 1t twice with a small al9m1'.2
13. s. Furn1vall, Netherlands India, A Study!?..!.
Plural Econom:r, P• 1. For a diacuaslon or the relative
Importance of the factors or geographical location and natural
resources 1n Indonesian history, aee A. E. Sokol, "Communication and Production 1n Indonesian H1sto17," 1!:!.!: Eastern
Quarterly, Vol. 7, August, 19481.PP• 339-353.
2a. II. M. Vlekke~ The Storl or the Dutch East Indies,
P• 56. Chapter IV or 11.r. ffikkela bookii devote"dt"O a
discussion or the part which religion plared in the t1gllt1ng
between the Catholic Portuguese and the Mohammedan natives.
1

2

Shortl1 a.fter this conquest, the Portuguese traders
discovered that ap1ces in Malacca cost t1ve to aeven times
as much as the spices bought in the islands Where they grew.
On the basia or this knowledge the1 quite naturall1 desired

to establish direct relations with the Spice Islands (Moluccas)
1n order to b1•paas the middlemen.,

This did not prave to be

dittioult as the local rulers were quite willing to give the
Portuguese such a foothold in return tor aid in carrying on
the almost constnnt warfare

or

the ialands.3

In 1522 the Portuguese were granted the right to ·
build a fort 1n the Spice Ialands and were also granted a
monopoly or cloves.

Wherever Portuguese traders went,

m1as1onaries followedJ consequentl1, when the Portuguese
moved into the Spice Islands, Chr1at1an1ty began to spread
through the territoryJ Islam, however, aproad muoh taster.
During the earlier part

or

the 17th centur1 thia was an

1ncreas1ngl1 important cause of friction.
to a head when, 1n 1570, the Sultan
and the evidence

or

Ternate was assassinated

strongly indicated that

Governor had instigated the·act.

The trouble came

the Portuguese

In a matter ot da1s the

ttoluccas were virtually in unanimous revolt against the
Portuguese. 4
By 1580 the Portuguese were in desperate straits as
a result of the alliance ot native princes against them when
the Portuguese received help from an unexpected 1ource1 in
3Furn1val1, ..2l?.
4vlekke,

.22• ~.,

ill• , pp • 15-16 •
P• 62.

that rear Philip II

or

Spain had made· good h1a claim to the

throne or Portugal.· With the aid or the Spanish and new
bases in th9 Ph111pp1nea (which were closer than Malacca),
the combined Portuguese-Spanish forces maintained a precarious
hold

in

the Moluccas.

However,· the· power or.Portugal was

broken· and, toward the end

or

the century, 1t seemed that

the·entire tropical Far East would tall to the Mohammedans.5
The Dutch arrived in the Indiea in 1596.

Though the7

had never wanted to come East, the ?letherlanders were forced
to do a o b1 the same event that had enabled the Portuguese
to' maintain their weak hold 1n the Ind1~a--the aucceas1on ot
Philip II

or

Spain to the throne

or

Portugal.

Prior to

1580 the Dutch spice trade had been pr1mar11J with Portugal.
King Philip, a bitter enemy or Dutch independence, closed
the harbors

'or Pol'tugal to his rebellious

Dutch subjects.

Thia torced Dutch traders to go to the source o~ the spice
'trade or else give up a lucrative trade wh1oh had become a
necesaacy moans

or

livelihood fo'l9 the Holland merchants.

· The Dutch ventures into the Eastern trade were not
backed by private organizations, but rather by the State and
civic corporations. Experience aoon demonstrated the .
necessity or a common policy ot trade and selling it

trade

was to remain protitable.6
·· Tho deaaJ.y end unrestricted competition between the
Dutch traders quickly torced prices up in the East and drove
5Fl:...~1vall,

O;?• ~.,

6Ibid., PP• 20-24.

pp .16-17.

them down on the home market. · Thia situation, combined with

the ~act that the Dutch Republic was not able to protect
trade in distant waters, led the States General to incorporate
the East Indian traders into the United East Indian Compan7
in 1502.

The new corporation was given divers rights

or

monopoly and.sovere1gnt7. Thia monopoly operated to the
exclusion ot all other Nethorlandors 1n the areas east
Cape

or

or

the

Good Hope and west ot the Straits ot MagellanJ the

powers ot sovere1gnt7 included the power to I?Bke alliances
and contract~ with the various princes and potentates in the
delimited area., :The Dutch Republic retained "onl7 a·right
or contro1,n7
The Compan7 did.not want to acqu1re·terr1tor7 at the
outset. of the venture 1X> the Eaat..

Its aim was to preserve

the Spice Islanda aa a private trading ground.

However, auch

a policy, though allegedly only comm~rcial, inevitably led
to a polic7 of territorial expansion •. This change grew out
ot:the d1acover7 b7 th8 Company that it was impossible to
trade sucoesstully unless the area was also governed.a
As a result of this change in polio7. the Compan7,
through agreements and a111enoea with native rulers,.acquired
an indirect control or dominance over largo areas in the
llalay Arch1pel1go.

By 1750 the Company had largely, but not

completely, shifted trom a co:mnercial to a territorial end
,Pol1t1cal bas1a.

Steadily declining

?A. Vandenbosch,

profits,

The Dutch East Indies,

ment, Problems,!!!.!! Polit!"Ci'; P• 5l.----

8Fuz.n1vall,

.21?.

poor financial

.ill• , p. 25 •

..!!! Govern-

5

administration at home, penurious treatment or its personnel
1n the East, and tho breakdown or the connneroial monopoly
..

combined, however,to cause the collapse of the Company
toward the end ot the 18th centu:rr.

.

In 1798 the charter of

the Comp8.?11' was null1t1ed,to take etteot on l January 1800.

On the latt~r date the Dutch Government took over both the
Company's aaseta and 1ts 11ab111t1ea.9

During the Napoleonic Wars the British took over the
Dutch Colonial possessions:1n the Far East.

The English

maintained that they did not come as enemies, but rather
to prevent the power ot France trom becoming dominant 1n
that area,· By the Treaty of Amiens ot 1802 all or these
possessions except Cerlon were restored to the Netherlands.
Renewal of hostilities placed the Dutch colonies at the
disposal ot the English once again.

In 1810 France annexed

the NetherlandsJ consequentl7, when the English arrived in
Java in August, 1811, they took the island trom the French
rather

than

"

trom the Dutoh.10

Java was placed under Raffles as Lieutenant Governor •
. Rattles instituted a system of taxation based upon the Eastern
concept that all property belonged to the ruler and that the
tenants kad to pay land rent.

This rent was tixed at two-

t1tths or the harvest and the ruler •s share o ould be paid 1n
either moner or produota.

Rattlos instituted other reforms

'dealing with administrative structure, the police force, and
9A. Vandenbosch,· "Indone11a," PP• 79-80, in L.A.
.!h! ~ World .2! South~.!!!!•

Mills and A1sooiat~s,

le>.Purnivall, ..2.2• ,g!!.,

PP• 54-67.
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While some ot .these reforms were

the judicial organization.

only _or. temporary- importance,

others

wero or permanent value

and marked Ra!'t'los_' administration aa a tuming

point 1n

colonial administration
.
. . in the lletherland Indies •11
. Under the.provisions o!' the Treat7 of London ot' 13
'

• •

..

-

.

~J

"

•

. August 1814, , the East Indies were givon_ back to the Netherlands •. " However,
because
ot
Napoleon'a
.
·'
..
. ~
. . .
. return- !'rom Elba,
the aotual trans.fer did not take place until 1816. B1 1819
\

'

'·

the Dutch had 01'.fec_tlvely occupied onl7 a tew small areas in
the Outer Terr1tor1es--Padang and Palembang in Sumatra,
Pontianak,_ Sambas, and BandJermssin 1n Borneo, .Madassar in
south and the Mina.hasa in north Celebos, and the Moluccas,
Which had made up the old center
general

In

o.f Company activity.

it l'IBJ be said that the formation ot the Dutch

colonial empire. _has been vecy _ largel1.

tho_ work ot thtt lut

.

century, with particular emphasis upon the period trom 1900
to 1940.12
Following the Napoleonic Wars the Dutch initiated a
now system ot taxation in their East Indies· possessions.
Prior to this time, the natives had been required to turn over
to the government a portion
taxes.

or

their crops as land rent or

U~der the new ayatem, which ~ame to be known aa the

Culture Syst~m, tho natives were required to place at the
disposal

or

the government a portion

certain number

or

working days.

llvandenbosch,

.21!•

ill•,

l2Ib1d., pp. 56-57.

Of their

land and

A

The land and working time
pp. 55-56.

.

~ ..... ',.

7

thus put atgo"leJ'nment disposal was used tor the cultivation
ot crops to~.export out ot the islands; the whole.process
waa under the supervision ot government ott!ciala.

While

the plan was tinanciall1~aucceaatul tor the Dutch, serious
abuaes·1n·the·adm1n1atrat1on ot the program began to create
conditions ot distress among.the Javanese peasants1 the
human tendenc7 to profiteer became evident in·t.he Netherlands Min1atr1 tor the Colonies.

Advoca~~g,

~-

as it did;

,
goveni men t supervision ot land, this program
operated to '

the disadvantage ot: the· Netherlands Indies ·in that Western
private enterprise .was kept out ot the countr,- Md the
economic development ot the area waa thus retarded.13
· '

While the Culture 87stem did result 1n the introduction

ot man7 new export crops which ultimatel7 benet1ted the islands
econom1.call7. b7·1850 the economic detic1enc1ea ot.the.87stem
had become·apparentJ in addition, liberals opposed the S7stem
on the grounds. that it was inconsistent with th8 economic
principles

or

the liberal trend ot thought which was then

prevalent·in the Hetherlands •. "In the long run ••• there was
no escape trom the.conclusion that the principles ot
Liberalism were irreconcilable with a a7stem ot government
enterprises baaed on compulso17 labor and trade monopolies.•14
Cond!tlona in Netherlands~India were·brought to the
attention of the Dutch public 1n 1860 when Edward Douwer Dekker,

-a tormsr Eaat

Indies otticial, published his.novel,~ Havelaar.

13vandenbo~ch, .21?• cit.~ 1'1 L.A.
14vlekke, .22• ,ill., pp. 156-160,

r.t1118, .21?•

.2.ll·• P• so.

9

In 1901 a coalition ministry composed of the representatives or three Christian parties came to power in the
Netherlands.

In th~ same year the Netherlands Government

1ssu~d an important ·atat.emant embodying the change 1n
pol1c11

"As a Christian power, the Netherlands 1a obligated

in the East Indian·Arch1pel1go to imbue the whole eonduot

or

the Government with the consciousness that the Netherlands
has a moral duty to .fulfill with respect to the people of
those reg1ona.ttl7 .In lfJ05 this polioy was implemented by a
forty million guilder loan which was paid by tho Netherlands
treasury to that

or

the· Indies Government so that funds might

be made available in the Indies for the improvement

or

economic conditions on Java and Madura.le
As stated above,'prior to.the l890's the Dutch had
not.attempted.to penetrate the vast territories or th&
1slanda, outside

or

Java, with their adm1n1strntion.

By

the turn or the centUI71 however, several factors combined
to force an abandonment or this policy ot ftnon-penetration."
The planters who inhabited the east coast or Sumatra, which
had become the center

or

a thriving European agricultural

industry, were demanding more effective administration •
..

Another tactor or Dlljor importance was fear or foreign
intervention and a growing uneasiness over the fierce outbreak or economic imperialism in the Far East.

The task ot

17vandenbosc·h, on. cit., 1n L. A. Milla, .21?• ill•,
lA..-

-vlekke, .22.

.

ill• , p , 175 ~

P• 81.

10
establishing Dutch control over these areas was entrusted to
Governor-General

van I!eutz; a tew years earlier General

van lleutz had successfully prosecuted a war against the
Achehnese,

a tanatica1· tribe ot aborigines who inhabit the

northern tip or Sumatra.

BGtwoen 1900 and 1912, and part1ou-

larly during.the period between 1904-1909, ettect1ve Dutch
control was established over most ot the Outer Territories.
: . .i;' ..

'

In addition, van Heutz•s administration marked the first
serious attempt to lay the basia·ror a popular educational
system; van Ueutz also introduced measures designed to
promote the ooonomic development or the Indonesians.19
Prior to Dutch rule tho arch1pe14go was-divided into

innumerable small states and this oond.1t1on made possible the
conquests or tha Portugueae and later.those or the Dutch.
Betore.1596 there_had been a great deal ot a1m1lar1ty
between tho situation in the islands and that ot teudal1at1c
Europe ot the Middle Ages.

Howeyer, the long period ot

Dutch rule resulted 1n integration 1n many apheres1 this
integration finally resulted in the development

or

a ~eel1ng

ot unity among the Indonesian peoples and eventually gaye
rise to a nationalist movement.20
In 1908 Indonesian nationalism was first expressed
1n an organized and institutionalized manner when~.

Wa1d1n

Soedira Ceaada, a ret1:••d medical subordinate, founded the
tirat Indonesian nationalist aooiet11 Doed! Oetomo (the
l9vandenbosoh, .21?•

.ill•, P• 65.

20vandenbosch, .21?• cit., 1n Le A. Mills, .21?• ill•1

P• B2.

Glorious Endeavor).
composed

or

11
Thia organization, which wa~ o~!s1.ually

Javanose intellectuals, had at first O!ll'f n .·

social• econom!o, and cultural program, but later it also
entered the political field.

This society, however, has

never been a popular movemont, working chie.fly among those
who have. obtained a Western education.

By virtue of these

taata

·it has, on the whole, exercised a moderating 1nfluonoe
on nationalist act1v1t1es.2l .
Shortly after the formation of Boedi Oetomo another

pol1 tical soc 1et1 was formed, Barelm t Islam.

The primo.17

cause tor the formation or this society was the depressed
condi.tiona in the batik 1ndustr,. in central Java.

For tho

moat part the depression had been caused b1' competition from
foreign countries. Ylh1le the principal element in the
formation ot Sarelmt Islam was economic, a religious element
was·1ntroduced in order to secure popular support for the
movermnt. Had Sareknt Islam confined its aot1v1t1es to the
economic field, it probabl1' would have remained primarily
a middle-class part1.
thia tact

The tounders of the movement recognized

and appealed to the only common elensnt in Javanese

11te--Islam1am--1n order to secure the interest ot the masses
and thus create a.wide.popular.base ~or tha movement.22
In general, the program of Sarekat Islam embodied a
twofold purpose--the promotion.or economic welt'are and the
advanoeJT18nt or the interests ot Islam.
2

. '

.

. ''

22vandenbosoh,

.

.

.£.!!., P• 243.
on • .£!!., P• 317.

1Puz.nivall, .2!?•

In connection with

12
the latter purpo~e, the movement not onl1 wished to keep
the people true to Mohammedanism,
wrong conceptions

but also to oppose all

ot the religion ot the Prophet.

At the

t'1rst congress ot Sarekat Islam, held_.1n 19131 expressions
ot lo1alt1 to the Netherlands were made, but the congress
aleo passed
a resolution calling tor the evolut1on&.r7
..
establishment ot a selt-govern1ng Indonesia within the
Dutch e~p1re,

B7 1917, when the aeoond con.gross ot the

part1·wae held, a much more radical spirit had become
apparent; by this time independence had become tho prima17
goal of.the movement. While the1 professed the desire to
obtain thia independence by parli~menta17 means, it peace1'ul activities tailed, the leaders implied that the party
lrould then lmow what course of action to t'ollow.

Within a

ehort time this new ap1r1t began to express itself in action:
in 1918 the personnel

or

the government p&1ftlBhops went on

strike out ot sympath1 tor a discharged pawnshop ott1e1al.
The third party congress, held in October, 1918, embodied a
new and still more radical trend as the leadership ot Sarekat
Jalam began to take on the charaoter ot doctrinaire socialism.
This was evidenced by the tacts that the party propnganda had
now singled out capitalism as the major ene?D7 and the class
atruegle. was given 1noreas1ng emphas1s.2~
A third tacet ot the nationalist mover::iont was reflected
in the Indian part1.

-

Thia part7, which was organized 1n 1912,
.

.

was composed ot both Eurasians nnd Indonesians; the party's

_.,

23Ibid

P• ~la.

13
platform was based on an appeal tor a brotherhood of these
two groups tor an independent East Indies.

However, the

early leadership·ot this'movemant was very radical and, as
a result, in 1914 three ot its leaders were exiled•

This

action quelled·tha radical element·in the party and it
continued a morepoaoet'ul exiatenoo under the name ot
Insulinde.24 · ·
In December~ 1916, ·th9 Volksra3d1 the central
legislative body, was created as a conce3s1on to the nationalists.

Its functions were only advisor,- and 1ta powers

extremely limited, a tact which continually led to trash
demands tor constitutional reform,

It is not at all surprising

that promises and preparations tor reform tailed to check the
nationalist move100nt.

Partiall7 because ot the ta1luro ot

tho'Netherlands Government to take more positive action on
the 1asua

or

con3t1tut1onal ratorm, the nationalist movement,

during the por1od from 1920 to 1927, began to acquire new
and radical tendencies.· During this period the nat1onal1at

movement fell under the influence ot communism; the islands
were ripe ror communist propaganda nt this time as the
Village, Which had been a social

and

economic Unit in 1tselt,

was being broken up b7 the introduction of large-scale
24Ib1d. See Rupert Emerson, "An Analysis ot Nationalism
in Southea'iit'"Asia,• FGr Eaatern @Iarterlr, Vol. 5, February,
1946, pp. 208-215. lir. Emeraon
soussea aom ot the characteristics of nationalism and the 1mp11cat1on or increasing
nationalism 1n regard to the hope tor a peacerui and cooperating world. This entire issue 01' the FAr Eastern Qµarterlt
1s devoted to the Netherlands Indies and lnoludes nrticles
on such subjects as natural resources, population problems,
cross currents or culture, the problem or minority groups,
objectives
or the Japanese occupation~ as well as an analysis
ot
nationalism.

14
European cultures.

With the breaking up ot the village

system, governmental functions becaJ12e more and more centralized; whereas formerly c1v11 servants had kept_themselvea
constantly informed on - local

problems and grievances and

had promptly sought their solution, under tho new centralized a7atem, local grievances went unnoticed and uncorrected,
The connuun1ats utilized and o.xplo1ted all of these local
.grievances as r.ru.ch as possible.
' ...
Following World \Var I a number of labor unions were
established and t:rom 1920 to 1927 fostered a aeries or
strikes 1n JaTa and Sumatra,

During this period Dutch and

native communists attempted to take over the labor unions
and pol1t1cal.aociet1es.

Within the span

or

a tow years

they were able to secure the positions of leadership 1n.
local chapters of Sarekat IalamJ however, they were defeated

1n their attempt to take over control of the central leaderah1p

or

the party.

In 1925 the party ejected the communists

and prohibited any ot its members trom joining th~ Communist
Party.

However, this victory tor the moderato3 was a hollow

one; .the power ot tho leaders ot .[arekat Islam had been
completely undermined and tho party never regained it~ former
proatige or mambersh1p,25

-

25For

a history or Indonesian pol1t1ca, see G. McT,
Kahin, ''Indonesian Pol1t1ca and Nationalism," pp. 73-196, in
As1en Nationalism end the West, edited by w. L. Holland.
Mr. Kahln deals with a-atueyo.r major Indonesian political
organizations and their programs up to the transfer or
sovereignty in part one or his article, In part two he
covers
the pol1t1cnl.
developments since thG transfer ot
sovereignty
to May, 1952.

l5

A.rter their expulsion

rrom

the party, the doctrinaire

radicals and communists went into the labor union movement
end organized a rival society to SArekat Isla~.

In addition

to the rival soc1ety1'which was called Sarekat Rayat Merah
(Red Proletariat League), the comr.mn1st leaders organized
a Red Trade Union Secretariat £or Indonesia and this
organization was apparently art111ated •1th the headquarters

or. the

Red Trado Union International at Moscow. Communist

activity caused a series

or

bitter •trikes and culminated in

a number-or simultaneous armed and violent disturbances
in Java and Sumatra.in November, 1925, and again in J~nuary,
1927. · The Dutch, now convinced that· the radical trend in
the nationalist movement was communist inspired, took steps
to repress such movements by establishing an internment camp
in the heart o~ New Guinea and by deporting to this camp
over a -'thousand communists and their ·.rami11es ... It aeems to
be quite probable that the suppression of the communist
outbreaks definitely ended that trend in the nationalist
movement which'sought atter and hoped tor aid 1'rom foreign
sources.· Since 1927 the nationalist movement baa thrown

otr outside 1n£luences and has aasu11»d a more purely nationalist character.26
Another phase ot the nationalist movement mant.tested
1tselt in the establishment

or

so-called "wild schools"J

these schools were nn1nta1ned by nationalist groups rather

-

than

·by

the government.

·

The sponsor• ·quite underatandably

16
refused
government aid in order . to. remain
t:ree from ott1c1al
.
. ~ ..
'

regulation.

The object

or

the nationalists in establishing

these ac~ools was to provide a strongl7 Indonesian, nationalistic training tor the people or the islands and to
raise.the levol ot developmont ot tho masses. Quite obviously,
students pla7ed leading rolos in the development and maintenance ot this movement •
. _Closely allied to this movement, 1n spirit at least.
was the establishment ot study groups by Indonesian 1ntellec~uals during tho m1d-1920•s tor the purpose ot discussing
~octal and political questions.

Some ot these clubs developed

in~o new pol1t1cal.pn.rt1ea and acquired large memberships.
Probably the.most prominent ot ~hese_ was the Bandung Study
Club which, in 1927, became the Parta1 Nasional Indonesia;
the fir.s.t leader

or

.this party ~as Sukarno, Who became the

Prosident ot_ the Republic ot ~ndonesia two decades later.
The basic principle of the party waa embodied in a policy
non-cooperation with the Dutch; the party's roothod

or

or

achieving its ends was largely built around nat1onal1at1c
mass action.

In the latter months ot 1929 the nationalist movement
again threatenod .to go over to violence, and the GovernorGeneral was forced to take action against the nationalists.
As a result, the Netherlands Government dissolved the Parta1
,!!&!1onal Indonesia in that year and arrested Sukarno, who
waa then interned on the island or Flores and later at
Benkoelen on Sumatra.

In addition to Sukarno, the Nether-

lands Government arrested and prosecuted several more leaders

ot the party.

17
Thia prosecution rosulted in the ejection ot

the Parta1 Nasional ·Indonesia trom the realm ot political

activity, at least tor the time being.27
In December, 1928,·the nJajor political parties,
largely through the ettorts ot the leaders ot the Parta1
Naston&\_·Indonesia,

were organized ·into a federation ot

nationalist societies.

However, by the SUmIIJ)r

or

1930 a

major breach had developed between the Parta1 Sareknt Islam

and the other tmmber ·a0ciet1es or the federation which were
religiously neutral.

The dispute became so bit~er that

toward the end ot 1930 the Islamic soo1ety decided to
withdraw from the tederation.20
The rapid rise ot the nationalist movement in the
East Indies produced
circles.

a

very de.t1n1te reaction 1n European

In 1929 this reaction manitoated itselt 1n the

organization ot the Vaderlandsche £.!!!!?.which championed
the interests ot the European population in the East Indies
and also maintained the belief in the 1nv1olab111ty ot the
empire.

In 1932 the nationalist leader in the Vol~raad

announoed'that the nationalist coalition had changed its
objective t'rom the creation ot an autonomous Indonesia to
tho creation ot an independent Indonesia.29

p. 83.

27vandenbosch, .21?• cit., in L.A.

Milla, 2.2• ,ill.,

28vandonbosoh, .21?• ..Q.!!., pp. 328-~30.
29

Ibid., pp. 333-~34.
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Aa a generalization,

it mo.y be said that the nation-

alist movement experienced a definite slowing down atter
This was caused, tor the most part, by two conditions.

1930.

The first was the depression which gravely attected the
economy

or

the islands as 1t did the rest of the world.

The depression made nationalist activity extremely dii'ficult
to carry on because or the lack of funds.

The second

•

condition was tho vigorous repressive measures which the
Eaat Indies Government invoked against the revolutionary
tendencies

or

nationalist activities.

This action,

or

course,

operated to koep many natives trom joining nationalist
societies tor tear ot repr~sals, .However, by the m1d-l930'a
the moveioont had been revived, but on a cooperative rather'
than a revolutionary bas1a.

The rise

.or

taso1am and national

socialism abroad, and.particularly the. ever-growing threat
ot Japan, had
not gone unnoticed by the nationalist leaders;
..
consequently, they began to see the advantages of cooperating
with the Dutch.30
In m1d·l936, however, the hopes ot the moderate

nationalists tor evolutionary self-government received a
sot-back.

In 1936 a majority ot the Volksraad ho.d passed a

resolution calling tor a ooni'erence to bo convened to discuss
plans tor the evolutionary development toward aelt-government
tor the Indies over a ten-year period Within the limits

or

the existing Dutch Constitution •. The Netherlands Government

-

rejected this propoeal and 1n doing so d1s1llus1oned a number
30vandonboach,

pp. 83-84.

.22• ,ill.,

in L. A. Mills, .21?•

ill••
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ot'Indone1ian1 who had previously maintained that a policy
or·moderat1on and cooperation with the.Dutch prOT!ded a sure,
if.slow, road toward self-government. ·Had not the threat

or

Fascism been so imminent, a str~ngly militant nationalism
niight have developed,· Faced with the existing situation,

the Ger!ndo, a new-party which had been rormed in l9J7 and
had gained power rapidly to become the powerful lett-w1ng
of.the nationalist movement, g~nerally cooperated with the
Dutch,but;tm.de clear that it cooperation.between Holland
and Indonesia ae;a1nst'Faso1sm waa to be et.foctive, it must
be on the.baa1a or equality,31
In'February, 1940, the Volksraad passed the W1woho
0

Reaolution'call!ng once again

fO'!-

selt-government within

the .framework of· the· ~letherlands Cons ti tut1on,
resolut1on·proposed expanding the membership
making department heads

or

or

This
the Volksraad,

the Netherlands Indies Government

responsible to this body, r.nd a revising of the powers ot
the Governor-General. 'The reply

or

the Netherlnnds Govern-

ment, Tbich was not received 'until three months after the·
German occupation

or

the Netherlands had taken place, stated

that its 'general attitude was that

no

political reforms c'ould

be considered until post-w&.l' restoration ot the mother
countt'1ts eovettnment had·taken place,

Shortly atter the

rejection ot the Wiwoho Resolution the Netherlands Government

-not1tied the Volksraad,

1n answer to a question trom that

. ~~a.1952.
T. Kah1n, . Nationalism
pp, 95-96,

.!ill!! Revolution.!!!

Indonesia,
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bod7, t.bat'the acceptance b1 the Netherlands or the Atlantic
Charter, which contained a pledge ot the right ot aelt•
determination tor all people, 1n no way arreoted the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia.
These two action• on the part ot the Netherlands
Government re1ulted in a rapid break-down

or

the Indoneaian-

Dutoh solidarity •h1ah had been·created by th• threat
Faaoiam. ·While a small number

or

or

1ntluential leaders or the

nationaliat movement remained convinced ot the evils ot
Paac1am, the7 were not able to check the growing conviction
ot the maasea that a Japanese invasion would actuall7 mean
the liberation ot the islands.

Consequentl7, when the

Japanoae did invade 1n February and March or 1942, the7 were
generall7 received with enthuaiaam.32.
During the t1rat tew months or occupation, the
Japanese operated under the illusion that the7 would
encounter no real ditticult7 with the nationalist leaders
and that the1, therefore, could exploit the countr1 to
the benefit ot Japan•a war ettort without making an1
concessions ·to Indonesian nationalism~· However, economic
exploitation and the rrequent brutality ot the Japaneae in
-

their dealing• with the Indonea1ana began to break down the
original enthusiasm and to replace it witn a strong antagonism.

By the end

or

1942 a rew srmll-scale insurrections had broken

out so that the Japanese began to realize that Indonesian
nat1onal1am waa a real· and power!\U. toroe with which some sort
32Ib1d., pp. 98-102.
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ot modus vivendi would have to be reached it they expected
to.achieve even the minimum aims or their occupation.
Consequently, the Japanese got in contact with the nationalist
leaders. in an attempt to secure popular support tor Japan's
war.ertorta.

The Japanese promised that self-government

would be.granted in tm~near. tuture e.nd, on 9 March 194:5,·

sanctioned the creation of an all-1nclua1ve nationalist
organization, known as . the Poetera •.. While the Japanese
considered the Poetera pr1mar111 as a means

or

securing

popular support tor.their war ettort, the nationalist leaders
used it ch!etly as an instrument tor spreading end.1ntensity1ng nationalist feelings among the.masses and tor securing
concessions toward aelt-governme~t t~om the Japanese.

The

nationalist leaders used the Poetera primarily to work toward
their.own long•term nationalist aims, and onl1 secondarily
to achieve the Japanese war a1as.

There seems to be little

doubt that the act1v1t1ea ot this organization resulted in
an increased political consc1ousne1s among the Indonesian
masses, particularlr in regard to their desire tor.independence.33
'"
33see
Australian Pape~ No. l, Dependencies~
Trusteeship !n the Pacific Area; this paper was prepared by
a study group o'f°'the Au3tral1an Institute ot International
Affairs in 1947. This group noted that "the Indonesian
nationalists who collaborated with the Japanese in putting
up the false tacade used the opportunity to strengthen the
foundations or a stronger policy directed ultimntelr
against both Japanese and Dutch." This paper deals with
colonial policy nnd economic development, problems or
aas1m1lat1on, Asiatic nationalism, and the effect or the
Japanese occupntion upon the varioua independence movements
ot Southeab~ Asia.
.
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In September, 1943, a Japanese trained, Indoneaianotticered military organization, known as the!.!!!• was
established to help the Japanese detend Indonesia against
Allied invasion. At the peak ot its strength, which waa
reached in the middle ot 1945, the ..............
Peta numbered about
120,000 armed men.

It waa·the Peta wb.1oh formed the backbone

ot the army ot the Republic ot Indonesia.
B1 the end ot 1943 the Japanese realized that the
Poetera was ••rving the purposes ot the Indonesian nationalists
to a tar greater extent than it was the Japanese war ettort.
Consequently, they dissolved the Poetera and in its place,
on 1March1944,

set up a new organization, DJawa Hokoka!,

which was :maintained compulaor1ly. Thia organization did
not •in popular support, nor did an all-inclusive Islamic
organization which was created aubsequentl7.
In m1d·l944 the Japanese established an organization
tar educated young men from about twent7 to thirty years ot
age Which was closely controlled.

Indonesians suspected

or

underground act1v1t1es were forced to assume positions ot
leadership in this organization: in this way the Japanese
hoped to curtail the activities
leaders.

or

the major Indonesian

However, in October, 1944, arter Premier Koise•a

announcement that Indonesia would be granted its independence
1n the very near future, Japanese policy underwent a change.
The Japanese army relaxed its controls over the Hokokat and
nationalist leaders were allowed to talk ot independence to

a

rar

greater extent, and were required to in.ruse loss

pro-Japanese sentiments in their speeches.

In late 1944

three Indonesians were appointed as residents in Java '2nd
Madura and in tho remaining rGs1denc1es
Incones1an sub-re31denta were appointed.

or

these two islands

In actuality these

residencies were administered by the Indon3s1an sub-residents
rather than by the Japanese.residents.
On 1tYarch1945

the Japanese sanctioned tho establ1Si-

ment or the In~~st.1gat1ng c.omm1ttee to?' the PI'eparat1on of
Independence ror Java and Madura,
committee .was.set up on Sumatra.

On 25 July 1945 a similar
On 17August1945,

two daya

after the Japanese had accepted the Potsdam Agreement as a
baais ror surrender, Suknrno and llattn met With the mombora
or the Prep~ator1 ~omm1ttee ~~ dr~w up a declaration of
1ndopendonce.
Attar some .discussion, the
text was decided
.
upon nnd the contents ot the declaration were broadcast over
. ..
,
.
the entire Indonesian radio a~d tel~graph network. The
Indonesian nationalist movement was once more in tho open
and moving towards its goo.l

-

or

independence.34

CHAPTER II
THE REVOLUTION
tTP 'l'O

THE LINGGADJATI AGREEMENT
On 29 September 1945 British troops landed in

Batavia to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces in
.. ·

accordance w1 th th~ provision!! or the Potsdam Aereemnt

and

to releas~i Allied prisoners e.nd personnel interned on the
.

,

,

islands.· Several weeks prior to this, however; on 3 Soptember,
'

~

Lord Louis Mountbatten, "Allied Commander for the Southeast
Pao1f1e Area, had charged

. duty or
the Japanese with the
;

tna1nta1n1ng law and.order as.well as" the duty' ot ma1~ta1n1ng
>

ti.>

I

the status guo pending
- ·1

,

~ •

'

I

the arrival of British troops.

In

•

implementation of this order, Mountbatten also ordered the
Japanese forces t.o disband the Republic of Indonesia which
had bocn proclaimed on 17 August 1945.

By the time that

this order was issued, however, the Republic was a functioning,
if untested, organization; in addition, Japanese arms had
been cr~ite widely distributed amon~ the population ~nd, as
a consequence, extremists and lawless ele~nts

had secured

arms along with the rest of the nativea.l

1nro~kings, Institution, Major Problems of United

.§.tates Foreign

Pol1c:r, 1949-50,
24

.

pp.

359-360.

-
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·

In general, the rapid establishment ot the Republican

Government ma7 be attributed to the tact that the Japaneae
were convinced (and the eloquent arguments ot newly-elected
President Sukarno materially aided in strengthening this
conv1ot1on) that any attempt to halt or auppresa the
nat1onal1at1o independence movement and the rise ot the new
government would inevitably lead to a bloody struggle.
While the Japanese might have won the right, such a victor;y
would have been achieved only at the cost

or

heavy caaualitiea,

Consequently, the Japanese attempted to avoid a direct clash
with the Indonesian revolutioni1ts1 aa a result, their policy
prior to the. arrival ot Allied troops waa one characterized
by uncertainty and e ompromiae.

While the Japanese did take

vigorous atepa toward stopping· the'.·growth ot Indonesian
m111ta17 power they were unable·to halt the mas3 movement ot
civilian

1'unct1onar1ea

The latter

to the serv1cetf o.f'the Republic.

situation was, o.f oourae, due to the tact, noted

in the previous chapter; that Indoneaiana had been installed
aa residents and sub-residents on the islands

or

Java end

Madura prior to the Japanese surrender at Potsdam.2
While the British rorces came to the Indies tor only
....

:

two major purposes, both pr1mar111 military

in nature

( (1) accepting the •urrander·or, disarming, and repatriating
some 2831000 Japanese troops and (2) liberating over 200,000
Dutch and Allied prieonera of war and internee•) it rapidly
that these aims could not
-became apparent
2
'
Ks.h!n, .21?• cit., pp. 138-139.

be achieved without

26

dealing with the pol1t1oal situation in the islands.
Britain was raced on the one hand by a nationalistic reeling
among the Indonesians which could easily become a militant
moyement and on the other by the danger that British support
or the as yet unrecognized Republic would almost certainly
alienate Holland and perhaps provoke her opposition to
Britain in the United Nations Security Counc11.3
Aa it turned out, the attempts ot the British to

maintain a neutral policy. in respect

or

the political

relations ot these two groups, had the temporary etteot ot
antagonizing both aides.

The Dutch round the British policy

toward the Indonesian leaders to be highly objectionable,
Immediately upon his arrival 1n Batavia• Lieutenant General
Sir P.A. Christison; Commander ot the Allied Forces in the
Netherlands East Ind1ea·(A.F.N.E.I.), 11aued a proclamation
stating that he intended, tirst, to aak the present party
leadera tor their support and, second, 1n view of the
extremel7 limited numbe~ ot Br1t1sh troops in the Nether-

lands East Indies, to allow the preaent Indonesian leaders
and authorities to retain respons1b111t7 tor the government
1n areas under their control.

This proclamation waa galling

to the Dutch because ot the implied recognition of Indonesian
authorities and part1 members Which it carried.

The Dutch,

ot course, did not want any type ot recognition to be extended,
either ott1c1ally or unott1c1ally.4
3charles Wolte; Jr.,
4Ib1d., p. 19.

!h! Indonesian Storz, pp. 18-19.
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The Indonesians, at t1rst,.d1d not oppose the landing
ot Brit1ah·troops and, following the landings, cooperatsd
with the British by running the civil adm1n1strat1on, public
utilities, and

by

maintaining law and order.

When Dutch and

Ambonese troops, which had been interned on the islands
during the war were released and attached to the Dutch
contingent ot A.F.N.E.I., the nationalist leadors 1mmed1atel7
~emanded that no new Dutch troops ahould be permitted to land
,until the Republic .had been recognized.

However, 1n the

early part ot October, 1945, two small companies

or

Dutch

volunteer combat troops landed and .they wore followed by
personnel ot the hated Netherlands Indies Civil Administration.
This action immediately touched ott a heated condemnation ot
British policy by_the Indonesian leaders because the arrival
ot Dutch ~roopa had been authorized b7 the Br1tish.5
. To add to the grav1t7 ot the ~ituation, the British,
prior to the landing of.Dutch troops, had stated that Netherlanda law would be applied and enforced by Netherlands
administrative officers.

Purther, General Christison declared

thnt_Japaneae. troops would be uaed on a temporary basis to
maintain law and order.

The Republican leaders oont1nuall7

warned the Br1t11h that the situation, pe.rticularly atter the
landing

or

new Dutch troops, was.becoming cr1t1ca1.6 •In

addition to the mere presence ot Dutch troops, the aot1v1t1ea

-

ot these troops further incensed the population.
5Ib1d~, P• 20,

6Kah1n, .21?. ,ill. , p. 142 •

Following
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or

the arrival ot the,Dutch General van Oyen, a number

"incidents" occurred which were caused by "trigger-hapPJ"
patrols ot Dutch and Ambonese troops.

Then too, the

nationalists wore informed that any ou~break on their part
would be dealt with immediately by.the occupying authoritie1.7
·These eleJrBnts ot dissension operated to convince
the Indonesians that tho1r.1ndependenoe was being threatened,
Thia apprehension on the part or the nationalists culminated
in armed attackes

upon Dutch and British patrols and an

1ntens1t1od ottort to secure more arms trom the Japanose.8
On 4 ?lovenb er 1945, l3r1gad1or I;fallaby, the Br! tish.

commander who had been negotiating with local Indonesian
authorities, was killed 1n Surebaya.

The British dld not

havo su.!"t1c1ont .troop strength to undertake immecllate
retaliatory action.~

On

9 November hcmever, Genero.l Mansergh,

who had succeeded Mallaby, ordered

the Indonesians

to surrender

their nrrns or the British would take offensive action against
them tor the purposo ot establishing law and order,

This

action was 1n1t1atod tho following do.y as it was evident
that

the ultimatum would not be complied with by .the

irregular arnod bands which were responsible tor the terror.
The resulting Battle ot Surabaya co3t the British several
hundred casunl1t1es (which included casual1t1es among Indian
troops); however, sev~ral thousand of tha irregular nationalist

1!arpar1s,

7p. E. Crockett, "How the Trouble Began in Java."
Vol. 192, March, 1946, P• 281.
8Kahin,

.22•

ill•,

p. 144.
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troops were kill~d.

In Bandwig British losses were smaller

becauso of the larger concentration ot British troops
there.9
As n part of the plan of battle against the Indonesian
extremists, the Allied Command ordered Japanese troops, under
Japanese co.mmnnders, to attack and recapture Indonesian-held

cities.
.,

Thia action not only increased the 111-teeling

which the Indonesians held against the British and Dutch,

of

but also brought a storm
world,10

protest trom the rest ot th•

The Battle ot Surabaya served notice on the British
that unless they were w1111n8 to undertake a major military
campaign.in Indonesia, .they- would have to· establish some
sort of a modus vivendi with the leaders

or

the Republic.

Consequentl7,
the British began to assume an unfavorable
·.'
attitude toward the Dutch rerusal to doal with the Republic
and the1 applied pressure on.the ·Dutch to negotiate some
sort or a peaceful comprom13e.ll
With tho beginning
began to improve:

.

On 10

or

the new 1eo.r the situation

FebruS.Z.,. 1946 the Lieutenant

Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies, at'ter a
-,

'

trip to Holland, began a new series ot discussions with the
Indonesian del~gat~o~, which was headed-by tho Republican

Prime M1nlater,'Sj~1r,

The Dutch.had.agreed to negotiate

~olr,
za- ill~· pp. 22-23.
lCL
,
.
-Aah1n, JU?• oit,, pp. 144-145.

lltbid.
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even though they atill refused to·accept Sukarno and Hatta
because ot their "collaboration" with the Japanese during the
war.12 ' 1:
. ;,
' .
'.

United

Nations Action

·t,

j

The situation in Indonesia was first brought to the
attention or the Security ~ounc.11 at. the second meeting or
that body ~ on 25. . January 1946.
.
'

At thia meting

the .President

or the Security Council brought to the notice or the Council
a cornmun1cation trom the head or the delegation

or

the

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic dealing with the
situation in Indonas1a; the item was then included on the
agenda.ls

.

The above-mentioned communication was brought up
tor discussion at the 12th 1r0et1ng
1946.

or

the Council on 7 Pebl9UarJ'

At tho.t time the Ukrainian representative, after

citing various newspaper reports as support tor his contention
. l2wo1r, ~·cit., PP• 23-24.
13seeur1tt Council, Oft1e1al Records, First Year:
First Series, Number l, From the ~Irst Meeting (17 January
1946) to the Twenty-Third Meeting (16 February 1946).
pp. 15-19. This letter, which was dated 21Janunry1946,
atated that military operations had been directed against
the Indonesian population tor a number or months and, that
1n addition to regular British troops. "Japanese enemy .
forces•• were also being used· 1n the operation. The Ukrainian
Government was ot the opinion that this situation constituted
a threat to the ma1ntenance·or international peace and
aecur1t1 as described in Article ~4 or the Charter. that the
Security Couno1l should carry out necessary- investigations,
and that appropriate measures should be takon to put an end
to the situation. (Securitt Council, Official. Records, First
Yeari First Series, Supplement Number 11 Annex 4, P• 76.
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that a dangerous situation existed, leveled tho chnrge at
the United Kingdom that British troops, along with Japanese
contingents, were being used to suppress Indonesian nationalists.
The Ukrainian delegate did not question the right ot British
troops to be 1n Indonesia, but he !lllintained th.at their use
"tor the suppression ot the national movement ot the
Indonesian people io 1nadrnissible.n

Mr. Manuilsky then

stated that tho appropriate thing tor the Secur1t7 Council
to do, with the Indonesian quoat1on at its present stage,
would be to create a special comm1as1on tor the. purpose ot
conducting an on-the-spot 1nvest1eat1on mid re-establ1sh1ns
the·peace.14

In answer to this chnrge the Dritish representative,

Mr. Bevin, pointed out that, because of an inadequate
1ntoll1genee service, tho British had sent only a limited
rorce to Indonesia.

ne·rurther st&ted that the British,

when the7 arrived in: Jl:lva nnd Surabs.y-a, never 1'1red a shot,
but were tired upon end somo British soldiers were killed.
lfr.

Bevin then pointed out that Genoral Vi.a.llaby- had been

assassinated while he was o1gning a truco with the leaders

or

tho nat1onnl1st ~ovement; such action (retarrins to the

tl>uce) could hardly bo construed in such a mnnner ns to support
the contention that British military authorities were attacking the Indoneatan movot1ent. Ile olosed by observing that,
in his opinion, it tho United Nations wished to help settle

-

the problem in Indone1ia, the proper approach would not be

178.

l4sacurtt1 Council, orrtcial Records, op. olt,, pp. 174-
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to send another connn1ss1on there, but rather to urge the
parties alread7 in negotiation "to bend their energies to
etrect a settlemont.nl5
1.ht. van Klettens ot the Netherlands, a.t'ter noting

the commission ot a number ot atrocities in the islands,
deolare·d that the action of British troops could not ra1rl;y
be termed to be a "mil1tar;y action", but was rather 1n the·
nature .ot police protection.

The Netherlands delegate

maintainod that no s1tuo.t1on existed in Indonesia which
endangered international peace, that no dispute existed,
and consequently, that no case existed with which the
3ecur1t;y Council was competent to deal because the matter
was a domeatio issue .la ·
_-, At the following meeting on 9 Februar;y 1946 the

'Ukrainian representative reiterated his charges concerning
the·use ot British and Japanese troops as instruments for
suppressing Indonesian nationalism.

or

his delegation, that the principle

He insisted, on behal.r

or

self-determination

Which is embodied in the Charter be-applied to the people or
Indonesia and he requested once again that a special· comm!asion
be created.17
The Br1t1ah representative maintained that Holland
was the recognized sovereign power 1n Indonesia and consequentl;y
tho Indonesian situation constituted an internal matter with

-Which the Security Council was not competent to concern itaelr.
15

Ib1!!·, pp, 178-182.

16Ib1d.,
17Ib1d

PP• 182-187.

-··

pp. 188-193.

He declared that any other troatment ot the problem would

set a precedent which would have repercussions over a very
Wide f1elde

out that

at

Du.ring the course Of his speech he pointed

or Ministers of Foreign At'fa1rs he

the Council
.

'

·,'

had "suggested an enquiry into the troubles in Bulgaria and
.

'

Roumania" but that the Soviet Government had stated "that
they were sover~ign Powers and it was declines."

Mr. Dov1n

believed that the sana principle.was applicable in this caae.18
The Netherlands delegate

o.losed the session with a

speech in which he questioned the Ukrainian delegate's
reforonce to a "one-sided" war.

He stated that, to tha best

ot h1a knowledge·, tha nativo toroes included approximately

ao,ooo

also

men who were well-armed and equ1pp9d.
•• t

ata~d

.rea.t.ftrmed his

...

'

that

the Br! t1ah troops were not

engaged in' a at1"1iggle··w1·th
the Indonuian
.

.. .

:

,

. .

-

.

I

Mr. van Kleffens

..

.

.

people but, rather,

. '

.

were concerned with subduing armed bands Which were attempting
to prevent Allied., ro.rcea tro~ carrying out their. orders .19

The next day at the 14th meeting ot the Council,

Mr. Vyshinsky, head ot the USSR delegation, supported the
Ukrainian oral proposal far the creation ot a special
investigating committee.

He maintained that

the rebuttals

ot the British and Netherlands delegations were not supported
by fact.

The Soviet delegate suggested that British, and to

a lesser extent Dutch, opposition to the investigating

-

COmm1sa1on was based upon the fact that botb or these countries

-··

lBib1d

pp. 193·196.

l9rb1d., PP• 196-198.
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have special business interests 1n Indonesia.

In conclusion

Mr. Vyahinsky stated that the use or Japanese troops was a
direct breach

or

the agreement which had been reached b7

the Alliea, under which General MacArthur issued the order
for Japanese troops. to surrender uncondit1 onally and be
diaarmed.20
The 15th meeting of the Security Council, also held
on 10 February, brought nothing new in so tar as the various
attitudes ot the members wero concerned.

Mr. Bevin merely

re-stated the tact that British commanders had been in contact
with Sukarno in an attempted cone111at1on before trouble
broke out between the Indonesians and British troops, while

Mr. Van ltlettena again acknowledged that military action
.

was being carried on in Indone•ia. but denied·that it was
being directed against the Indonesian nationalist movement
as such; it was, according to Mr. Van IQettens, being
directed against extremists over whom the nationalists, by
their own admission, had little controi.21
On 11February1946,

the delegate representing the

Ukrainian SSR, atter some debate upon his authority to do
so, submitted a resolution calling tor the establishment ot
a commission composod ot representatives or the United
States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands.

-

This commission would carry out an on-the-spot

investigation in order to get a ractual picture of the
20Ib1d., pp. 199-209.
21rb1d., pp. 216-219.
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situation in Indonesia end it would then report to the
Security Council on the result or its work.22
Following the introduction ot the Ukrainian resolution,
the delegate repl'eeentating the United·states, Mr. Stettinius,
stated

that,

1n view ot the tact that negotiations

were

already being carried on between the Netherlands Government
and-the Indonesian leaders, the beat hope tor settlement
would lie 1n the prompt mid succeastUl. completion ot such
negotiations.

'Consequent1,.., the-Council should take no

action wh1oh would introduce new·. complications

which, 1n

turn, -, might prejudioe or retard the completion

or

the

negotiations, 'In the opinion ot tho United Statoa delegation
the· appointment

or

a oc;·,.1aston such as the one propOsed b7

the Ukrainian delegate Would have·the'arorementioiied 8rrect.

Mr. Stett1n1us added; somewhat parentheticall1, that' the
general view ot tha United States 1n regard to any tactrtnding or 1nvest1gating commissions which might be created
by the Council was that such bodies should be composed ot

impartial. porsons chosen on the basis

or· tho1r

competence

and Who would repreaent the Security Couno11 as an international. bod7 rather·th411 their individual CQ.llltries.

The·

United Statea representative closed by saying that he
believed it Would be appropriate ror the Council to express
the hope that the disarmament and repatriation
troops might be promptly carried out.23

-

or

Japanese

.

· In general, the USSR, Mexico, and Poland were in
favor of sending the comm!asion to Indonesia.

The representa-

tive or the United Kingdom flatly declared that "he would
re.ruse to be a party to the commiasion."

The Netherlands

representative· ·maintained his view that he would not oppose
creating a comm1es1on Which would deal only with the question
ot the conduct of British troops 1n Indonesia, but that he
would refuse to accept a comm1as1on "which would busy itselr
with ·matters w1 thin domestic 'jur1sd1ot1on."24

On 12 February the Egyptian delegate submitted a
proposal, at the 17th meeting of the Council, stating, in
ettect, th.tit under no circumstances should British troops be
. '

used against the·Indonesian nationalist movement.

It urged

that the Br1t1ah troops be withdrawn t"rom Indonesia as soon
aa their strictly limited objectives were aocompl1ahed.
The.resolution also declared that the Council •1ahed to be
1ntorimd ot the results or the negot1at1ona being carried on
between the Indonesians

and the Netmrlands

Government.

The

Council, ot course, reserved the right to take such further
action

as

it might deem necessary and proper.25

The Indonesian question was considered tor the last
time in 1946 on 13 Februa17 at the 18th moet1ng
At that meeting the Ukrainian proposal

or

tho Council.

was put to a vote and

it was rejected as there were onl~ two votes in favor
rneaaure.

or

the

The representat1Ye ot:the USSR then submitted an

24yearbook.2,! !!'.!!..United Nations, 1946-47, p. 340.
25secur1tz Council, Official Records, .2.2•

.!?.!!••

p. 251.

.
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AJllendment to tho Egyptian proposal calling tor the creation
and dispatch of a comm1ss1on which would be composed of
representatives ot China, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
the United States, and the USSR.' Thia amendment was defeated
With onl1 Mexico, Poland, and the USSR voting in tavor ot
it.· The Egyptian proposal itselt was then put to a vote and
it was also rejected as only two repreaontatives voted.26
'As stated abova, in February, 1946, d1acuaa1ona were
opened between the Indonesian delegation and the Dutch
Lieutenant Governor General,. However, 1n addition to thia
peacet'ul attempt to reach a solution, the Dutch also employed
the ••rvicea or the now notorious Captain Westerling and
ordered him to •pacJ.1'7• the areas 1n rebellion against the
Dutch,

Republican reports and thoae ot the Diitch d1t[;'er a

groat deal aa to the number or caaualitiea intlioted b7
Westerling,

Republican authorities asserted that nearl1

30,000 Indonesians, civilians as well as guerrillas, were
executed b7 his tiring squads, or otherwise killed,

On the

other hand, orttcial·Dutch sources reported that only 4,000
were killed.

While tho Netherlands Government did appoint a

commtasion to.look into the r..llegad brutalitiaa ot Dutch
troops, no report waa ever published.27
Although, aocording to the C1v11 Administration
Agreement ot 28 August 1945, the Supreme Allied Commander or

-the re-ocouP1ing rorcea was authorized to exercise tinal
26Jb1J!,,

pp. 257-263.

27vA~1
l
"\.CU" n, .21?. c 1 t , , p • 45 • ·

.

local a~thor1ty over all branches
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ot the Netherlanda Ind!ea

Government 1n matt~rs ot a military nature, .the Dutch
Lieutenant Governor General retained

h1s position as the

top authority .in purel;y civil natters.
were required

Bia actions, however,

to contorm to m111tacy ordera.

The British·

.
.
.
Commander-in-Chief
waa empowered to 1ntorm the Dutch Lieutenant

Governor General IVhen and the extent to which the mllitar;y
situation would allow responsibility tor the civil ~dm1n1atrat1on to be ~eaumed by the Netherlands Indies Government.
Conaequentl;y, aa the mllitar;y oituatlon became relativel;y .
quiet in 1946, the Dutch Civil Administration

was authorized

to a~s~ an inc~eaaed scope ot responsibility, although
remaining ~ltimately re~pons1ble to the orders
in-Chiet".ot

,or

the Comnander-

A,F.N.E.z.28

.. As.a result

or

the •1tuat1on noted above, by Jul7,

.
~. tho
- . . . Dutch .had almo~t
.
. comi:>le·t~ly
.
1946,
re-establi1hed
1

their

control and authority in Borneo, the Celebes, and the islands
east ot Java.

With
the return. or. tho.Dutch
to these areas,
..
.
'

~,

economic rehab111tat1on was undertaken and, in general,
progressed quite .rap1dl;r~~9 , ..

- ----- -----The Mal!no Conterence

In July 1946 a conference between the Dutch and
representatives ot the islands east or Java~

-

the Dutch

As

area known to

the Outer Ialanda--waa convened in Malino 1n the

.

28woit, .2.I!• o1t., P• 24.
29nrook1ngs

Institution, .21?• cit •• p. 360.

.
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Celebes.
.

'

The purpose ot this conterenoe, which had been

.. .

.

'

'.

.

0

summoned by Dr. van Mook, who at· that·t1me was Lieutenant
Governor General ot Netherlands India, waa the inauguration
. . ,
.~ .
ot some term ot representative government in the Outer Island.a.
,_

;.

....

"'\

Prior to·th1s time this area had been under direct or indirect
Dutch adm1n1str.at1on.~0
The results ot this conference were embodied in three
principal decisions Wh1°ch wero unan1moUsly.adopted.

The first

ot these called tor the organization· or a United Indonesia,
to be kliovm as Sarekat

Indonesia, on a federal basis.

Thia

tederat1on.waa later to be expanded to include both Java and
.

-

·,

Sumatra.

.

.

.

The second decision called for the r.a1ntenance ot

lasting cooperation between Indonesia ~d

the Nethorlands.

The final dec1a1on stated th&.t·aelt-government was to be'·
88tabl1shed within &11 ot the component units ot the tederat1oii,
The tirat.and·third decisions ~onst1t~te ·at least partial·
evidence·
or the tear telt b;r the Outer Terr1torieo
that the:r
~
.
.

.-

and.their interests would be subordinated
.

•

'

I

to those or Java

.

and Sumatra in a United Indonosia established on an1 basis
other than that or federalism.

It was tor these reasons that

Dr. van Mook, in his opening speech at ita11no completely end
deliberately rejected the idea held by the Republic of a
.

~°narbo.ra Whittingham-Jones, "The ira11no Conference

and After,," ,Ih! Asiatic Review, Vol. XLII, October, 1946,

P• 371. MJ.:u Whittinghal!l-Jones, 1n d1acus11ng the Outer
Islands, etates that tho feeling of nationalism in that area
1a as deep and sturdy as that round in Java. However, the
nationalism ot the Outer Islands is leas doctrinaire than
its counter-part in Java and hence !a more realistic. The
leaders from the Outer Ialands si;nc1t1call1 acknowledged the
necessity ot cooperating with the Dutch, at least during the
interim period prior to the transter ot sovereignty.

.
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unitarr State which would be ruled from Java.

It was also

at least partially because ot the Republican ideal ot a

unitary- state that the Nstherlnnds considered the Republic
to be composed ot radicals with whom negotiation was veryd1tt1oult.
In regard to the nature ot the relationship which
Would exiat between Indonesia Sarekat and the Netherlands,
the conference
drew up a torma1 resolution
which declared
.
.
.
that this relationship should be described and detined in
.

,

.

.

.

a atatutei this statute would alao include provisions tor
!

•

:.

.

•

the .establishment ot separate constitutions tor the Netherlands and tor.Indonesia. Another resolution was concerned
with the problem aa to whether Indonesia would remain under
.

'

Dutch
declare . herselt to . be . completely
sovereign
. . hegemony
.
. or
.
'
and. independent,
.
.
Thia problem was not solved, but a resolution
was adopted under
.,
. which a final decision on the natter was
•

•

,.

,

•

:

4

..

l

'

postponed until after.a ten-year t~ial period or period ot
transition. According to the ~esolution, during this time
United Indonesia would be able to create the necessary
Poli t1cal,

ec onom1 e , social. and cUJ.tural,

and governmental

structures and institutions which would be necessary in order
to make a "tree end independent decis1on~"31.
While the great majority ot the delegates at the
flalino Con.rerenco expressed a desire to remain within the
Dutch Emp!re·aa an·oqual partner with the Netherlands, a

-

minority maintained that the relationship should be established

.

41
by treaty rather than by statute.

This point of view waa,

ot course, almost identical with the one which was held by
the leaders of the Republlo.32
Th~ British Withdrawal
---------

On 15 October 1946 a truce was negotiatod between the
'.·

.

. l

'-

~

. ""

' .

British and the Dutch on the one hand and the Indonesians on
the othsr.

Undar ~he terms.or this truce, which waa designed

to allow the British to w!thdr~w their troops .from the islands,
lines or demarcation were established around the bridgeheads,
which now becamo Dutch tort1f1oat1ons as they had been
I

•"

Dritiah.

•

•

'

I

I

Neither side
wao to conduct
off0nsive operations
.
~
.
.

beyond these lines J however,'· in practice, both sides violated
.

.

this

part

or the agroeimnt.

...

In addition, -, the Indonesians

agreed to the ;J.anding of additional Dutch troops •. The
maximum number was sot as that ot the total number

or

Dutch

and British troops which had been in the archipolago on
'

15 October when the truce had been concluded.
with

In accordance

this provision, Br1t1s.h~.tra1ned Dutch troops arrived

until the 92,000 joint total was reached; 1n addition, the
.

;-

British turned over. their surplus war materiel to the Dutch
replacem~nts.

On 30 November 1946, the last ot the British

troops were withdrawn trom Batavia.

Consequently, A.F.N.E.I.

· 32Ib1d. Miss Whittingham·Jonea stressed the
1mportance~the
Mal1no Conference aa a step in the right
direction, an importance which does not seem to have been
borne out by later events. She gives most ot the credit
for the eucceas of the Ma.lino Conference to Dr. van Mook,
who was the guiding torce behind the Conterence.

.
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was oftio1ally disbanded and military control passed over to
the Dutch.33

Events Leadin5 !g !h! L1nggadjat1 Agreement
The negotiations between the Dutch and the Republicans,
though they were protracted, finally led to positive results.
There wero several factors which lod to the agreement between
the Republic and the Netherlands to resume negotiation early
in 1946.

Among the more prominent was the tao t that

Republican
leaders realized that their
leadership in trained
.
. .
administrative and professional personnel was very weak;
.

.

1n addition,
they knew that there
was not sutt1c1ent capital
.
.
in the country to provide tor 1ts economic developmt!nt.
'

·\:

..

...

.

' .

'

-~

' "';,'

Both
stood to gain
from a 1ettlement
. . aides realized that they
.
·,
.
'

'

-

which would ensure the maintenance
as the continuation

or

or

good relations aa well

Dutch technical and financial

aasiatance.34

The Dr1t1ah, anxious to withdraw from Indonesia
.
.
had informed the Dutch that the withdrawal of British troops
.

'

; ;

.

would be commenced by the end ot Novenber, 1946. In this
.
.
and other ways the British exerted great pressure on the
'

Netherlands
to como to an agreement w1 th the Republic. This
.. . . '
~
~ ., i ', ! ·. ::. .
pressure, combined with th& attitude or progressive Dutch
"

·'

'

,.

elexmnts toward making realistic conoeasions to the Indonesians,
led to the 1n1t1al1ng of the L1nggadjat1Agreemonton15

33wo1r,

.22•
34Brookinga

.

.!tll•, pp. 24-2~.
Institution, .21?•

November,

.!?.!!•• P• 360.
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19461 by the' Dutch Commission-General in Indonesia and the
Republ!c·~35
· ·,,
The negotiations, which had been primaril7 carried
on between Sjahrlr· and van Mo~k, were .. be~

in· earl7 1946.

However, the dlaouasions were suspended when the Schermerhorn
c~bin~t·. resigned on 21 Mar.- - Van Mook~ ot course, felt it
neceasar7 to abstain from further formal negotiations either
until

he received a ne\Y

mandate

or until the new political

l1ns-up·~nd policr in Holl~nd had been clarified. In June,
.
.
1946, an attempted coup d'etat against the SUkarno-Sjahrir
Government dela7ed-ncgot1at1ons still further.

On 2 Jul7 a

new cabinet was formed in the Netherlands Government; van Mook
then proeeeded to convene the Via.lino Conterence referred to
above • 36

On 13' August· Sukarilo 'a di: ta torship 1 ·which he had

established in order'to combat ettectivel7 t~e attempted

coup d'etat atter Sjahr!r had been kidnapped, was ended
1

.

.

and Sjahrir waa returned to tho post of Prime Minister aa
the head of a new cabinet which included three more mombers
of a atrongl7 rightist Islamic Party than its predecessor
had.
policy

The ·Islamic Party tended to favor an antagonistic
toward Dutch proposals.

On 17 August the States-

General of.the ?letherlands Government aet up a Commiasion
General to represent it in the negotiations.
:55Kah1n,
~6 .
.

sa-

.

cit.,
.

This commission

p. 196.
.

-, The resolutions reached at this conterence were
endorsed at the Pangkal PinangConrerence, which was held in
October, by European, Eurasian, Chinese, and Arab racial
m1nor1t1ea. 'Wol1', .!m• .!ll•• P• 41

••
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was given tar reaching powers to negotiate and reach an
v

•

' ..

agreement
without having to refer back to the Hague, aa
.
.

'

\

One of the most important

van : Mook
had been
required . to do.
.
.
.

events which preceded the initialing

or

the L1nggadjat1

Agreeme~t.was a trip into the interior ot Java b~

a

semi-

official Dutch m1as1on.' This
trip,
which lasted from 15
.
.
.
September to 20 SeptetJber, was
Republic.

Illlde

at the invitation

or

the

The report on conditions in the interior which

was l!E.de by Dr. P. Ji.Koeta, the chief ot van Mook's cabinet
and head or the mission, was very
. favornble. to the Republic~
Coming as 1t did on the eve or tho reswnpt1on or negotiations,
thia report was a major tactor !n creating the improved
•

•

I

•

•

•

atmosphere which prevailed at that time.37
•

.
• I

I;

~

• "

•

f

~

•

•

•

··. Though -the dra1't ·Agre.ement was initialed
·

'

•

I

it was. not ~ormall;r. ai~ed

"

,

•

•

•

··at L1nggadjat1,
,

••

.by ~he Governments o'!' the ?Tether-

.

.

lands and the ~epubl1o ot Indonesia until 25 March 1947.38

..

.....

~.

Before . it was adopted, however,
the Agreement encountered
.
,.

I

'

'

•'

sti!t
opposition
trom
both
the
Dutch Government and tho
.
;
.
·:
:
•·
.
Government ot the Republic.39
The Linggadjati Agreement (al;~ kn~
I

'

•

'

•

'-

•

.I.

.,

I

•

~

'•

•'

•

as t~8 Cheribon

'

,

AgreetnGnt)
. ' provideda
1. 'l'ho.t the ?letherlands Government recognize th9
Republic as the~ facto authority 1n Java and SumatraJ40
37werr, .21?.
3EL

-.Kah!n,

ill•,
.21?. ill•,
.

pp. 39-43.
p , 206.

39nrook1ngs Institution, .22• ~.,
p. 361.
40see Soebandrio, "De Facto Status at L1nggadjat1,"
Far Eaate?'ll Survey, Vol. XVII, February 11, 1948, p. 29.
Dr. Soebandrlo discusses tho implications ot de facto
recognition and its effect on the interim status
the
Republic.

or

••
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.

.

2• That the Netherlands and Republican Governments
cooperate toward the setting up of a sovereign democratic
federal state, tho United States or Indonesia, to
consist ot three states, the Republic or Indonesia, .
embracing Java and Sumatra, the atate·or Borneo, end
the Great East~rn StateJ
3 • That tho Netherlands and Republican Government
cooperate toward the forzmt1on ot the NetherlandsIndones1an Union, to consist of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands--including the Netherlands, Surinam, and
Curacao--and the u.s.1., which Union would have as 1ta
head the Queen of the NetherlandaJ ·
.
..
4. That the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the
u.s.1. be tormed not later than January l, 1949, and
that the Union aet up its own ageno1es tor the regulation
ot imtters or common interoat to tho member states,· ·
spec1t1oally foreign attaira; ·defense, and certain
1'1nanc1a~ and economic po11c1esJ
<

5.
Finally-, 1 the Agreement provided tor a mutual
reduction in troop strength and a gradual evacuation
ot Dutch troops trom RepublieAn areas as quickly as
possible consistent with the maintenance of law and
order, and for th• recognition by the Republic ot all
claims by 1'ore1gn nationals !'or the restitution and ·
ma1ntenanc& of the1r.r1ghts41nd properties within areas
controlled by the republio.
·
.

)

···The Agreement embodied two mjor
the cause
tions

or

~

the rap14 break-down

or

~

..

detects which were
.

Dutch-Indonesian rela-

during the pertod between· 'the co~clusion ot negotiations

in Uovamber, 1946, ·and the final ratification or the Agreement
on 25 March 1947.

The t1rat 01' these la1 in tho tact that

the Agreement referred continually to 'cooperat16n between
the two parties.

Untortwi.ately, there were strong !'actions

on both aides that were not ready for such cooperation.
Readiness tor cooperation was lacking because of a mutual
distrust in the sincerity and trustworthiness of the other.
••
•~olt, .2:2• e1t., pp. 43-44. The complete English
text or the L~ggadjatl Agreement may be found on page 175
ot this book.
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In the second place, tho Agreement called tor a federal
United States ot Indonesia which was to be composed ot
three semi-autonomous states.

This carried the implication

ot an equality ot areaa··which has 'not been, is not, and
never will be a taot.42 ·
Even at the time of the signing.~~

both

or

.the Agreement,

the parties openly placed different interpretations

upon
the
.

terms "cooperation"
and. "federal".
For the Dutch,
.
.
:

i

coopsration meant continued leadership and sole resp~1b111ty
for tho tornnt1on or the United States ot Indonesia, while
the Indonesians took. it to iman joint responsibility
and
. .
consultation in the formation ot the proposed federation.
'·

A similar d1tterence existed in the interpretation
term "federal".

or

the

The Netherlands held that it meant equal

states cooper~t1ng.w1th the\Metherlands, while the Republic
~

maintained

.

·~ ~

.

that a federal United States of Indonesia would

not deny the Republio'ita po11t1on ot superiority among.the
ialands,·based upon its superior political and economic
wealth and its maturity.4~

In view of the exiatenoe ot such

a situation, it 1a not d1tt1cult to ••e wh7 the relations
ot·the Republic and the N$therlanda·aurtered a rapid
deterioration in the months immediately following the torma.l
aigriing ot the L1nggadjat1·Agreenent.

42Ib1d~·, PP• 44-45.

_,
43Ib1d.

P• 46.

••

CHAPTER III
L!NGGADJATI TO RENVILLE
With the aig?ling ot the L1nggadjat1 Agreement on
25 March 1947, optimism pervaded tha atmosphere in Batavia.
,

.

,

'

.

This outlook waa, however, doomed to a short-lived existence.
During the two months which followed the signing ot the
Agreement alleged

violations and breaches or the "spirit
.
.
or L1nggadjat1" increased 1n n'limber, although both the
.

Netherlands Government and the Republic continued to pay
lip

service to the ·,Agreement.l
•

1

. .~

'

'I

· ~
I

oi

t

Failure 2t_ Negotiations Following L1nggadjat1
.. '.
As not8d 1n the preceding chapter, the L1nggadjat1
;

Agreement lett

\,

mny problems unsolved •. Among.the more

important ot these were_(l) the question or the power to be
exercised b7 the Crown as head of the Netherlands-Indonesian
Union, and (2) .the controversy.between the Republican and
non-Republican Indonesians.

New diaputee arose concerning

tho trade and commerce restr1ot1ona imposed on Indonesia by
the Dutch and tho.presence of Dutch troops on Republican
terr1tory.2
lwolt,

The situation was .t'urther aggravated bJ Dutch
.21?•

ill•i

P• 106. , . ·•

2Brook1nga Institution,~·£..!!., P• 361.
47
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support or the movement toward autonomy in East Indonesia
and Borneo, and by the 1ncraaaed program ot foreign relations
on the part ot the Republic.

The Indonesians,

or

course,

considered any step toward the establishment of an autonomous
East Indonesia or Borneo as a direct violation ot the
L1nggadjat1 Agreement; the Dutch considered the increased
foreign relations

or

the Republic as evidence that the

RepUblio did not intend to live up to its commitments under
the L1nggadjat1 Agreement.. ·In addition to these issues,
numorous violations ot the cease-tire truce agreement

or

14 October·l946 took place and, tollowing Linggadjat1, a
number

or

"plots" wero discovered which, according to Dutch

allegations, involved Republican leaders.

These "plots"

were supposed to have.been·des1gned tor the purpose of
creating disorder and instigating aabotag$ in Eaat Indonesia.3
' Failure to rGcono11e these d1.tferences reaul ted in
a.complote·impasse. After the Republican cabinet had
rejected an agreement. which had been initiated by both
partiea, calling tor the establishment

or

a joint police

force, tension 1ncreaae.d and v1as nnrked by the burning of
brid~ea and other struotures by tho Republ1cana.4
In the course of negotiations following the a1gri1ng
ot the L1nggadjat1 Agreeimnt, Mr. Sja.hrir, realizing that
.the Dutch were quite prepared to go to war 1.r their domo.nds
were not accepted, agreed to a number ot major concessions.
3wol.f, .2.2• c1ti, pp. 106-114.
4Brook1nga
Ins ti tu ti on, .21?. ill•

••

,

p • 361.
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The more important ot these concessions included (l) acceptance

ot a Dutch-dominated interim governmnt. (2) recognition ot
the ,S.! Jure position of the Crown's representatives in such
a government, and (3) aoquiesce~e 1n the control ot Indonesian
foreign relations b7·the Netherlands Government during the
interim period,

The 1mmana1ty of these concessions operated

to weaken Sjahrir•a political support in the Republic.

The

'

internal situation grew steadily worse until, on 27 June,
Sjahrir notified Sukarno ot his resignation as Prime
On 3 July- a new cabinet was formed with r.tr. Amir

1iln1ater,5

Sjar1.tudd.1n as Prime Minister.

This new cabinet went even

further in its concessions to Dutch demanda than had Sjahrir,
but the Dutch were not placated.

They- continued to demand

the establ!ahment of an Indoneaian police torce which would
be jointly manned and controlled and which would operate

inside ot the Republic.

'

Thi' demand waa rejected bf

Sjar1tudd1n and the rest·o.t the Republican leadera.6
On

18 July- discussions were broken ott and the

already heated atmosphere approached the point ot combustion.
On 21 July-, at the recciDmende.t1on ot van Mook, Dutch troops

...

moved to launch an all-out attack designed to destror the.
Republic.~

The Dutch "police action•• was also a1med at

securing possession ot the connnarciallr moat prot1table
regions nt Indonesia, whose posaeiaion and control the
5Kah1n, .21?• ~.,PP•
6

~..

.

207-208.

pp. 209-211.

7.
.
'
Wolf, .21!•

ill•,

P• 126.

••
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Netherlands had not been able to obtain through the
negotiations which had produced the Linggadjat1 Agreement.
The fact that Dutch economic resources were verr low while
their mi11tar7 strength was at a peak was an important
consideration in the Dutch decision to resort to a "police
act1on.n8,, . \ .
.... '.
J,

.

..

.

: .In instituting military action ths Dutch or1g1nall;r
maintained that, by. t!:iftir action, the7 wero not abandoning
the L1nggadjat1 Agreement.

The so-called "police action"

was, according to the Netherlands Government, ot a temporar;r
nature rendered neoessary by the inability_ ot the Republic
to maintain law and order.· Further, the Dutch maintained
that Republican activity, "eapeciall1 the holding

or

Dutch

hostagea,.had not been regulated under·the L1nggadjat1
Agreement and that the arbitration provision ot that
agreement therefore did not apply."9. From the beginning,

.

however, a divergence or opinion was apparent.·

.

On

.,

21 July,

in a memorandum to the Republican Governmont, Dr. van Mook
stated that the Netherlands Government had resumed its
treedom ot action and no ~onger considered itself bound by
.
.
..
.
.
.
the L1nggadjat1 Agreement. On 26 August van Mook recognized
East Borneo as

. 8F.

a new "autonomous" state

and prospective

Kennedy, "Truce:· in Indonesia," !.!.!:, Eastern

Survez, Vol. XVII, March 24, 1948, P• 65. See c. M. Morrell,
'"fndonea1an Survey," !h2. Asiatic, Review, ver., XLIV, April,
1948, pp• 206•212 •. Mr, .Morrell diSQU3S8S
the signing of the
L1nggadjat1 Agreement and then defends the Dutch "police
action" ot July, 1947.
9Brook1ngs
Institution, .22• .21!•• · p. ~61.

.
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member

or

the United States

or

Indonesia. Dr. van Mook

also expressed the "hope" that action ot a similar nature
might take place in West and East Java, the Palembang area

in South Sumatra, and the Medan area or the northeast coast
ot Sumatra.

The 1mpl1cat1ons or.such a statement were quite

clear in light or the tact that these territories were
recognized as being under the .2,! taoto jur1ad1ct1on ot the
Republican Government under the L1nggadjat1 AgreemGnt.10
': ·

In general the Dutch advance was very rapid and th11

progress.enabled them to capture large stocks ot export
goods •. Moat or the3e goods hnd been stockpiled in the
Republ1o·because ct. the Dutch blockade which had been
imposed upon the islands shortly after the Japanese
surrender. B7 capturing the export goods the.Dutch were
able to attain one ot their mor~ important aeoondar7 object1vea, which was to secure export gooda 1n order to help
1

relieve

the economic situation in the Netherlands.11

~ubm1as1on !£?

Jm! Seourity Council .

•

!

By letters dated 30 Jul11947

or

the acting representative

Australia and the permanent liaaon officer ot the Govern-

ment

ot

India brought. to the attention ot the Seour1 ty Council

the renewal or host111t1ea in Indonea1a.12
10wolf
I

llKahin,

ill• I
.21?• £!!.,

.2J? •

12seour1tt

Council,

p • 130 •

Supplement Number 16, Annex

P• 214.

0ff1e1al Records, Second Year,
p. 149, and Annex 41, P• 150.

4o,
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The Australian communication stated, first, that hoat111t1ea
were in progress in Java and Sumatra between the armed
forces ot the Netherlands and the Republic ot Indonesia, and,
•eoond, that his Government considered these host111tie1 to
be a breach of.the.peace ·under Article 39 ot the Charterf
he urged the~Council to take imnediate action to restore
interna t1onal peace and secur1 ty. ·· The oommun1oa t1on t"urther

proposed that.the Council order both partiea:to cease
host111t1es immediately and to 1nat1tute arbitration under
Article 17 ot the Linggadjat1 Agreement.

The letter concluded

with a request that.a imeting or the Securit1 Council be
called immediately
to. consider this commun1cat1on.13
.
.
'

.~. The
. : ...

communication from the Indian Government al•o

.

drew the Council'• attention to the Indo.n~sian s1~uat1on,
under
Article
35 ot ~ the
Charter; the Indian
Government was
.
'
. ,
·. . . .
.
.

or the opinion. t.hat the
constituted
a danger to
. ' situation
.
-.
the maintenance ot international pea~e.and s.ec~1ty aa
detined in Article 34 or the Charter, and it therefore
requested the _Council to take the.meaau~ea,neoesaary.to
bring the crisis to

ml

end.

In drawing the Council's

· attention to the Indonesian s1 tuation, the Indian Government
noted that the Dutch torcea had attackad the Indonea1an
people without warning "at a time when ~.delegation ot the
Indonesian . Republican Government.was
aotuall1 at Batavia tor
~
. .
negotiations with the Du~ch authorities on the implementation
ot the. Lin~adjat1

Agreemont.14

•• Annex 40, pp. 149-150,
14rb1d., Annex 41, p. 150.
13~

.

'
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· Following the submission of the Indonesian question
to the Security Council, that body considered the question

at length tor several meetings.

In general, there were

or

three problems which received the greatest amount

or

(l) the question

attention:

the legal status ot the Republic ot

Indonesia, (2) the question ot the method and machinery to
be used to bring about a ceiaation or ho.st111t1es, and
(3) the question ot the competence ot the Security Council
to deal with the Indonesian question.

171at Meeting,· 31 Jul:r 1947 ··

The Indonesian question waa brought up tor debate
at the l7lat meeting of the Seourit7 Council which was held
...

J

' ; .. '·

•

} '

on 31·'. Jul7 . • 194~.
I '

•

'

' . .

>'

.>.

{

'

Upon t~e invi tat1on
i-, •

or

representatives
'

..

"

'

"

' : '

'

or

•

'

s

•

.

•

~he Pre~ident_.'· the

the Netherlands.and India were invited
'

'

•:

.

,

.~

'

'

'

1-

•;

!_'; •

t -,_

.... 1'

\.

f

;

• '

•

~

'

.,

to take part in the d.1aoua11ons •. Upon theae two representatives
,>

'r

.

'

.

I

'

'

taking their places at the Council table, Mr. GroL'lY'kO ot the
'

o.s.s.R.

)

'

•

'

I

~

'.

'

r~1aed the question o~ _e~tending an invitation to
'

•

•-

participate to the ~overnment

4

•

or

•

the ~epublio.

objected
grounds
that' the admiaaion
......on tha
.·.
. ·' ·..
.
;

'.

or

Mr. van Klettena
Republican

repr~aontative~ wou~d, in ettect, prejudge the whole question
...

before the Couno11-·the question ot the logal status of the
~o~e~nt ot t~e Republi.o ot Indoneaia.15
Colonel Hodgson, ~he Australian representative,

stated that, in ,view

or

the fact that~ facto recognition

15seourit~ Co~c11~ Official Records, Second Year,
Number 67 (17lat f~eting, 31July1947), PP• 1516-1619.
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had been extended to the Republic end aince the L1nggadjat1
Agreement called for the President or the International Court
ot Justice (a judicial body.before which only state• may be
a part~ to . a case) to nominate the chairman of ~A
arbitration
,,.
body, Indonesia was a state in international law-.

Mr. Hodgson

then aubm1tted. a dra.t't reaolution which called tor
. an
immediate oe11ation - or host111t1ea
and tor aettlement ot
.
the ._dispute by_arb1trat1on under the proviaiona

or

the

L1nggadjat1
Agreement.16.
The. Chinese representative
..
.
.
...
.
propoaed an amendlmnt to the Australian resolution adding
•'

"other
peaceful meansn.to arbitration.as
a means ot settle..
. .
.
~
'

,,·

'

ment •. The,Auatral1an delegation accepted the amendment.17
With the d1acuaa1on centering around the legal

/

atatua or Indonea1a and whether an 1nv1tat1on to participate

.

in. . . the... d1souas1ons
should
be,,, extend~d
. ..
. .
. .
.
.. to. that body, the
Netherlands representative reiterated· hta Government'•
•

I

poa1t1on that a legal state or war did not exiat'in Indonesia.
The Dutch ·delegate maintai~ed that th~ ·disturbance was ·

.

caused by lawless bands

of

natives w~o were not controlled

b7 the Republican Government beoause 'that Government waa
corrupt and consequently unable to secure obedience trom
•

•

t

•

those under it•~
concluded

by

l

'

(

~

.

.

facto authority.

lYr. van Kletfen1

po1nt1ng.out that co~s1derat1on. or the matter

by the Secur1t7 Council might upset negotiationa between the
..

l6Ib1d., pp. 1623-1626.
17Ib1d., PP• 1639~1648.
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Netherlands

and·the Republtc.18

At the close of the· m3et1ng,· Mr. Johnaon of the

United States delegation in.formed the Council that hia
Government, being ver1 much concerned with the existing
the· parties the use ot

a1tuat1on 1n Indonea1a, ·had ottered

!ta good otticea.19 'In general, SJria, Colombia, and China
supported the Australian.resolution.· The French delegation
felt it would be dangerous·to adopt a resolution without
further information and debate.on.tho 1ubstanoe of the
question.

The Soviet and Indian delegations favored an

immediate· decision in regard to cesaation of host111t1ea,
but the7 telt that the rnatter ot arbitration needed further
atud1.20 :

l72nd ~

173rd Meet1nes, 1 Aufi;ust 1947
At the 172nd tmet1ng on_l.August tho representative

or

thB United States, atter pointing out that the legal

ques~1ona relating to.the_ atatua: ot the Republic ?Ould be
aettled later, aubmitted an amendment to the Australian
'

-

'.

reaolutionJ
this amendment
called
for
a ce1sation
ot host111t1ea
.
.
.
. :
. .
'
and the settlement of the dispute
by arbitration or other
.
.
'
)

...

peaceful Jneans.
I

made no mention
. lSibid.,

'

Mr. Johnson stated that, since the amendment
.

or

,:.

an1 article

•

or

•

the Charter and contained

PP• 1639-1648.

19Ib1d., P• 1648.
20united Nations Yearbook, 1947-48, P• 365.
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no commitment regarding Netherlands' aovere1gnty over the
region,,, the amondimnt would leave the question ot sovereignty
to be aettled at a later date and hence would allow the
part1ea to make uae ot the United States• otter ot good
offices which, earlier 1n the day's d1acuss1on, the Netherland•' delegate had accepted on behalt ot his Government~21
Following submission ot the·United States amendment,

Mr. Oromrko, atter discussing the~ taoto recognition
extended to the Republic by the L1nggadjat1 Agreemont and·
the dangers inherent in negot1at1ona conducted between
occupying a.nd·occupied countries, submitted an addition
to the Australian re1olution providing for the immediate
Withdrawal ot the troops ct both,aidea to the poa1t1onl.Wh1ch
the7·had held prior to the,beg1nning.ot mil1tar,. operationa.22
On

the· afternoon ot 1 Augu.at, .at the 173rd meeting

ot the Council, Mr. Parodi ot the French.delegation, attar:
atat1ng that he did not teel the SecuritT Couno11 to be
competent to deal with the Indonesian que1tion, introduced
a reaolut1on'wh1ch (1) reserved entirely the question ot
the Council'• competence, and (2) called upon the parties
concerned . to bring hoat111t1e1 to an end.23

Mr. Lange ot

Poland suggested that to the United State1 amendment there
ahould be added the phraae "and keep the Securit7 Council
21secur1ty Cou~oil, Official Rec~rds, Second Yea;,
Number 68 (l72nd and l73rd Jleetinga), l August 1947, pp.
1655-1659.'

22Ib1d.,
23~••

PP• 1659-1665.
PP• 1676-1678.
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informed ot the progrea1 • ot aettlemnt."24

The United

States representative informed the Council that he wa1
willing to incorporate the French amendment concerning the
competence ot the Council into his own proposai.25
The Council voted upon the proposal, paragraph by
The preamble ("Noting with concern the host111t1ea

paragraph.

in progress be_tween the arn'_l9d force• ot the Netherlands and

ot the Republic

or

adopted by a vote ot

Indonesia •••• ")was

The second part ot the preamble,

7 to 0 with 4 abstentions.

•hich embodied the Prench suggestion concerning the competence

or

the Council, was rejected by a vote ot 5 to 0 with 6
-

abatentiona.

The remaining three paragraphs, which called

tor (1) cessation ot host111t1ea,-(2) keeping the Security

Col1nc1i i~ormd

~r pi-og~e~.,-. and-· (3)
'.

\

settlement ot the
.

;·

,

-'.

.

dispute by arbitration or other peaceful means, 'were all

vote•

adopted.by identical

ot 8 in ravor, none oppoaed, and

3 abatent1~n• (Belgium, France~ United Kingdom).26
The Council

next acted

upon
th&
-

.

ot

calling tor th~ 1mmad.1ate withdrawal
l .

Soviet resolution

troops~

.

Mr. van

~

Kletrens of the Netherlands cautioned the Council that,
ah0uld this re•olut1on be adopted, "terrible acts ot
l

.. ~

:retaliation" against "a great number of people belonging to
,

•

-'

~

'

~

-

Cr

'-

'•

I

( '.

'

•

'

various racea" would tollow the proposed withdrawal ot Dutch
~
.
.
..
troopa from the areaa which they had occupied 1ince 21 Jul1.
'

~4Ib1d.~

_,

2sib1d~

26Ib!d~,

P• 1686.

P•

1ea1.

PP• 1699-1703.

••

Mr. Johnson ot the United Statei•was ot'a •1m11ar opinion;
he maintained that chaos and disorder would follow the
withdrawal ot the Dutch civil 'adm1n1strat1on.27 Following
the veey br1et debate; the

u.s.s.R.

resolution was rejected

by a vote or·2 to none, with 9 abstentiona.28

Reaction '.Q! !h! Disputants ·!2 ,!!!! Cease-Fire Order
By a letter dated 3 August 1947, tho Netherlands
Government informed the Preaident ot the Security Council
that,
while it, the Netherlands,
tmintained ita attitude in
...
.
regard to . th> jurisdiction
Council, the Lieutenant. or the
.
.,

'

Governor.aeneral had been instructed to get in contact the
•

~

~

~

: !

~

"\

....

authorit1ea
or the. .. Republic
tor the purpose ot reaching an
.
. . ~. . .
.
. - ... : . ... : . ;. .
agreement concerning a oeasat1on ot host11it1ea. A cable
('

.

'

.

'\.

•

-

'

•.

~

. ;.

.

~-.,-

'

l ...

~-

',

~-.

.

.

..

·.....

~

·.•.

·•

~

\··

trom the Deputy Prime Miniater ot Indone11a, Mr. Gani, did
... •

'

-.' .. '

'.

'·

•

>

•

• •.

'

~

•

not indicate what attitude ar aot~on would be taken by ~e
..

Republic; the Primo r41n1ater had. Just b~en re~eaaed trom a
concentration camp and, in addition,. d1tt1cult1ea in tranam1aa1on had delayed h1• receipt of the telegram concerning
United Natio~s action in regar~ to ceaaat1on

or

hoatilitiea.29

The
or the. Republican Government waa trans.
. . attitude
mltted to the President ot the Security Council by means ot
a cablegram dated 6 August 1947.

_.,

2'1Ib1d

PP• 1704-1705.

28Ib1d.,

P• 1710.

This commun1cat1on contained

·
29secur1 tz C ouno 1 l, Otf 1o1al ·Records, Second Year
Humber 69 (174th .i1Ioetlng), 4 August 1947, PP• 1716-1717. 1
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tho tollow1ng prov1a1onsi

or

reaolut1on

(1) 1n compliance with the Council'•

1 August, Indonesian armed forces would cease

hoat111t1ea at 2400 houri, .Indonea1an standard time, on
Monday 4 AugustJ (2) the Netherlanda' delay in the tran1mias!on

or

the Security Council resolution.to the Republic

was noted and the Council was a1ked to consider

the t'aot

·:

that serious teehn1cal d1t"t1cult1es, caused b1 Dutch •act•

ot aggression", had to be overcome in executing the ceaaet1roJ (3) ~he Republic_ pointed out thnt, in contrast to the
t1rat cease-tire issued in connection with tho truce

no

Ootober 1946,·

definite

or

14

l.1ne ot demarcation could be

trac~d; (4) t he Government of the Republic expressed grave
0

concern' 'over the tact that unle11
by a third party,

aupeM1aed

that auch ari order 'would not
\

•

Dutch torceaJ
to all klnds

I

•

(5)

'

the eeaae-t"ire were "to be
-~ ~ .
, . .
·there would be no guarantee ·-

be

unil~terally

•

violated by the

•.

.

the ce11at1on ot hoat111t1ee

or action directed b7 the

'

ahould apply

Dutch .military and

c1v11 ~uthoritiel' agai~t the civilian population} and
(6) a cea1aticin ot host1litlea· should be tollowed by a
Withdrawal ot Dutch arnsd torcea to the demarcation linea
t1.xed bJ both sides on 14 October 1946.30

The Government ot the Republic,

by a cablegram dated

7 August 1947, not1t1ed the United States Goveniment that it

was tull7 prepared to submit to the deciaion

or

th& Secur1t1

Council, wh1ch.deo1e1on recommended arbitration as the pr1:ms.rJ
30secur1t;t
Council, Ottic1al Records, Second Year,
Number 72 (l78th Meeting), 7 August 1947, footnote on page1
1941-1842.
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meana or settling the dispute.

or

the United States otter

The Republic alao accepted

good offices and requested that

Government to use its influence to secure the immediate
dispatch ot:an 1nternat1onal arbitration commission to
Indone11a. 'Mr• Senor

India put the Indones1an·auggeat1on

regarding an 1nternat1onal arbitration comm11s1on betore the
Security Council at !ta 170th.meet1ng on 7 Augu2t 1947.31
178th Meeting, 7 Au~st

1947

Following Mr. Sen•a speech in which he presented the
Indone11an requeat, Mr, van 1Uerren1.once again prese~ted to
the Council the reasons for the Dutch "police act1onn.
'

.

I•

.

4

general these reasons were (1) that the Re!'11.blto
.

.

'

•,

. .. ,,

.

.

In

•

.

'

..

.

\

wa1

..

. .

still
' ~,,

'·

holding hostages contral'J' to the L1nggadJat1 AgreementJ
'

'

'

.

~

.

.

.

.·.

..

:;

.

.

. ..

..

,

',',

~.

~

'

'·

..

..

:. '

.

.'

.

' .

(2) that the territories held by the Dutch had had their
' '

I •

·\~

•

~

"

I

.·'

',•

·aupply or toodsturta cut ott,
also contrary. .to the AgreementJ
.
, ... . .
and (3) that host111t1ea had not ceaaed in accordance with
,..

the proYiaions· ot LinggadJat1.~2
'

....

lAOth and 1Blst Meet1nva, 12 A~eust 1947
The Indonesian question'was not brought up tor
d1acues1on again until 12 August, When Colonel Hodgson
.the Australian delegation, noting

the

United States .ofter ot

good ott1cea, atated that h1a Govemment
31Ib1d., p. 1847 end footnote.
32Ib1d., p. 1848.

or

had ottered to join
••
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the United States aa mediatora and arb1tratora.1n the dispute,
and, ·further, that th11 otter had been accepted by the ,
Government ot.the Republ1o.

The Australian representative

then· aubm1 tted a dratt ·resolution tor· cona1derat1on b7 the
Council. . Thia resolution called tor the estab11•hment or.·
a comm1111on whose dut7 it would be to report to the Security
Council "on the a1tuation in Indone1ia following the resolution
which the Council had adopted on 1August1947."33

In-

propo11ng auch a commiasion, Colonel Hodgson aa1d that hi•
re1olution·deliberatel7 rerralned trom naming the represent&•
t1Yes who would compo1e.the membership ot the comm11s1on
because he felt 1t would be better if . the members were
appointed b7 the Couno1l·once the partiea had begun
negot1at1ona•~":Iniregard to the atatua ot the·oomm1aa1on·
membera, the Auatra11an·delegat1on·relt that auch member•
aa would be appointed b7' the Co'1no11 should be con11dered
aa agents or the Council who would aot a1 observera·andhelp atab111ze the general 11tuat1on until negotiations were
under way.' Aa.agenta or the Council, the repreaentat1vea
would report directly to that bod7 and thua enable 1t to
have access to the true tacta.34· The remainder or the l8l1t
meeting waa taken up by d1scu111on ot the Pol1ah representa-

tive•a proposal'that the representatives ·or.the Republic or
~3secur1ty Council,· Official Records, Second Year,
Number '14 · (180th and l8lat lr!eetlnga J, 12 August 1947,
· ·
PP• 1917-1918. The text or the Australian resolution ma7 be
round in the footnotes .or these pages.
.. .
.·.

.~.

. 34 . . . . . . "
,

- . . . ... . - . ··-
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Indonesia be invited to participate

or the Council read

President

in the discussions.

The

a. letter trom ?.tr. SJahrir, the

Indonea1an representat1ve1.1n which the Securit7 Council was
advised that it an invitation to participate were extended to
the Republic, that Government accepted in advance, tor purposes
ot the dispute, the obligation• ot a member ot the.United
1-tr._van Klettens. opposed this suggestion on the

Nations.

grounds that, since the letter trom r.tr. SJ&.hrir olearl7
indicated that the Republic baaed 1ta request on Article 32
ot the Charter, the Republic had no legal grounds tor ma.king .
. auch a request in view ot_the tact that 1t was not a sovereign
and independent nation. After several repreaentat1vea
expreaaed points ot Tiew, pro_and con, on the matter ot
Indoneaian sovere1gnt7,
•.·- Johnson. ot .. the. United States,
.
. .Mr
·.
while stating that_ h1• Government "eXpreaal7 .takes no .
position" on the legal 1tatu1.

or

the.Republic, as1erted

that the representative• of Indonesia should be invited.
He . then pointed out that
such an 1nv1tat1on could be extended
.
through rule 39

or

the rulea

or

procedure it that rule were

given a liberal'interpretation. ·Since, under Article 40,
'

'

all decisions are without prejudice to the legal rights ot
the parties concerned, extending an 1nv1tat1on to I~doneaia
Would be a matter

or

Simple justice and WOuld,1n no Way
'·

'

•

..

•

.t

'"

confer upon the Republlo.an7 international status

it waa not,. 8.lready
. ··- ~ . entitled.35
•·

-

The President

or

to which
the Council

closed debate ~n the_propoaed invitation to Indonaaia b7
35Ib1d.,

pp.

1918-1933.
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a ta ting that such an invi

ta ti on ·"would no t bind any sta t·e

to recognize the independence or aoveroignty ot the Indonesian
Repuhl1cn but,· rather, "would be extended simply in connection
with the work ot the Security Council."· The proposal was
.

.

adopted b7 a vote ot 8 to 3. ·Although both France and Great

Britain voted against

the proposal, the President stated that

thla matter was a procedui-al point and, therei"ore,
the measure adopted.36

Mr. van Klet'tens

tn~in raised

declared
the

question ot inviting representatives ot East Indonesia and
Borneo •. Several.of tha.Council member3 questioned whether
the p'os1 tions ot East Indonesia and Borneo were tho aaln9
'

'•

'

'

•

',.

I

'

as that of the Republic in· view ·ot the taot'that no fighting
'

.

'

waa taking

place

in

.

these area·a.

As the applica.tion

or

the

Ph111pp1nea ·tO. partici,p~te ~1n.tb0 d11cu1s1ons was already

b~tore the Council, no'actlo~ could be
0

suggestion

:t~en on

that the question 'be put to:a
. .

the Belgian

vote.~7

.

.

l84th Meeting,· 14 · A.ugust '1947

.The Philippine ~equeat ~aa acted upon at the 184th
meeting which
waa held on
1947•. The queat1on
...
.. 14 August
.
'·

'

'

or

~h1~1pp1ne part1c1pa~_1on: .•as put to: a vote ear11.1n the mee.ting
~a th:ere was verr. little

d1acus11on .on .the subject.

proposal was adopted b7 a .v~te
the

u.s.s.R.
36

~·,.

abstaining.

or

The

9 to none with Poland and .

F~llowing thB vote, General Romulo,

.

p. 1940.

37Ib1d., PP• 1942-1943 •.
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representative or the Philippines, wa1 invited to take a
seat at the conference table.~8

, . The .next item upon which the Council acted was the
Belgian proposal to invite East Indonea1a end Borneo to
participate 1n the work ot.. the Council •. Thia pro~oaal had
,

'

originated with Mr. van Klertena ot the Netherlands but was
aupported by Belgium in view or the fact that the Nethorl~nde
waa not, at that time,_a ~m'ber_.o:r the Council s

or

~ose in favor

.

In general,

the propoaal ba~ed their attitude upon the

assumption
that. extending
an invitation
to these territorie•
.
.
.
'

would be the only equ1 table

ot Australia stated

or

_or

the rule a

ot th.a Charter.
that

thing to do..

Colonel Hodgson

that his Oovernt!lent wanted to admit

t~e representatives
rule 39

\

Ea~t _Ind~nesia an~ Borneo, but under

or

procedure and not under Article 32

The reason ror this attitude wa1 the tact

the Reptibl1c had been granted-2!, facto recognition by

1even countries, including the Netherlands. the United
.
.
Kingdom, Australia, and the.United States, whereas East
Indoneaia and Borneo were recognized as possessing~
•

.

.

.

f

status· only by the Netherlands.

taoto

.

· The rest

or the debate· on

thia topic centered around the viawa concerning the appl1cab111t7
..
ot Article 32 or rule 39. lJr, Gromyko produced
a telegram,
dated 6 August, trom the Prime Minister.of the East Indoneaian
Government to Ur. ·v_an Klettena in which Mr~ lie.dJamoeddin, the
.

.

Prime Minister, intoned

llr. van Kletfens that the East

Indonesian Government "expreased 1 ts agreement with the decision
39

.

.

Securitx Council, 0tf1o1al Record1, Second Year,
Number 76 Cl83rd fllld l84th N.eetingaf, l4 August 1947, ·
pp. 1979-1980.
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ot·the·Netherlands Government to initiate police action
against those element• of the Republic which obstruct the
execution ot the L1nggadjat1 Agreement."

Mr. Grotny"ko 1tated

that he broueht thia telegram to the attention ot the Council
·"in order.that we m8.7 be clear'as to-whom the Netherlands
Government reoommends u1 to 1nv1te'to the Seclll'ity Councll.•~9
The Belgian proposal was rejected by a vote ot 4 1n tayor,
none againat,-and · 7 abstent1ona. <iO .: The rem1ndel9 or the
meeting waa devoted to a speech by Mr• Sja.hrir or Indonesia

or

in"which he briefly,traced th$'h1storj

or· the

nationalist movemnt

the development

in Indonesia, concentrating :

particularly on the happenings 1lnce the landing ot Allied
troops following the end ot World War II.41
': .'. ' ;·.

.

.,

..

.

.. ·~

~.

f' • " ' . -,

.·,

~

~. . .,

185th Meet!ne;, 15 Aup;u•t 1947
)

.

The following day, at the 1S5th7moet1ng~ Mr. van Kletrena
answered Mr. 3jahr1r•a version ot tha history ot Indonesia.
In the course

ot hl1

1peech,·the Dutch representative atated

that-the:Republio•e acceptance of;the'otter ot good ott"ice1
made by the United Statea,waa so weighted with conditions
and reservations· that it actually did not amount to an
acceptance at all. 42 ' ;. •:
r

.

I

. · , ' .. : :59Ib1d., PP• 1901-1992. - Tbs text or the telegram
trom the Eaat Indone11an Prime :M1n1ater may be round in the
tootnote·on·page 1991.' ·

"'wnber
u

40Ib1d.,

P• 1~92.

41Ibid~,

PP• 1995-2003.'

'.'

I

42secur1tn·counc11, Official Records, Second Year,
77 (l85th eeting), 15 August I~47, pp. 2006-2014.
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Following Mr. van Klettena• apeech, Uir. Katz•Such7.or
Poland submitted an amendment to the Australian resolution
which had been introduced at the l8l1t meeting.

Wherea1

the Australian resolution had called tor the creation ot a
comm1aa1on whose onl1 dut7 would be to report to the
Securit7 Council on the a1tuat1on 1n Indonesia, the Po11ah
amondment provided that this comm1as1on should aot aa a

mediator and·an arbitrator 1n the Indonesian d1aputa.
Mr. Alitz...Such7 noted that; had the Securit7 Counail taken

action on the Indonesian question 1n January, 1946, the
problem would not have developed into the aerious situation
with which the Council waa faced in August, 1947,43

.....

l87th Meeting, 19 August 1947
••

•

'

...,

'>#

-

~

•

_,

At the'l87th meeting itr. Gromyko, in d1acusa1ng the
proposed commission, stated that the United States waa
I

'

~·~

.~·

r

..

- , -, ';

~,'

i

=.

at
1 ts good offices upon tho Indonesian
.. to-opting to force
.
.
Republic) in view or the 1'.aot that the Republic had requested_
,.,,·,.

~ ~ .. ,

~..

.

,.

the Security Council to set up its own commission tor
arbitration and mediation, t~ Soviet delegate tm1nta1ned
'

that insistence by the Unit~d States upon use ot its good
offices indicated a lack or re1pect not only tor the
Indonesian Government and the Indonesian people, but e.la;o

tor the ~ecur1t1 Council •.. Mr. 'arolllJ'ko suggested that the
.
43Ib1d~, PP• 20l4•2017. The text or the Polish
amendment may be found in Securiti Council, 0tf1o1al Records,
Second Year, Number 79 (l87th and 188th Meetings), !9
.
August 1947 in a tootnote on page·2osa •. ·
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insistence ot the United States was baaed, at leaat_part1al17,
upon her large economic
interest
in Indonesia. The Russian
"'
.
-.
... ...
representative concluded by expressing
the
hope that the
.
·.
~~ .
;

'

Council. would
compl7
with the. Republic's
request
for the
~ . '"
. .
.
.. .
.
'

creation of an arb1tral commia11on.44
Following.Mr. Gromyko's speech, Mr. Ts1ang ot China

ernrt

ottered another amendrmnt to the Australian

.

resolution.

.

This amendment noted that the Netherlands intended to·
requelt

the

career oon1ula stationed in Batavia to.submit

joint reports on the situation in the Ropublio.and to propose

to
j

the Republic.the appointment
•

or

•

an impartial atate to
'

•

enquire into the a1tuat1on and to supervise the cea1e-tireJ
.~.

J

~

each or the two d!aputanta were to designate a atate and
these two states

would· the.; aelec.t

were -defined bf the amendment.

the state. whose ·dutiea

The ~n1eti.dment resolved' that

the c~~ular b.ody at Batavia end ·the impartial state
be requested

to

ahould

torw'ard. copies ot: their reports to the .

Secur1t1 Counc11.45 ·Colonel Hodgaon of.Australia maintained

or

that the ettect
.

the Chinese ~mendment
~

.

would

be .to· take

the

.

matter outside ot the Secur1t7 Council since it referred
only ·to 'reports b7 the consular body at Batavia and did not
even 1ay to whom that bod7 was to reports in addition, the
amendment said nothing about whether the consular bod7 waa
to be appointed by the Security Council or was to be subject
44 .

:

'

.

Seo~r1tx Council, Offioiaj Records, Second Year,
Number 79 (l87th and l88th Meetings , 19 August 1947,

PP• 2058-2063 •

.

.

•5Ibid•, P• 2067. Tho text ot the Chinese emendment
ma7 be found in the footnote ot page 2067.
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to that
'

body's

jurisdiction in any way,46

In adjourning

....

the meeting, the President ot the Council suggested that the
representatives of Australia, China, and Poland meet toBather
and try to tormul~te a compromise propoaai.47

. 192nd and l93rd
On

Meetings,

'

22 AU:1?;Ust 1947

22 August 1947 Mr._van Klettens, in the !irat

speech of the da1, declared t~t anyone who voted in favor

or

the Australian resolution, even were.it to be modified by
the Polish and Chineee.armndmontai
. .
~ .
.would
,. . ~ be implicitly
.
.

atat!ng that the Council had jurisdiction in the dispute.

In view ot this tact, according to th~. Ne~herl:an~s representative, it the Council were to adopt the Australian resolution,
an important.precedent
would
be set in regard
to
Security
.
.
.
.
'

.

Council intervention in matters
d1otion of sovereign States~

....

~it~in the dome.atlc jur1a-

ot course,

Mr •. ~an ~ettena,

regarded the Indonesian question aa a matter

or

domestic

.concern and he maintained that 1~ ~a~ "pure illusion to
think that

the Government. or the Re~~~\·~~~e;resenta

anything

but itself."48
. Mr. ,Pillai

·or

or the Indian c!elegat.1~n spoke in support

the Australian .draft resolution, subject ~o the Polish

a'!Mndment.

The Indian delegate (1) opposed the Chinese>.·

46 rsre, , p • 2 072.
47Ib1d., P• 2075.

48seour1ty Council, Official necords, Second Year,
Number 82 (192nd and i93rd Meetings), 22 August 19471
PP• 2144-2147.
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amendment on the grounds that it virtually took the matter
out

of

the Council's hands, (2) insisted that the troops ot

both sides must return.to their original positions, and
(3) considered undesirable the involvement

orr1c1a11 in ~est1ons

or

or

consular

this kind, particularly in view

:the circumstances or the Indonesian situation. 49
Colombian delegate, Mr. Lopez,

.wa~

or

The

of the opinion that the

Security Council should accept the respons1b111t1es which
logically followed from its cease-tire orderJ the Council
should first decide whethor to ask the parties to revert to
their original military positions and, next, whether to
appoint a commias1on or. to follow the Netherlands proposal
regarding the selection ot an impartial state to uupervise
the cease-tire.50
On·the afternoon ot 22 August 1947 the first matter
to be considered was a draft resolution presented by the
representative ot Belgium.

Thia resolution called tor

extending an invitation to participate in the work ot the
Council to the representatives

or

East Indonesia and Borneo.

Though a similar proposal had been rejected at the l84th
meeting, the President decided to put the new resolution to
a vote because the rules ot procedure contained no speo1t1c
provision prohibiting rejected resolutions being put to a·
vote a second time.

The Belgian proposal was rejected by a

vote· ot ., in-favor~· none against, and 7 abstentions--the aame
49Ibtd •• P• 2156.
50Ib1d., P• 2160.

••

. "10

vote as was registered ~gains~ the enrlier.proposa1.5l
.

'

Tho Australian represontat1ve briefly reviewed the

resolutions be.tore tho Council.

Colonel liod.gson stated .

that, 1n compl1anoe .w~th the requ~st or the President, he
hsd.lmt
with the reprasontativea
from the . Chinese e.nd
. .
.
Polish delegations in an a~tempt to reach a compromise on.
}

the .resolu.t1on. ~ubmitted by- Australia en d the amendments
su~nlitted.theret~ by Ch~n~ ~d Po~and.

The Chinese end

Australian representatives came to an agroeroont whilo the
•

• •

~

•

•

•

•

z

Polish reprosentat1ve mn1nta1nod one reservation 1n rego.rd
to .the composition ot the colilll!1ss1on.

The Austral1an-

Ch1neso Joint resolution requested the Go·rnrnl'!len ta which.
'

'

•

'

I

.

wore members or . the
Security
Council
and which hnd career
...
....
. '
. ... .........
consuls in., Batavia
tho1r
consuls
to prepare
~
.to,instruct
.
..
·~
.
.

;

Joint r~ports.on

the situation in
Indonesia
following
tho.
.
. .
...

Security Council resolution or 1 August.
to cover.tho observance

or

Those reports were

the ceaae~t1re order and the

conditions prevailing in areas under military- occupation
and in areas .from which arned tore es 1nieht be w1 thdrawn by
~greement between the parties. ,The resolution further
requested
Government of
.
' the . Nothorlanda Government and . the
~
the Republic .t~ grant .to these consular ~epresentat1ves

all

tac111t1es necessary tor tho '. etfect1ve ful.t"illment ot their
duty.52
51tb1d.,

PP• 2170•2172 •

ot the joint
Auatralian-Chlneae resolution may be found in the footnotes
on page1 2173-2174.
.

52Ib1d.,

PP• 2172-2174.

The text
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Colonel Hodgson then referred to the second Australian
resolution which dealt with a proposal ror arbitration.
While this resolution
to the original

..

was vecy similar to the Polish amendment

Australian

resolution, the dit:t"erence laj ·_

in the :t"act that the Polish amendment called
ment

or

tor the appoint-

three arbitrators by the Security Council, while the

Australian resolution envisio~ed the appointment of one
arbitrator each by the Governments of.the Netherlands end
.

-

.

the Republic end by the Security
Counc11.53
In.conclusion,
.
.
the Aust.r~1an del~gate noted. the advance~e.nt b7 the United
States of a resolution b7 which the Council 'llOuld resolve .
to tender its good otticea to the parties

in diapute.

American resolution
also provided that, it
-·

The

the parties
ao
.

requested, the Council would a1siat in the •ettlemant through
'

a committee composed

or

-.

•

•

•

-#.

three members~.the
••

J

•

•

•

.

Counc11J each,
•

of the parties _to the dispute would •elect one or the
committee mambera and these two would then select the
third.5,4

Mr. Oro1t11ko opposed the. var1~us proposal• tor the
creation ot an arbitration commission and the creation ot a
consular commission on the grounds that (1) .the consular
comm!aaion VDuld be biased in tavor ot the Netherlands
because,

or

the five el1g1~le career ~onsuls 1n Batavia, three,

the United Statea, the United Kingdom, and France, were
53Ib1d., P• 2174. The text ot the Australian
re•olution m~ be tound in the footnotes ot this page.
'
.
54Ib1d,,
The text ot the United Stntea reaolution
may be touiid'l'ii the footnotes on·page •. 2179.
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tavorable·to,the colonial point of view, and (2) the propoaed
comm1as1ona ot e.rb1trat1on would. put the solution ot the
Indonesian problem into the hands

or. one,

two, or three

nations rather than 1nto the hands of the Security Council
as a whole.55

l94th Meet1n~, 25 August 1947

Mr. Sjahrir ot the Republic ot Indonesia, speaking
. .
.
at the l94th meeting on 25 August 19471 noted that (1) the
. .
.
~
military 11tuation
in
tho
Republic
was dally growing worse
.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

despite the l August cease-fire order, (2) the Council should
.
..
condemn aggression and should require the withdrawal ct
.

-

,

.

~

.

•

1, •

•

•

~

.

'

Netherlands troops to the positions
which they occupied under
.
.

or

tho terms

'

.

.•

1'

.

.

waa willing to accept e.ny resolution
• ~

.,..

the 14 October 1946 truce, and (3) the Republic
•

•

•

•

~

•

~

or

\

impartial arbitration,

•

•

J

•

.

'

provided that the Security Counc11'wouid riot be by•paased.56
'

'

'

:

.,,

.

'..

The Belgian repre1entative, Mr. van Langenhove,
brought to thB attention

.

or

.

.

the Council a drart reaolut1on

requesting the International Court o~ Justice to give an
•

'~

I

advisory opinion on the question or the competence or the
Security Council to de~l with
.

.

.

th~

',

Indones1~ queatlon.57
.

~

Mr. Gromyko then submitted an amendment to the joint AustralianChinese resolution.

Thia amendm8nt proposed the om1sa1on ot

55Ibid.,' PP• 2179-2183.

-

56se~u.r1t~
Council, Official Records, Second Year,
Number 03 (194th Foet1ng), 25 August 1947, pp. 2190-2191.
57Ib1d., p. 2193. The text or the Belgian resolution
may be touiid"i"n t.bl footnote on thla page.

••

the paragraphs

ot the consular

dealing with the establishment

comm1es1on and in·1ta place proposed.the creation of a
commission wh1ch would be composed ot the states which

or

were Members

the Secur1t7 Counc11J the dut7 of this

·,

commission would be to supervise the:1mpleimntat1on ot the
Council's l August resolution. ~The amendment was rejected
by a French Teto,

the vote being 7: in tavor, 2 aga~at

.

(Belgium, Franco), end 2 abatent1ons (China, United Kingdom).58
Following the vote on the Soviet amendment, Mr. KatzSuchy of Poland submitted an amendnent to the United States
resolution end the Australian resolution which called tor
,

.

.

!

~

~.

or

the establishment
,

a commission consisting of eleven

would

members. ot th~ Seour1.ty Council whose duty it

imcllatora· end. arbitrators

act as

.

'

.

1n

the.

indone~1~n dtspute.s9

•

~ .. ;_'.

"'.

- •

'

.

..

'

The Polish omendment to the Australian resolution
<(I

be to

'.

•

was rejected
•

'

'

•

by a vote of 4 in favor, 3 against, with 4 abstentions.
·.

.

.·

Immediately after the vote on the Polish amendment, the
I

.

:

•,

Auat.ral1an resolution

',.

was· put to a· vote.

in ravor,

adoption, the vote being 3
abstentions.
:.-. I : .

The
•

:

It. railed

ot

none against, and a

tin.tl vote ot the· da1 was taken on the
. ··

: .'

·1

i

•'

·_ •. . · .., ·

1

~'. ·

;

·

;

.

United States draft. resolution calling tor the cr~ation or a
,_

1o

f .

or

Committee

Good Oftice1.
:,

'

':, ,, ",

Thia proposal was adopted by a

' ,_/

vote ot 8 in tavor, none against,

v-

'•

I

with 3 abstentiona.60

-

58Ib1d., P• 2200.
-~9

~.,
pp. 22~3"'.'~204.
'.60Ibid";, P• 2209 •.
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The d11cu1sion now turned to consideration

or

the

Belg1an,propo1al to aak the International Court for an
adviaorr opinion on the question

or

the Council's competence.

Mr. Gromyko attacked the proposal as being designed to divert
the attention ot the Securit1 Council and the United Nations

trom the aubatance
'

or

legal considerations

the
que1t1on
and "to draw attention to
··. ..
. .

or

secondary importance which properly

should never even have a~i~~n. n61 ·

l95th Meeting, 26August·1947
Consideration of the Belgian proposal was continued
at the 1S5th neeting which wa1 held on 26 August 1947.

In ·

general, the opponent• ot the proposal epoke ot the tims
whioh would probably be neceasary to.obtain an advi•ol"J"
opinion trom the CourtJ this delay would ottaet any value
which might be derived from such en opinion.

When put to a

vote, the Belgian reaolution waa not adoptedJ the vote on
the zmaaure was 4 in tavor, 1 against, and 6 abata1n1ng.62
The Polish reaolut1on, dated 25 August, reminding
the Uetherlands and.Indone•ian
cease-tire order

or

Governments or tho Council's

l August and calling upon those Govern-

nenta to adhere strictl7 to that resolution waa considered
next.

The d1souaa1on ot this proposal centered around ceaae-

tire violation and whether the Republican Government was
61

.
. ' '
.
Ibid., PP• 22~0~2211.

62segur1tt Counoll, 0ttio1al Records, Second Year,
Number B4 (l95th and 196th Meetinga), 26 August 1947,
pp. 2214-2224.
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actually capable or maintaining law and order in the area
under its jurisdiction. At the cloae ·or this debate the -

or

Poliah resolution was adopted by a vote
abstention.63

ss: !h!

Interim Report

10 to O with l ·: ' :·

Consular Com.m1sa1on

An interim report
.the consular repreaontativea
.
..from
,
. .

at Batavia, dated 22 September 1947, was included on the
agenda
of the 205th m;,et1ng
which was held on 29
September.
.
.
.
The Comm1as1on's interim report waa baaed upon visita by
its members to eleven different
Netherlands
and Indonesian•
.
.
.
controlled areas in Java and Sumatra. The report.noted that
•

-,

-,

•

.,•

)

\'

'

C•'

the. advancea
ot Netherlands
troops between
20 . July
and 4
. .
'
'.
.
. .
~
IP
August had
been in the .nature
of.spearheads.
aomo
fighting
. . ._
.
.
. .. and
.
.
.

,

.

.

.

,.

had occurred. While the . main bod1ea
or
Republican
troops•.
.
..
.
. ,,
retreated betore the Dutch advance, considerable numbers
'

,,,.

"remained between the spearheads 1~ 1ome areas end guerrillas
·.

'J,/"·,/

rena1ned in all areaa."

During
and after
the
Dutch advances,
.
...
.
;

the Indonasiana pursued a scorched-earth
pol1c1:
looting and
. .
.
\

'

other disturbances also took place
along with heavy loss ot
' .
..
lite, particularly &mong the Chinese, during thia period.
'

On 29 August the ~etherlands. Ea.st. Indie_a Government announced

its intention to acoompliah "complete restoration

or

law and

order and the complete d1ao.rmo.ment and winding up ot all
armed organizations~ which.opposed the author1t7 of the East
••
6Zib1d.:.

PP• 2224-2232 •. Tho.. te.xt ot the Poliah·
resolution may be found in the tootnotea on pages 2224-2225.
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Indies Government. The Dutch set the demarcation line tor
the area in which they proposed to re-eatabl1ah law and order
at th& point or their most advanced pos1t1ona. The Republic
did not accept this 11ne

or

dermrcation and consequently

considered Dutch patrol action along this line to be hostile
action.· The result or this ai tuat1on
a continuance

or

waa9\

quite naturall7,

or

patrol clashes and an1p1ng 1n spite

the

Council's cease-tire order ot 1· August. · The Comm1as1on
further noted that the situation described above was not
only the cause

or

the continued cont'lict, but also the major

obstacle in the path of etfeot1ve 1mpleimntat1on

or

the

cease-tire order. · The Commission reported that no practical
interim meaaures had been discovered which would more
effectively 1mplenent the 1 August resolution or reduce
·casualitie•. The report concluded b7 stating that the
Comm1as1on hoped to complete a written report on or about
30 Septent>er.64

By a letter dated 30 August the Netherle.nd:t representative not1t1ed,• the Secretary-General that his Government's
;

attitude concerning the competence .or.t~ Security Council

.

~aa unchanged, but that the tendency of the Council's
·resolutions ot 25 and 26 August was acceptabl$ and the
•

~-·of

•

'

•

•

~

~

,

t; .

Netherlands Government would provide the career consuls at
Batavia with the nece11ary tac111t1ea.65
64secur1ty
Council, Otf1o1al Records, Second Year,
Number 91
65secur1t1 Council, 0ft1c1al Records, Second Year,
Number 92 (206th i1eet1ng), l October 1947, P• 2481.

••

77

Five da1s later the Netherlanda delegate notified the
Secretary-General that hia Government had invited the Belgian
Government to serve on the Committee or Good Offices and the ..
invitation had been accepted.66.
The Preaident or the Council was not1t1ed ot the
aelection ot the other members ot the Committee b1 lettera
dated.18 September.

The Republic ot Indonea1a selected'the

Government of Australia to serve as 1ta repreaentativeJ
the representatives or Australia and Belgium jointl1 selected
the United States to serve aa·the third member ot the·
Committee •67. ·
.The Australian Government appointed Mr. Justice
Kirby, a judge ot t.ne Australian Cormnonwealth Court

or

Conciliation and Arbitration, aa 1te representative on the
Committee and the Government ot Belgium aeleoted tormer
Prime Minister Paul van Zeeland.ea

207tb Meeting,~

Ootober 1947

Mr. Evatt ot Australia opened d1acuas1on at the
~October

meeting

or

the Secur1t1 Council on the interim ~·

report ot the Consular Commission

by

noting the tact that the

cease-tire was not be1n~ observed; in view ot the graT1ty or
the situation, the Australian delegate submitted a resolution

68seeur1ti
Council, Official Records, Second Year,
Numbe~ 93 (2o7th 7eetlng),.3 October 1947, pp. 2483-2484 and
footnotes.

••

.,8
.

'

requesting'the Secretary-General "to act as convenor·or·the
CoMmlttee.or Three.and arrange tor the organization or its
work" and~ further, that the Committee be requested to proceed
with its work."w1th.the utmost dlspatch".69
. · Immediately followinc; Mr~'· Evatt'•
declared

th8.t

speech, Mr.· Gromyko

the interim report clearly 1nd1oated that

th.8

SecW.it~ Counc11's.decta1on waa being ignored. ·The Soviet
delegation considered it to be'the

to

SecU1'1ty Council'• duty

rectify thia situation end, accordingly, aubYnttted a

re1oluti0n calling for the 'wt thdrawal or"· both Netherlands·
and Indonosian troops

to the.pos1t1ons'.wfl1ch they had occupied

r~.

be tore· tba beginning ot · Dii.11 tary ·operations.

Gromyko

subm1tted·th1a·resolut1on because he telt the Australian
resolution to be ·1nsutr1cient ·;and useloaa in view ot the
existing s1tuation~70 ' : : - · .. : · ·
·· · ~
..

Mr. van Klertens concluded

'day's apeeohes

t.f:v)

by

presenting the Netherle.nda' reasons tor opposing the with'I

. '

»:

drawal of troopa.

The primary reasons were (1) the inadequac7

and corruptneaa ot the Republican administration in areas
I''·

•

,

·•.•

between the Dutch troope, and (2) the danger to hosteges and
.

,,.

..

\

.

! .

.

.

.

.

.

'

.

~

•

the fear or reprisals in. a:t>ee.s. from which Dutch troops would
be withdrawn.

In the course

or

..

his speech Mr. van JQ.effena.

alluded to a cablegram,
dated 29 September, from Mr. A.G.
'·
Gani, Deput,-,
Prime
Minister,
ot the Republic to the President
.
.
·.
69Ib1d.1 P• 2488.
be found on page 2503.

The text of this resolu~ion ma.7

70rb1d., pp •. 2488-2491. The text ot the Soviet
resolution may be found on page 2491.

••
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ot the Security Council.

Mr ... Gan1 atated that the Dutch

advances amounted to penetration,,not occupation, and th~t
auch pene~rat1on did not conter upon.the penetrators the
right to regard~areas between their conv~rging lines a•
occupied.territory., The Indonesian ott1c1al also.declared
that the Netherlands was attempting to "divide and conquer"
by "making preparations.tor tbe.eatabliahment.ot a puppet

atate with other qu1al1nga, •••wh1ch in tact )JJ!)ana a continued
ettort. by_ the . Netherlands to a_trangle the ~epubl1c politic ally ••• "

Mr. van Kletfens maintained.that. this telegram preaented_a.
distorted picture·and then proceeded with a description or
the inadequacy ot Republican adm1n1atrat1on
evidence•
.
. and
...
ot lack ot good tai th on the. part of. the. Indonesian lea.dera. 71
'

Before . the meeting wa1 adjourned, a vote,. was. taken on the ...
Australian r,eaolut~ons J. thia propoaal. waa ~dopted by a vote
ot 9.in ta!or,

none agatnat, with 2 absta1n1ng.72

208th Meeting, 7 October 1947
Diacuaaion or' the' interim report ot the Con1ular .
Co~11aion

was continued at the 208th DBeting.' ~Tr, Pillai

ot I~d1a, the
.t

~itiaf

..

speaker ot the day, aupp'orted th~

•

Republican

•

~

•

point . ot view that the e1tabli1hment ot apearhead1

did not constitute
occupation.
-- effective
..
..
.

The . Indian delegate
pointed out that the Ne~herlanda ,Government.had 1et it• own

-··

71Ibid PP• 2492-2502. The text or Mr, Gani'a
cablegram may be round.in the footnote on page 2494.
72Ibtd.'

P• 2503.

••

so
demarcation line and had. evidently expected the Republic to
accept th1a aa a!!.!! aocomp11.
atrocities,

Mr.

In regard to the alleged
..

Pillai auggeeted that very probably such

accuaat1ona could be justifiably made against both s1~ea.
.

.

In.view

.

or

~'

'.,,

the circumstances it was natural that the Republic

1hould regard the Dutch attempt to restore law and order
'behind the ·ao-calle·d "van Mook line" aa a continuation ot
hoat111t1ea. Consequently, the Indian representative was ot
the' opinion that the t1ghting 'probabl7 could not be •topped
until .th~ armed ~orcoa of both aldea.were withdrawn to their
ante-bellum posi tiona.'l3

Mr. Palar or Indonesia apoke atronglJ in tavor or
.....

the withdrawal ot Dutch.troop• to the poa1t1ons which the1
had held.under the truce ot 14October.1946.

The Indonesian

delegate maintained that the d1fticult1ea noted b7 the
Consular Commiasion in !ta.report were all cauaed by the .. ·
presence ot Dutch troops in Republican terr1tor7. The
Republic, while gratetul.to the Council tor the otter ot it•
good ottices, wanted a guarantee that an7 solution reached~
would be binding upon both parties.

In conclu11on, Mr. Palar

noted, at length and with numerous examplea, 1naccurac1e1 in
the speech given at the previous meeting by the Netherlands
repreaentativ•. 74. ·

u.

. . . ''ms~curi t~ Couno
O.t'f1o1.al Records, Second Year,
Number 94 (208th )~et1ng), 7October1947• pp. 2506-2509.
-- 74Ib1d.,· PP• 2517-2523.

•

•
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209tb Meeting, 9 October 1947
Speaking
at the 209th meeting on 9 October, ?4r. Auatin
. . .
. . ,.
t
ot the United States ~xpreased the opinion that the interim
.

.

report of the Consular Comm!1s1on did not supply the Council
.
~
.
.
..
with adequate information concerning the proposed withdrawal
..

t

;

•

~

• ....

...

1

•

.

, .

~

ot troops and the consequence1
or such an action. Consequentl7,
,..
.
.

the United State•
delegation
felt. that the parties. to the
,.. .
~
dispute should
'

or
.

..

seek to conclude an agreement, with the aid
•

the Committee

'.

of

'

•

I

Good Offices which waa about to commence

work.75
:

..

210th Meetin3, 11Ootober1947

'.Colonel Hodg1on took issue with the United State•'
point

or Yiew at the next meeting. ·~ Tha representative or·

Australia disagreed with~the opinion that no tacts existed
which warranted withdrawal ot armed torcea b7 atat!ng that
the existence of continued hoat111t1ea and the tact that .
the Security Council order •a• not being obe1ed constituted
auttic ient evidence upon which to base the . withdrawal. ot ·
troop1. Colonel Hodgson also opposed the Soviet re1olution
becauae he telt that·1t was impractical since it did not
·provide for a lose of contact between the armed torcea ot
".

-

the two part1e~.
.. · .·· .· .

lle ~hen aubd tted a ·proposal ·calling· upon

the Netherlanda and the Republic to withdraw their armed
. 75seour1tR·counc1l, Official Records, Second Year,
Number.95 (209th

eeting), 9Octob~r1947,·pp.

2526·2528.

••

82

torcea to a point at least t1ve kilometre• behind the
posit1ona 'Which the7 had held prior to the ceaae-t1re
.~
order ot l AugUat. 76 - ·
\

Sir Alexander Cadogan ot the United Kingdom noted

that it would be extremel7 d1tt1cult tor ·the Couno11 to
ascertain the poa1t1on ot the troopa ot both aide• as ot
l AuguatJ consequentl7,

1t

1D

uld be extremel7 d1tt1cult ·

to 1mplemont the Australian roaolution •. With the purpose
'•

or

remed71ng this situation in mind, the British delegate

1ubmitted a dratt resolution stating that the first atep
toward ensuring observance ot the cea1e•fire order should

be the eat~b_l~1ah~e.nt_
?~. _a proviai,~;~&:l. demrca tion line•.

The

resolution alao requested the Committee ot Good Offices to
'

i

'

' •

·,,:.

J ,

•.

.. ~ l

~- ........ : ~~, : ~. ~ \. ~· :.

..

~

make thia 1ta first object1Ye and to instruct the Consular
J

.

•.

•

1 • ~

':

• •

)-#

.

,. .

\,

.

~

~:

• .

•

• ·-.

• .

, ..

- ..

:.

)

•

•

~

_._

"

. ~

Commission to make proposal• tor establishing such a line.77
,

1

,

I

_

•

-;

•

• 4

Mr. de La Tournelle

,

•

1

:

•. ,

,

•

,

, •

~'

ot France went on record as

being detinitel7 opposed to the Soviet resolution on the
't.,

grounds that the withdrawal

•

or

•

I

troopa might even extend the

area or conflict. The French delegate felt

that the

Australian proposal wa1 not aui table because t.he_ troops in
:··..

question
-

did not occup1 olearl1
'

.

"'\

·:

detined
~
.and •table ,. positions;
.

France did, however, support the proposal ot the United

.

'

.

Kingdom. 78

· 76secur1t~ Council, Ott1c1al Reco~ds, Second Year,
Number 96 (210th~et1ng), ll October 1947, pp. 2552-2555.
The text ot the Australian resolution may be round on ..

page 2555.
·

77ll2.1Ji. ," pp. 2556-2558.

The text

reaolut1on may be found on page 2558.
78~.,

PP• 2559-2560.

ot t.h.9 British

••

. The;.A.ustralian delegation felt that the United
Kingdom resolution would be 1nettect1ve in getting the
troopa to break contact whereas their own resolution was a
positive attempt to secure thia objective.

The Netherland•

representative maintained that the Australian resolution
was too simple to provide tor a practical solution to the
problem~

or

preventing future violations

order, but he aupported

the

the cease-tire

Br1 tish proposal as being baaed

upon "pure common aense.•79

2llth Meeting, 14 October 1947
··On 14 October at the opening
the President
attention

or

or

.

the 2llth meeting,
'

·.

.

the Council, Sir Alexander Cadoean, drew the

that bod7 to a cablegram dated 11October1947

trom the Consular Comm11sion.
a summary or the
report.

or

1111

This communication contained

in points or the complete e onauler

It pointed out, first, that cease-fire orders had

been given but there was no confidence on the part of either
part7 that the other aide would obe7 themJ no attempt had
been made b7 either side to reach an agreement tor the
purpoae of implementing them.

Second, the Republican

Goveniment had ordered its troopa "to remain in their
poa1t1ons and ceaae host111t1e1J" the Netherlands East
Indies Government had considered it necea1a17 to continue
with the restoration ot law and order within the limit• ot
the "van Mook" line.

_.,

79Ib1d

Third, the Dutch troops continued ·

••

84

mopping-up operations in areas occupied by Republican troops
which had been by-passed during rapid Dutch·advance; Indonea1&n:
troops were ordered to defend themselves and "to oppose
movements within Netherlands-held territory.~

Fourth, a

considerable amount ot banditry, murder, and araon was
1t1 ll

be 1ng e arr1ed on by irregular bands. . Flf th, the

population suffered cona1derabl7:before the police action
and scorched-earth pol1011 thi•

au.tter1ng had been 1ntens1•

tied during and atter the police action.· Sixth, adm1niatrat1on arid cultivation

waa

being carried·on under emergenc7

conditions in both areaar in the Net~rlands

area tears of

band1tJ"7 and or future Republ1can·repr1sala ex1ated,.wh1le
1n the Republican area wide-spread ahortage1 caused bJ the

cessation o~ normal export and import trade had become
apparentJ

the.

rood •1tuat1on

might deteriorate·

in the Republic waa good, but

in a tew months· time. · Seventh, the ·

1ntluent1al claas ot Indonea1ana,:wh1ch numbered not more
than 5~

or

the total populat1on,·all sought independence,.

while not neceasar11J supporting the RepublicJ ~there ia
little hatred ot the Netherlands, whose assistance in
rUnning tha countr,- 11 recognized

aa essent1a1.n80

The reprosentat1vea of Poland end the U.S.S.R. both
atreased

the need ror 1nnm.diate Securit7 Council _action in

view of the tact that the Dutch were continuing with their
· ·

· ·

80seour1tPo

Council~ Ott'1c1al Rec.ords, Second Year,
Number 97 (2llth~et1ng), 14 October 1947, pp. 2569-2570.
The text or the Comm1as1onta cablegram mar be found in the
footnotes of pagea 2570-2571.

•

•

~mopping-up"

operations wh11e the Republic had ordered 1ta

troopa to remain in their positions and cease host111t1es.Sl

Mr. El-Khouri ot the Syrian delegation, 1n d1scusa1ng
tha proposals betore the Council, stated that he did not
believe that the Consular Comm1aa1on would be able to.draw

or

the·line

dennrcation proposed bJ the Dr1t1sh resolution
I

as 1 t would be a ver7 c.Urr1cult
aerv1cea ot experts.

job and vo uld require: the

The Syrian delegate did not believe

the Australian propoaal to be practical or likel7 to achieve
good results becauae he did not think it correct to a1k
troops which had not.advanced at all.to withdraw still
farther. · ·.MJ'. El-Khouri considered the Soviet proposal to be .
a practical re1olution,·11noe it was baaed on the line ot
demarcation accepted by.both •idea.two or more years
prev1ous17. ; In order to ott1et

the Dutch· contention that· .

withdrawal ot troops would lead .to repr1aals and retaliations,
he submitted an amendment to the Huasian r••o1ut1on calling
tor the release ot hostagea and the declaration ot a general
amneaty in tavor ot persons guilt1 ot political crimea.82 ..
213th Meeting, 22 October 1947
At tho opening
'

or

the 213th imeting on 22 October 1947

_.j

. the President stated th:it the complete report ot the consular
Comm.1s~1on had.been receiv~d.83 Thia report went into great
~

.. Sl

~

t

.
Ibid,, PP• 2572-2580.
82
.
~.,
PP• 2583-2585.

-.

I

83sa~~r1tn
.
Coun~11, orr1~1a1 Records,.Sec~nd Year,
Number 99 (2l3th:ieet1ng), 22 October 1947, pp. 2597-2598.

•

•

86

detail on such DBttera as the differing interpretations ot
.

the cease-tire order, the van Mook line, allegations ot
breaches ot the cease-tire order; and the general condition
ot the areas :occupied by the reapect1ve toroes

of the

Republic and the Netherlands ... The complete report merely
empbaa1zed the tact

that the d1tter1ng interpretations

placed upon the ceaae•tire order precluded the etrect1ve
operation ot the Council'• l August resolution. Economic
rehabilitation had been.started on the·east coast ot
Sumatra, but in the absence

or

agreement between the Nether-

lands and the Republic, great d1tt1cult1ea would continue.
The report alao noted that.trade in general, and particularly
exports, had been "hamstrung" by the blockade and the

general 1natab111t1
.

-

.'

-

'

or.

t~e
~

~~t~.a4
·•

Mr. Auatin wa1 ot t1:-e opinion that the major problem
.
tac1ng the Council had to do with the long-range settlemant

or the dispute.

In an etfort to,solve this problem, the
.

.

~·

.

United States
representative
submitted
.
.
~
. . '·
. a dratt resolution
'

calling upon both parties to consult with oach other tor the

.

'

purpose or implementing
the cease-tire order and, ponding
. ..
.
.
. ·"'
'

-·

the conclusion ot auoh agreement, to cease any activ1t1ea
"which directly ~r indirectly contravene .th.at resolution;"
the resolution .fUrther called upon the Committee ot Good
0.t'ticea to assist the parties in reaching the agreement
mentioned above and also requeated the Conaular Commiaa1on .
· - : 84secur1t;y Council, Ott!cie.1 Reoorda, .second Year,
Special Supplement Number 4, "Report by the Consular
Commiasion at Batavia to the Securitr Council," pp. 65-66.

••

87
and 1ta military assistants to tmke its services aYailable ·
to the Committee.85

Ur. van Kl.ettens stated that neither the amnesty

or

proposed by Syria nor the Indonesian guarantee

ma1nta1n1ng

peace e.nd order would be etrect1ve·as the Republican Governlmnt was'not capable'of entorelng such a guarantee.86 ·aeneral
Romulo ot the Philippine delegation· expressed· the op1n10n

that the second·inter1m report'ot the Commission was unduly
favorable to the Netherlands, citing examplea in support

or

th1a argument.87

214th Meeting, 27 October 1947'
Atter studying
ths complete report. ot the Consula~
....
'.

•

..

_.'

•.

Commission,
Mr.. Pillai
or . . India,
speaking
at
the
. '
•.·.
~
. ' .
.. '
·. . 214th
.
.
JOOeting of the Council, declared that this report gave
'

-

'

\

...

,

,- . .r

.

•

•.

••

.~ .•. .

·•

.

...

•

I

,

·..

....;

.-

J.

.

. \

~,

~

. ,;

:

added support to his 1tatezm,nt made in connection with the
.

•

1.

.

Comm1es1on•a first . interim
reportJ naimly,
that
the reapona1~
. .
.
.
'

b111ty for the continuance ot hostilities in Indonesia should
be plac~d ~~.the ~etherlan~~ Go~e~ent.89
representative held that the full
report. t
., .

~o· United -, State1

or
:

the Commission
t

.

•

indicated that it would.not be w1ae tor the Security Coun~11
~
.
...
- ...
.
.
to attempt to solve ta, complicated military problem: thla
'

'

.

.

•

•

'

{

.

.

...

.

·,

'.

.

'

j>

.

.

~.: .

•

•

·'

matter should be ·: given
. to .. , the . Committee. . of~ Good Offices.· In
light ot the.roport's disclosure that d1tter1ng 1nterprcta-.
;

.-,

85socur1tl Council, orr101a1 Records,· Second Year, Number
99 (213th lieetlng, 22 October 1947; PP• 2602-2604. The text or
the United States resolution may be found on page 2604.
86Ib1d.,
. 87Jbid.,

pp• 2606-2507 •..
P• .2598~ .
-

88seour1ty Council, Official Records, Second Year,Numl:e~
. ~

.

100 (214th Meeting), 27 October 1947, P• 2624.

>

••

88

tions ot the cease-fire order were the cause ot the trouble,
Mr. Austin submitted a revision to the resolution which•he

had aubmitted at the 213th meeting.

The reviaed.reaolution

contained an additional paragraph advising the part1ea·to ·. ·
the dispute .that the Council's cease-tire order "should be
interpreted aa not permitting the use·ot the armed torcea

or

~!the~ ~~tr by ~111tary action to alter.substantially

the terr1to17 under ite control on 4 August 1947."89
1

At the next neot1ng 81~ Alexander Cadogan withdrew
the drat~ resolution concerning the establishment of a line
ot demarcation which he had submitted at the 210th meet1ns
because that resolution was covered b7 the broader United

of . Poland,

States
resolution.90
Mr. Katz-Suchy
~ ...
.

in . a length7
.
speech directed against ~he Netherlands, objected to the
'

'
.
United States resolution on the grotUtds that (1) it recognized

territorial gains acquired
by rorce,
.

and
(2) it was conducive
.

to further misinterpretation, particularly the meaning ot the
. .
.
.
.
term Rsubata.nt1al." In consequence or h11 indictment or the
.

.

Netherlands, the Polish delagats submitted a resolution
.
.
(l) stating that the Netherlands had been gu1lt7 ot-railure
to compl7 with the Security Council reaolut1on or 1 August
and 27 August, (2) calling upon the Dutch Governzoont to ·
withdraw all troops and civil administration trom Republican
'

f

•

~

terr! tory end tor the Consular .Comm1seion to supervise the

89Ib1d.,
PP• 26(0-2544. The text ot the revised
United States resolution nay be found 1n the rootnote on
page 2644.

90seeur1t~

Council, Official Records, Second Year,
Number 101(215th1'4eet1ng), 29 October 1947, P• 2648 •.

••

89

complience ot both parties with the above provisions,
(3) requesting the Committee ot Good O!'fice1 to take·' into
consideration the !'act that the Netherlands Government had
not complied with the Council's resolutions, and (4) calling
to the attention

or

the Netherlands Government the tact that

failure to coDply with the provisional measures would create
a a1tuat1on which mie;ht lead to.the necess1t1·or appl11ng
en!'orcement measures.91

216th ~

217th Meetings, ~1October1947
On 31October1947,

·

the representative of Chl~a,

Mr. Tsiang, : proposed
to the United
States.
..
.
. en anendment
.
\
.
. .

resolution.

dratt

This amendment, in regard to the resolution's

provision concerning a~n3ultat1on betwee~ the pa~t1es, added
a phrase calling for 1uch consultation to take place either
L

•

'

•

directly or through the Committee ot Good Offices.

The

amendnent
also added a phra•e calling tor . cessattom or incite.
.
ment to act1v1t1es which would contravene
the
resolution
and
.
.
.

.

tor
appropriate
to be taken for sate-guarding
11.te
.
...
. measures
. .
.
~ '

or

and property.92 Colonel Hodgson

Australia noted the

Belgian a?mndtmnt to tho revised text
\

I

•:

-

~

•

i

•.

or
•

the United States
'•

dratt
resolution• which stated thnt . nny I:.substantial alteration
,
ot the territory occupied b7 the
parties on 4 August would
.

.

be.1ncona1stent with the Cou_"lcil's resolution Qf l.A~lgU3t.
91Ib1d~,
PP• 2660·2662. The text ot the Polish
resolution may be round on pages 2561-2662.
~

.

Secur1tl Council, Otf1c1al Records, Second Year,
Number 102 (2l6th and 217th Meetings), 31October19471
p. 2683.

••

90

this amendment nerel7 changed the wording ot the

In etteot,

last paragraph or the United Stat~a resolution from a
negative to a pos1tiYe atatement.9~
•

' ~ .: '
drew the Council's.

U.s.s.R.

Mr. Gromyko ot the

attention to a letter, dated 28October1947,

ot the Republ.1c ot Indon~sia,

repreaentative

P_rea1dent of the s.,curity

Council.

addressed

to the

In thia letter the

-Indoneeian
delegate stated~ that the ~ly
.
.
.

from Mr. Thamboe,

aituat~on und~?'

'

which
an understanding could
be . ?'eaohed
would
be complete
.
.
.
.
Withdrawal or.Netherlands forces trom territory which they
,'

•

•

••

•

.

'

•

1·•

had occupied after 21 July.
..

~

'

The Republican Government again

•

• t •

called
Security Council
to appoint an international
'
.. . upon
. . the
·- . ' .
~ .
commia11on composed or representatives or .the Securit7
'

•

'

·,

l

•

••

'•

·.1

•

.'.

'

Council; the dut1ea ot thla comm1as1on would include observing
•.

'

•

·.'

•

·:•

' •

•.

•

...

'

'

''

l

'

•"

-"

'

~

•

I

,.

'

'

,!

1

•

t

•'

and 1nveat1gating conditions.in and auperT1a1on or the
•

,

~

r

•

'•

1

•

•

I

·"'

•.

·j

•

"'•

,.

\

"'

'

'

territories evacuated b7 Netherlands forcea.94
On the afternoon of 31 October, at . the 217th Dl')eting,

or

Mr. Muniz
. .

Drazil
declared that
the. . report
ot the Consular
._,
.
. .
. '
.
"

Commission clearl1 indicated ·! the
impracticality
or attempting
,.
.
.. .
~
'.
'

'

',

'

,.... .. ••

••

• ••

-.

.-4

•

to supervise

a ceaae-tire
without' direct
..
. contact w1 th the

situation.

The Brazilian delegate oppo~e~ the resolutions

•ubmitted

_,

b1 .the u.s.s.R., Australia, ~nd _Poland on the.

ground1 .that the7 adopted
too theoretical
an approach to
'
.
. •.
.
·,

the proble~.

He.aupported the United States resolution and
.

•·

9.3Ib14., P• 2684. The text ot the Belgian amendment
may be found
in the footnote or this page.
94 .
.
Ibid•, PP• 2689-2690.
The text or th1a communication
tound In the footnotes on pages 2689-2690.
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was ot ·the opinion that the proposed functions were within

the competence

or

·'

the.Committee'ot Good Otticea.95

Sir Alexander Cadogan of'the United Kingdom also
opposed the Ruas1ari and Pol1sh·resolut1ons because· of the
serious disorders which might result from the withdrawal
ot troopsJ he felt that the Australian resolution was
impraotical a1noe there were·pockets of Republican troops
which were situated well behind any line which could

be ·

drawn in the territory held by Dutch troops.· The British
representative supported 'the United States resolution '' ·.
generally, but thought that it could be improved by the
Belgian and Chinese amendments.96 ·
· :. Since the 1111 t ot speakers in gene.ral discus a ion

was exhausted, the Pre1ldent put the:Soviet resolution,
calling tor withdrawal of troops, to a vote.

The resolution

was rejected aince it tailed to receive·· the attirna t1ve vote1

ot seven member11 the vote on the measure waa 4 in·· favor, 4 ·
against, and 3 abstentions•· The Australian dra.tt resolution
waa next in order of priority.

Defore the resolution was

put to a vote, Colonel Hodgson accepted an amendment
submitted

b7 Mr. GromJko changing the diatance or withdrawal

ot troops trom
five to twent1-tive. kilometrea.
.

The Australian

reaolution. wa1~ not. adopted,
tb~ vote
1
~
. . being
~
. 5 .in favor,
.
against, ~nd 5 ~b~tentione.97 Following the vote on the
'

95Ibid.,

-

96Ib1d.,
97Ib1d.,

;

....

-- -

'

-

.,

.

PP• 2691-2693.
PP• 2693-2696.
PP• 2698-2699.

'

.... ~

..... _..,.

-

~

••
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Australian resolut1on, .. Colonel Hodgson submitted an·amendment
to the United Statea proposal which would change the wording

ot the last paragraph or that resolution to "a positive ,
atatement of the clear intention ot the Counc11."9S ·

Mr. Austin, United States·representative, proposed
the establishment or a small sub-cOlttl!l!ttee· to study the
. United States

dratt

resolution·and.

the Chinese,

Belgian,

and Australian amendment• with the purpose ot reconciling.
the di.fterent texta.

Thia resolution was adopted b7 a vote

ot 7 in favor, none against,

with 4 · aba tent1ona.

Following

the vote, the President suggested that thia sub-committee be
oompoaed or the representatives or· the United Statea, ·
Australia, Belgium, and ChinaJ the Council approve~ thia
suggestion by'avote·or
abatent1ona.

"I in

tavorl'none against,·and 4

The Co'1nc11, however, rejected a Prealdential
I'

proposal that· 'the 'terms. or reference or the aub~omm1ttee
be broad enough to include the United States and Pol1ah

dratt resolutions on an e'qual tooting tor purposes or
exam1nat1on~99

-

218th arid 219th·Meet1nga, 1November1947
The aub-comm1ttee submitted a dratt resolution at
the 218th meeting on 1November1947.

This resolution called

upon the parties to consult with each other, either d.1rectl7
gs

.

.

l,2g.'

pp. 2702-2703.

.
The text or the Australian
;

resolution may be round on page 2703.
·

99

'

Ibtd., PP• 2706-2717.

l

'

••

or through the Committee of Good Ott1ce•1 tor. the purpose

ot giving effect to the cease-fire order, to cease an1
aot1v1t1ea or incitement to activities which would violate
that order, and to take msasures to provide for safeguarding
life ·and propert7.

The . resolution f'urther advised .the

parties that the cease-fire order should be interpreted aa
,roh1b1t1n3 "the uae of.the armed torce1 or either party
by hostile action to extend its control over territory not

occupied bf it on 4 August l947J" the parties were also
invited to conclude •greementa'aa to the withdrawal~ot \
troops in - the event ths. t aueb ec t1on should appear _to be .-

neces1ary and the'Committee or Good 0tf1ces was requested.
to aid the parties in reaching an agreement while the
Consular Comm1as1on waa requested·to make its aervicea,
and its m111ta17a11s11tants,

available to.the.Committee ot

Good Oftices.lOO The President.announced that all proposals
betore the Council which had been submitted by the delegations

.

.

of China, Belg1Wll1 Australia, and the United States had been
w1thdrawn'1n favor ot . the·reaolution submitted by the aubcomm1'tte.e .101

· · ( · ' ' · '.:

Mr• Pillai.of India felt.that the.new resolution waa
to-o weak in that 1 t ·did not express regret

or di•approval in

regard to the tact that the Counc11t1 cease-tire order had
not be~~ ·1~1.e~nted,
'

that

the.

'

-

• '

,."

"

•

•

,t~11~·
i

~

l~-:

Gromyko wai

·or

the. opinion~

•

reao_lution could not pro~oe

satisfactory .resulta

100seeur1ty Council, Off1c1~1 Records, Seoond Year,
Number 103 (2l8th and 219th i'etings}, l November 19471
pp. 2723-2724.

lOllb1d., P• 2724.

•'
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•ince it did not provide for the withdrawal

or

troops.

Mr. Gromyko also noted that the resolution would have the
ettect

or

te~1tory

legalizing the control of the Netherlands over
occupied bJ Dutch troops on ( A~6ust.102

At the

219th meeting, Mr. Lopez ot Colombia, tm1ntain1ng that 1t
would be a very aerioua matter for the Council morely to
note that the l August resolution had been disregarded,
proposed an amendment to the aub-comm!ttee•s resolution
1tating that
the Security Council expected.• to see the
.
l AugUs't resolution fully and tat thtully complied with b;y
the .two ~ove~menti.103

Thie emendment was not adopted aa

it tailed to receive the attirmative vote or •even member•
ot the Councit.104
The sub-committee resolution was adopted b;y a vote ot
7 to 1 with~

abstentions. The Pol1ah resolution waa

rejected, 2 votes in tavor, 4 votes againat, and 5
abstent1ona.lOS

or

At the 222nd meeting

the Council on 9 December,

the President noted receipt

ot a commun1oat1on from the

Committee of Good Offices.

This cablegram, dated l December,

stated that. the Netherlanda and the Republic had agreed to
hold d1scusa1ons on board a •hip ot the United Statea Govern•
ln8nt. if such were available.

The United States Government

102Ib1d., PP• 2725•2730~
l03Ib1d~, pp. 2746-2747. The text of the Colombian
amend.men} niay"Oe found on page 2747.
04Ib1d., P• 2749.
105Ibid., PP• 2750-2751.

• •
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had notified the Committee that it ~ould put at ita diapoaal
'

the

u.s.s.

.

·~

Renville, a dut1 trans~rt.106

229th Meetin3, 17 January 1947

.

.•

On 17 Janua17 1948,·at the'229th meeting,the
P~a1dent,'· Mr.

van' Langenhove,"' read
.

.

to the Council a cable•

,·

gram, dated 17 Januar7,· trom the Committee or Good Otrice1.
This· comnnm1c.at1on stated that the goverrimente or the
N'etberlanda and ot the Republic

.

'

truce agreement at 1430 hours

u.s.s.

Renville.

.

·or

on

Indonesia would sign a

that da7 on board the

Two hours atter the signing or the agree.

.

Jll)nt identical cease-tire orders and regulations were to be.
aent out

to

the armed toroea ot both 'parties .107' ': ·- . .

·The trlioe agreement·pi-ov1ded tor the 111uance

or

a

a·tand-ta1t 'and ceaae.:.r1re: orde~ ·to the troopa or both ·
partiea.

These order1 were'to appl1 along the •yan Mook

line" which had been described in the Proclamation or the
Netherlands Ind! ea Government on 29 Augua t 1947, and
demilitarized zonea were to be ••tabl11hed
con.torm1ty

in general

with th1a line, without prejudice to the rights,

claims, ·or position ot the'partiea.108
..

,•

'The Renville
.

Agreement set torth a list ot twelve

pr1no1plea

which were to goyern the relat1oneh1p

.

political

.

. . , . lOOseouritx Council, Official
Supplement Number 20, Annex •7, PP•

Records,

171-172 •

Second Year,

. 107
.
.
Seeur! t_y Council, Ott1c1al Records, Number l~llS · .·
(226th-240th Meetings), 6 .ranuary-4-Pebruary 1948, P• 128 •..

·lOSunited Net1ona Yearbook, 1947-48, P• 376.

• •
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between the two parties, plus six principles upon which
.

i

further negotiations were to be based.
or principle a·~~~ 'not
'.

-

·aoc~pted

The latter group
b:y both ;~rti~a until
.

.

19 Januarr; Th~ twelve political principle• provided tor
I

•

~

'

. '

"continuation ot the Committee's asaiatanoe, civil and

p~i!tical 11bertlea, ~·h~ges

in,. th~·

o~ .

a~dm1~1~trat1on

territory to be made "only.with the full and tree consent
.
:
. . ·-~ . . '., , . . .
.
.
' .·
or the population, gradual reduction or arnmd torces, reaump'.

•"

.

._

tion or trade,·· transport, mid commun1c.at1ona~ the holding
ot free elections after a period

.

or

from six to twelve

.
.
months, aelt-determination by the people or their political
relationship .to. the United States ot Indonesia, the convening
;

.

'

'

.

.

'·

_;

\

ot a constitutional convention, tha possible observation b7
.

'

.

,,

.

a United Natione agenc.y or conditions between the . ~1~1ng
•

l

~

-~

•

•

·-

'

ot the agreement and the transter ot aovere1gnty to the
United States or Indonesia, the independence or the
Indonesian peoplo and cooperation between the people ot the
Netherlands and Indonesia, a sovereign tederal state under
a constitution to be arrived at by democratic prooeaaes,

and union of the United States ot Indoneaia and other parts
ot the Kingdom ot the Netherlands under the King ot the
Netherlands."109
The six additional principle1 contained the following
provi11onsr

(l) "Sovereignty throughout the Netherland.a Indies

lhould remain with the Kingdom

or

the Netherlands until, atter

a atated interval, th! Kingdom transferred ita aovere1gnt7_to

• •
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the United States ot Indonesia:" (2) "the Republic ot
Indonea!a should be a state within the United States ot
Indonesia;" (3) "all states would be ottered ta1r representation in any prov1a1onal federal government;" (4) "either

or

party might request cont1nuence

the Committee's services

during the interim periodJ" (5) plebiscites were to be
held ftunder international observation to determine whether
the people• ot the various'territoriea
Sumatra wish their respective

or

the Republic

'

~

'

.

.

l

or

Java~ Madura, and

territories
'

"' .

;

. .~

part

to. torm
.

ot

'

Indonesia or another atate" and that "there
.

.

be a constitutional -convention in which the vnr.ious atate1
.

•

·~

•

.

'

.

'

•

,

•

-_

' .. '

~

• _:

, #

"

~

.....

would be represented in proportion to their poplilationa J"
(6) "any -•tat~ could,· 1n~tead ·or r~t-1ty1~g the. cons ti tut1on,
negotiate

a special

rela t1onah1p ~1tt1 tho

United Sta t~·s ot

Indonesia and the Kingdom ot the,Neth~rl~nds~•llO .

..

I

llOib1d., P• 377.

t

CHAPTER IV
RENVILLE TO THE SECOND POLICE ACTION
The signing

or

the Renville Agreement, at least

partially in response to pressure trom the United States
Government, caused a break-down in the internal politic•

ot the Republic•

On

·'

16 JartUD.%7 1948 the large at ot the .

political parties, the Maajumi, withdrew trom the cab1netJ
on 23 Janll8.17 Sjarituddin resigned aa Prime Minister.
President Sukarno appointed Mohammed Hatta, who was then
Vice-President, to torm a new cabinet.

The reason tor

this choice was that Hatta, aa V1ce-Prea1dent, atood above
part7. ·

A new

cabinet was tinally formed on 29 JanuarJ"

with Hntta as Prime Minister and the Masjurni and Indonesian
I

Nationalist Parties as the dominant tac'tions •1
Th~ New cabinet took immediate steps to implement
the Renville Agreeimnt, including recognition ot the van
Mook line.

By 26 February approx1matel7 35,000 men ot regular

Republican army units had withdrawn trom their pockets
be7ond the van Mook line into Republican-held territory.
Within a week atter signing the Renville Agreement, the
Dutch unilaterall7 conducted a pleb1ac1te on the island ot
Madurai the purpose ot the plebiscite was to determine the
1

Kahin,

.

sa- ill•,

•

PP• 230-234.
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t

status

,

or that

•

•

area as between the Republic

i

t

c.

'

and the newl1- ·.

~

cre.ated Interim

Federal ·Government.: Thia ·action was violative

or the Renville

Agreement in that

it

(1)

wa·a not ·conducted

under the.observation or the Committee ot Good ort1cea1
(2) the Renville Agreement had provided that no such plebiscite
'

,

I

·. •

should be carried out until at lea.st aix months after the
signing

or the Agreement, and (3) the conditions stipulated

by the Renville
Agreement under
which
such plebiscites were
.
l ·. .
.
.
·• •,

to be carried out (freedom or speech, as.semblJ, and publicaOn 21 Janua17 van Mook recognized

tion) were not observed.

or

the "State

• ..

l)tadura" .2

In West Java, Dutch activity followed
'

p&ttem.

.

·'·

••

.~ "

'

•

a
t

similar

Ve'J:7

-•'

•

••

On 12 October to 19 October 1947, the Dutch had
·-·~·

...
,···1

·,

'·~-·-~··

..

~

.. ~

convened two conrerencea designed to eatabl1ah an independent
:

'

1tate.

,...

._-..,

~. .

.

"'

'

I

'

:

·.c

The second or the1e conterencea bad provided tor-. the

'·
~
.
- ·' . '· . . . . . .· ~
. . - . calling ot a third, to meet on 24 February 1948. Despite
.

~ .,·

•

•

•.

~

\<

Renville provisions to the contrary, thia conference was
convened 1n Bandung on 23 February.
conference was the birth

The result

or

this

or the new State or West Java.

9 March the creation or an' interim
'

On

federal g0\femlne11t waa ·.
f,

.

announced by van MookJ th1agovernment was· to function
a·United States ot Indonea1a was establ1ah~dJwh1ie

until

the

Republic was invited to join 1n thia goveni~ent, the ~toh
..

established aa a condition.or acceptance the negotiation
a tinal political settlement
the Republic.
2

~·,

or

between the Netherlands and

On 27 May a tederal conterence was convened
PP• 235-238. -

.

'
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at Bandung b7 the Dutch and thia action seemed to constitute
add1t1onal proot, in the c1es ot Republican leaders, ot.
unilateral Netherlands activity in violation ot the prino1plea
of Renv1lle.3.

.

....

'•I

~

Interim

!h2 Comm! ttee 2I.. ~

Report ~

Otf!cea.

•. <

On 10 Februar1 1948 · the c'ommi ttee of Good
submitted 1ta tirat

Otf1cea

interim rep.ort t~ tho Sec~1.·tJ Council.

In general, thia report,

which covered the· activities ot

the Committee through Januar7, 1948, dealt with a review ot
.

'

the Comm!ttoe•a work, tha work ot special committees which
had been eatabliahed to implement the Council's resolution
~

i

.

•.

•

.

'·

..

ot l November 1947, and a description ot the negotiations
•

'

.

~

.

'

'

. ,

4•

'!

•

'

.

'

~

which lead to the algning ot the truce agreement and acceptance
,(

I

'

•

\

of the political principles aa a basis tor further political
negotia~tiona. 4
.

J..

~

247th Meeting, 17 February 1948
)_,I-'

Council resumed consideration ot tho

. The Securit7

.

Indonesian question on 17 February.1948 at its 247th meeting.
Arter the Council approved a request b7 the Australian
represe~t~tive~hat his Governmentbe 1~v1ted ~o participate
.·

Zibid~,
pp.' 238-247
•.
__........_.
.
'

' .

Council," Oft1o1al Records,.Th1rd Year,
Supplement Number 1-;-irtrnlted·Ilatlona Securit7
··
Council's Connn1ttee or Good Offices on the Indonesian
Question: First Interim Report of the Committee to the
·..

.

4socur1tI

Special

Security

Council,"

pp.· 1·16.

I.
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:.in the discussions,. Mr, Frank.Graham ot the United States,
Chairman of the Committee of Good Ott!cea, preaented the
'

~

.

~

.

;

.

Committee's report to the Council. Thia report was pr1mar117
.
.
.
'
concerned with a description or the historical background ot
the Indonesian problem and ot the course of negotiations
.which had culmlnat~d in ~he Renv·~'{1~ ~~~m~n~.5: ·~.
~ ' .·

,.... .

!

J

••

,

•

~stioe

~

Kirby, Auatral1an reprosentat1ve on the Committee of Good

.

-

.

Otticea, auggested that in the future the Cor.mdttee should
make its suggeations to tho parties without necessarily
waiting.. for an invitation from both parties to do so. He
also advocated an,informal rather than a formal approach
.

, •

'

• ..

. .: .i •

•

f

on the part or the Committee and a greater d1aplar of
•

.

:

.!

~

•

initiative than the a1tuat1on in the p~st had allowed.
:-r

Netherlands
•

•

,

:

•

repre·s-entativ~, while' welcoming. tho

,

•'

,

.,

'

...

The

..

~#

I

~

"",

•'

:.

'

7

:

~

t,

\

•

, : \

., · :

I

agreementa
•

•

1

J

t

•

.,•

d

~·

which had been reached, noted that continued political
I

-

•

•

~'

•'.

,

0

•

'

'

d1acuaa1ona would involve such ditticult problems a1 the
.

•

.~

. r .

'

,. . . •

..

.

~

.

relat1onah1p between the Government of the Republic and
I

-

•

the interim tederal government, the constitution

or

tho

United States ot Indonesia, and a det1n1t1on ot the relationship batwean that bod7 end the Governm~nt ot the Netherland•.6
·~

~

1

· 5united Nations Yearbook,· 1947-48, p. 376. The text
ot t~ Auat~al!an letter requesting en Invitation to participate in the d1sousa1on1 may be found in SecuritI Council,
Ottic1al Records, Third Year, Supplement for Januar7, 1''ebrua17,
~h

1948, Document S/674,

-

6Ib1d.,

P• 377.
.

P• 29.-

·

·

••
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248th Meeting, 17 February 1948 ·.
Later in the day• at the 248th meetingt the Indonesian
.

~

.

delegate expreased the opinion that the Committee ot Good
Offices should be granted powers beyond the mere rendering·
.

' ... ·

.

·'

.•..

.

'

.

of good otf1cesJ he emphasized thia point particularly in
regard

to .the ~oblem

ot con.ri1oting
.

or the agrearmnta.

provisions

while urging

the parties

interpretation•
.

or

'

Mr. van Zeela.,d of Belgium~

to 1mplelll9nt ooncrotelr thct '·eighteen
.

'

principlea of the Renville Agreement, laid atress upon the
need tor replacing the provisional arrangement•
with a lasting agreement.

or

the truce

The Australian repreaentat1ve

felt that a baaia had been established tor a "just and
enduring ae.ttleimnt,"

but believed

that the Committee

should have mors poa1t1ve tunet1ona 1n order to bring.about
moro ettectively tultillment ot the Renville Agreement.
The delegate trom Belgium disagreed w1th·th1a point ot view•
maintaining
restricted

that the Committee ahould not go beyond the
power• which it posseaaed at:_that timo.7

249th Meeting, 18 Februa;rx 1948

•

'.
I

~

The following day, at the 249th meeting, the Soviet
delegate

noted that Netherlands troops continued to take over
'

{

more and more Indonesian territory.

He also stated that the

Comm! ttee had forced . the Republic
to accept what. he termed
.
. .
a Netherlanda ultimatum embodied in the Renville Agree~nt
••
7

; .: .

~·•PP•

377-378.
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and that this agreement waa designed, not in the interest

or

the Indonesian ~eople, but for the purpose ot continuing

colonial dominance.

u.s.s.n.

tive or the

In view

or

this situation, the representa-

held th.at the only solution was adoption

ot the Soviet proposal tor the Withdrawal
both aide•.

or

the troopa

or

Following th1a speech, the Canadian delegate -· · ~,

1ubm1tted a draft reaolution which (1) noted with aat11taction
that the Truce Agree?mnt had been signed, (2) commended the
Co:nmittee~tor its aaaiatance, and'(3) requested both the
parties to the dispute and the Committee to kaep the Council
Wormed aa to the progress - ot the political' settloment.6,.,. · ~
'

25lat

.
20 February 1948.

Meeting,
The

· ---

.....

~

~

United Stat•• representative, at the 25lst
~. ;

.

meeting, noted the great achievement 'Which the parties had
...

·,

made in that they had reached an agreeimnt and brought about
an end to host111t1ea.
.

The ·Indian and Chinese deleg~te~,
.

.

. .

..

•·....

.~

however, both expreaaed the opinion that the cessation ot
·..
.
.
.
host111t1tea, while a a1gnif1cant aucceas, had been achieved
'

'·

<

.

.

\

'

largelr through the concessions. of
the Republic and its faith
.:
..

' .

'

{

\

-:·.

...

in the Secur1tr Council.

s.s.n.
•·

repeated the charges
•

•

~ :

J •

.

;

l.

The repreaentat1ve of the Ukrainian

~r

•

'

the Soviet delegate as to the
•

~

'

..

part1al1ti.or the Committee towards
the Netherlands and ita
..
adherence to the colonial polnt of vlew.9
-!

8
~·•

P• 378.

9Ib1d•,

pp. :578-379.

•

-

• •
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252nd .Meet1ne;, 21February1948
At tho-next'1meting, held on 21·Februa17, the
Indonesian representative accused the Netherlands ot intending
to establish

new

states1in West Java, ~!adura, end East Sumatra

without the plebiscites called tor in the Renville Agreement.
He reiterated hia request that the Committee ot Good Otticea
be given the power ot arbitration.

The Colombian delegate

subm1 tted amendments to the Canadian reaolution which .
(1) added an invitation to both parties to attempt to reach
an early and f'u.11 1mple1TJ9ntat1on ot the political principles,
· (2) suggested that· the parties

use the Comc1tteo•a aervicea

to adjust dittcrenoes in the 1nterpretat1on·and application

of these pr1iic1ples,

and. (3) requested

the Committee to :.

continue to aaa1at the parties.to attain the above goala.
The delegate

from Auatralia nl10 submitted an amendment

to the Canadian resolution.

Thia s.mendment atated that the

matter of ottering suggestions to the parties in an attempt
to help them roach a political settlement

without nece1aaril1

waiting tor thf> parties to request such action ahould be left
to the discretion of the Committee itaelt..

The lletherlanda

representative opposed th1a point of view; he maintained
that publication ot proposals without ~~e previous consent
of both parties would c onst1 tute a means. or applying preaslire

to the pnrt1ea a~d such a a1tuat1on_would not~· compatible
with the funotion1 or a good offices committe~~lO

10Ib1d., PP• 379-380.

• •
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256tg Meeting, 26 Februn:r;r 1948

The Indonesian question was not d11cuaaed again
until 26 Februar7 at the 256th meeting.
rep~eaentative trom'the Republic
Netherlands

or

At that time the

Indonesia charged the

with interpreting unilaterally the Renville

Agreement b1 their promotion o£ the "popular movements"
1n West Java and Sumatra.·

While supporting the Colombian

and Australian amendments, the Indonesian delegate relt
tha.t unilateral action 'on the part
to break dc:mn tho Renville

0£ tho Dutch threatened

Agreement in tha aamo wa7 similar

act1c~ had ruined the· L1nggadjati Agreement.

The

3oviet ·

delegate opposed the Canadian resolution on the ground.II that
1t approved ot the Renville Agreement and tho
that that Agreement was not aol1c1toua
Republic •11 ·

or

u.s.s.a.

the rights

or

telt
the··

259th Meot1n5, 28 February 1948
representative agreed with this

.. The Philippine

point

or

view, speaking at the 259th meeting, by ttn1nta1nlng

that the Republic had been forced to abide by a detmrcation·
line which had been establ11hed bf torce, contrary- to the
Council's resolution

or

l . Auguat 1947.

Tha Chinese delegate,

noting the great importance ot the events in Western Java
and !!adura, subm1tted·a-dratt• resolution requesting the
• •
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Committee ot Good 0tt1ces .to pa7 particular attention to
the political events in Western Java and Madura and to··.
report to the Council on such event• at trequent intervals.
This resolution waa adopted b7 a vote ot 8 in ravor, none
againat, with 3 abstaining.

In view

or

tho "debate in the

Council and the stntenent by th$ Chairman

or

or

tho Committee

Good Ottices, the Australian representative

it necesaacy to urge adoption

Cenadian resolution.

did not reel

or, h1a amendment to the -

The Security Council then rejected

the Colombian amendment to the Canadie.n resolutionJ the
Canadian resolution itself was adopted b7 a vote or 7 in
favor,

none e.ga1ns t

u.s.s.R.

and the

1

ab1ta1n1ng.12 _..
:

2nd- Interim

-

S .s .n.,

with Colombia, S7ria, Ukrainian

Report ~

··~

I

•

)..

(

'•

Special

Reports

.:

l£2!!! !b!, Committee

ss:

...................

Good Oft!ce1

-

'

:;

'. •.. 1

B7 a letter dated 19 March 1948, Mr. Palar, representa-

or

tive
'

t~ Republic of Indon~aia, intormod the Socurit7
•

~

1

'

I,.'

~

;

.. ~

•

. i ~

'

'·

Council- that.his Government considered the establishment ot
'

.

'

th8 State of Eaat Sumatra, which had been promoted
1

•

• •

'-,

I

:. t

.')

,.

~.-

"

•

Netherlands, to be a violation

or

by the

•"

the Renv11ie A~e~ment.1~

On 1 May the Council received the report of the Committee ot
Good Offices on political developments in Western Jnva. ·For
-

'

the most part, this report dealt with a resume ot.th~ three
12Ib14~
13secur1t1

council, Official R~co~ds, Third Year,

Supplement for January, Februar,., end March 1948, Docwnant

S/701, P• 40.
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conference9 held 1n Western Java e.nd a presentation
opinions

or

each

or

or

the

the parties, tha Netherlands and the

Rspublie.14 On 26 Mny the Committae submitted a report on
the pol1t1oal·developments·1n Uadura and also its second
1nter1m report. The report on the political development 1n
Madura dealt pr1tnr11y with a description of the plebiscite
which had been held on 23 January tor the purpose

or

deter-

mining the status o:t Madura. : Like the previous report on
ti/ostern. Java,

this report

presonted the contlicting opinions

ot the two parties a3 advanced by the respeotlve

partiea.15

The second interim report doscribed the work ot the varioua
aub-comm1 ttees.

· The report

had begun on 15 ·~en;

noted that pol1 t1cal d1aouss1ons

~'bmi~aion and cUsou111on of working

papers b1·both parties indicated that there was.substantinl
·agreement on a good many points• .The.report also.stated,
however, ·that no Wlderatand!ng had been reached on the
following

po1ntsi

. (l)

"Mse.sures tor

cooperat1on.:dur1ng

the

interim period ••• J" this point included the transfer ot
governmental·tunot1ons trom the.Netherland• to the Republic;
'(2) the date ot the pleb1sc1teJ.

(3). terr1tor1ea to be

involved in the pleb1ao1teJ and (4) the atatua ot New
Guinea.16

'

'

.

l4seour1t:r Council, Official Records, Third Year,
. Supplement for June. 1948, Document S/'129, PP• 11-24 •
. l5Ib1d.,

Document S/786,. pp. 25•41.

l.6Ib1d.,

Document S/787, pp. 41-72.

Ii
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~16th ~~et!n~, 10 June 1948
'. The Secur1 t7 Council resumed· d1aouss1on

ot

the

question on 10 June. ·Mr. 'Palar, the first

Indonesian

speaker, ecouaed the·Dutch· ot attempting to.el1m1nato the·
Republic by c1rcurnvent1ng.the actual negotiations,

While

crit1c1z1ng·the Dutch .for the1r·1ack o!' sincerity in
negotiating

and

ob jeoted ·to the··dela1 ·by the Security

Pa.lar strongly
and cited

for their continued. m111 tary' action,'. 1.!r.
Council

more· ·

the poas1b111t7 of the'Counc11 becoming no

than a registering

the past.

agency tor events which have happened in

The Indonesian delegate mentioned six spec1t1o

events as.the cause ot~"tremendous d1stru1t on the part ot
. ',I

These events werea

the Indone1ian Republic."

(1) the

establishment or the "Provisional Federal Government tor
Indonesia" b7 the Netherlanda.on 9 March 1948; (2) tho

or

holding

the Dutch-sponsored Bandung Conference; (3) the

••

•

..

(

•

'

•

I

-

'

•

'

'

~

banning
by the
Netherlands
ot a counter-conference
which
. .
.
.
.
.

'

'

'

waa to have been . held in Jakarta, Batav1aJ
(4) the amendment
.
to the Dutch Conat1tut1on
regarding Indone11a1
.(5) the
~
.
·. ..
'~
·,

\..r''

...

events in 1tiadura;
and
(6) the events . !n. .Weat Java.17 Mr.. van .
.
. .
Klertona of tho Netherlands countered bf declaring that a
"·~

~-

: •

i

•

.

..

'

.

{

'.•

.

.

~

~

.

,

'.

.

negative Republ1c~_att1tude in rega~d to previous agreements
tor a tederal Indonesian State and for a Union ot the Nether.-

.

•

'.

.1

...

,..

lands end United Sta tea ot Indoneaia. waa the underlying.. . .
17seour.1.t;r. Coune11,- Ot'f1c1al Records, Third Yenr,
Number
02 (3l6th and 317th Miet1nga),"1o June 1948, pp. 2-24.
.
.
;

•,

'

• •
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rea1on for the inability or the Parties to come to a tull
agreement.· The Dutch representative also noted that the
opposition or non-Republican Indonesians to a un1ta17 state
which would be headed by the Republic was a major stumbling
block.

Mr. van Klettens .. ma1nta1ned that the. Council should

not devote its time to.d1acuas1ng "incidental questions ot
.

.

'

1econda17, impo~tance;" he 1'urther suggested that the Council
let the Committee of Good Otfioea work with the problem
rather than carry on periodical debates itaelt aince such ..
debates 1eem to "estrange the part1ea rather than conciliate,·
them."

The.Notherlanda delegate also expressed the hope

that the Council would·not support any augee1tion1 aimed
at mod1f11ng "the nature, competence• or procedure ot the
Committee· ot Good Ot"tioea ••••

1'_eport .2!l ~

~ls. ;, ·. '.

.!! Banduns · .

Federal Confereme

the

The report ot

ot

Committee

Good Otticea on the

Federal Conference which opened in Bandung on '27 May was
included on the agenda

~n 17

or

the Z22nd meeting which was held

.
:•.
. · .. , ... : •.- ~
In general, this report contained only the

.

June.19

'~.'

'

. ....

torinal

~

'

docmnents 'relating to the conterence and a· presentation
:

.

'

'

'•.

.'

'

.

.

'.

'

'

.

ot the contl1ot1ng interpretations ot the two parties in
regard. to th~ motive behind. the Conference. rather than any
'

.

\

.,

.

\

'

,,

',

:

concrete obserYations on the part ot the Committee. itaelr.20
lBibid., .PP•

2S·3•.

19seaurit1 Council~ Official Records, Third Year,
Supplement for June 1948, Document S/842, PP• 91-118.
20z<ah1n,
.21!. ill•, pp. 246-247.
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322nd and 323rd i~et1nga, 17 June 1948
Mr. Tsiang

or

China disagreed with Mr. van Klefrens•

contention that the Republic of In~onos1a WQnted a unitary
state and had·diaplayed

a

negative attitude in regard to a

union with the Netherlands.

The'Chinese delegate maintained

that th<t real quostion· in Indonesia was.not a·choice betwaen
tedcrali1m end unitarianism, but rather, whether such a
tederation would be "an Indonesian federation created through
democratic methods or through Dutch control and manipulation."
lfr.~Ts1ang then 1uggested that, .1n view

or

the Republic's

oppos1 t1on to the new a ta tea of Madura and Western Java,
fair and 1mpart1al·pleb1sc1tes should be held in those areaa
unless the parties should voluntar11,. agree to some othor
torm

or

settlement.

The Chine19 repre1entat1ve closed b"1 ,.

expressing the hope that the Renville Agreement would not
be followed by a "police action" as the L1nggadjat1 Agreement
had been.21
On the bas1a of the reports betore the Council,

itr. Pillai ot India charged th~ Dutch with numerous and
flagrant violations ot th& Renville Agreement by the1r
act1v1tie1, which he described as 1nc1t1nc dlasidence and
eng1near1ng separatist movements, in West Java and Madura.22·
Mr. Malik once again charged that the Committee

or

2lpeour1tI Council, Otticial Records,
Number 86 (322nd nnd 323rd Moet1nga), l7 June Third Year,
1948, pp. 2-4.
22

.

1.2,!g., pp. 4-13.

• •
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Good Otticea, through 1ta report1, had supported Dutch
•

'.

•

r

~.

colonial . interests
and were not
In referring to
'
. objective.
.
the report• on political developments in Madura and West
Java, Mr. Malik atated that the former could be more
accurately described as "a report on the erb1trary organiza,

.

\

.

·~

.

.

t1on by the Nethe.rlanda ·author!tie a ot a pleb1sc1 te in
Madura," while the latter should be entitled "a report on

~r·a ·

the establishment by't?ie1 Ne.therlanda authorltiea

puppet State in Weatern Ja~a.• ·The Soviet·delegate concluded

b7 declaring that the po1101 ot the Netherlands Government
1n Indonesia ··stood in contradiction to the basic· princ1ple1

ot the Un1t~·dNations Charter.23
'

.

..

....

.

.,

~

.

'

'

Mr. van JO.ettens read a proas release or the Committee
'
.
.~ ... . . .
.
.
.. . ·- - . .
....

'

•.

·:

.•.

ot Good Ott1cea, dated 16 Jwie; which •tated that'the Netherlanda delegation h~d no.tit1e'd the Comm.1tteethat, In view ot

-·

•·
...
..... '·'
'
the publication ot a atr1ctlr confidential
document,
it
.

'

would discontinue negot1at1ona, ·except ro·r diaousaiona
regarding

1-aP1ementat1on or the. truce agreement,

pending

receipt ot new 1nst~t1ons.24:

At the· 32Zrd meeting,
s.s.R.

Mr~ Tara1enko ot tho Ukrainian

ch&rged the Committee or Good Ottioea •1th a lack or

object1v1t11 he noted particularl1

the t~ct that American

oil compan1ea were hold1ng'oonveraat1ona with the N~therlanda
Government concerning oil conce1aion1 1n Indonesia. The
Ukrainian delegate alao reiterated
2Sib1d·.,
24Ib1d~,

pp; 14-21;
PP• 24•27 •.

. ,

the charge that the
• •
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Netherle.nd1 was attempting to torce Indonesia back into the
1tatu1 of complete colonial dependence upon Holland.25

-~

326th Meeting, 23 June 1948
On 23

June the Couno111n1t1ated

d1scu1s1on on the

Federal Conference which. ,,was .. being held
in .Bandung.
..
Palar

or

Mr •

:

:

Indone11a examined th•
report Which the Committee
•'
'

ot Good Otticea had submitted on this Conference against
a background ot the roports on Weatern Java and Madura,

and arrived at the conclusion that the Netherlands had
intentionally
m111ntormed
the Council
in regard
to the report
. .
.
.
.
.
'

on West Java.
.

He al10 atated that the Republic had complatel7
'

l

'

.

.

accepted< the idea ot a tedera t1on, but not one c~eated
.

...

.

,,

...

,

'

through the uae of imthoda auch aa had been emplo7ed in Wast
'

.

.

•

\

t.

•.

'

'

'

..

.

Java and Madura, •ince a federation create~ 1n such a
manner would benetit the Dutch and not the Indoneaian people.
The Indonesian representative concluded that the Federal
.

.

'

'

.

..

Conference waa a unilateral attompt on the part

or

the

Dutch to sot up a federation which could be_dominnted by
•

•

~

.._,I

'

:

,.

}

;

•

•

them.26 _Mr. van Kl~ffens, of course, objected to Mr. Palar•a
version ot the Bandung Conference. He stated that "the
•

'•

'

~

#

••

Republic has neither ths monopoly nor priority to diacuas
the problem ot·tederat1on with u3 or with the other states
who are going to form the United 3tates ot IndoneaiaJ"

-

25~b1~.~ pp.-40•46.

'

I•·

'

26seeur1t~ Council, OtN.cial Records~ Third Year,
Number 89 (326th ~.feeting}, 23 June 1948, pp. 2•14.

• •

ll.Z

since the Bandung Conference in no way threatened international

peace and security, the Dutch representative t'elt ·

that it should not take up eny more ot the Council'a tim&.27
General Romulo ot'the.Ph111pp1ne·delegat1on decried the
'

l

f

.

•

attitude or some Council ~mbers

who were afraid that any

action on the pQrt'or the Council would disrupt negot1at1ona.
He emphasized tha~ the Council had interfered to the extent
ot' requesting ~eporta on the.situation in Weit.Java and

Madura end that these reports clearly indicated that Holland
~

I

..

'~

'

I

\

was responsible tor the separatist m01ement in Indoneaia.28
t.

. '

'•

.,

-

'

•

\...

Mr. Malik, after again accusing the Netherlands
•

t_,

or

nttempting

•.

to set .up puppet states while econom~cally destroying the
Republic by a blockade, noted that tha Council.had received
•

~·

l

•

•

a cablegram rrom the Committee or Good Otrtces in.which the
I

•

.._

;>

~

•

•

•

•· •

'

I

\.

United 5tatea
and Australian
deleg&t!ona
.
.
.
. expressed concern
that no. substantial progress
had been mado towards
settling .,
. .
'
,

.

the dispute• Consequently_ these two delegations had jo1ntl7
aubmitted a·' working papor. tor
consideration
b1 . the parties.
.
.
The NGtherlanda.delegation~ however, reru~ed to accept th1a
paper aa an agenda 1tsm •.
Thia cablegram
also stated that
~ . .
~
.
'

;

the Committee had been notified on 22 June that the Netherlanda GovertmJent waa prepared to resume d.1scusa1ona.~9
27I'b1d.,

PP• 14·1~.

-

28Ib1d., PP• 16-21.
29Ib1d., PP• 23-29. The text ot the cablegram t'rom
the Commit~o.f.Good
Otticea may be found in Security
Council, Off1o1nl Records, Third Year, Supplement tor June,

l94a, Documents s/~50 and S/850/Add. 1,

pp -. 147-150.

'

•

t
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By a cablegram dated 29 June, the Committee

or

Good

Ott1cea not1t1ed·the Securit1 Council that no agreement had
been reached.under which the Australian-United States working
paper could be' cons1deredJ in add1 tlon, the Netherlanda .
Goveniment stated that·1ts decision not to consider th!a
working paper was tina1.:50 ·

3rd futerlm Roport

ss: lb!

.2!

Committee

Good Offices

The Committee ot Good 0tt1oes transmitted its.third
interim report to the President ot·the Seourit1 Council by
a letter dated 23 June•

or

Thia repor~ noted the "evacuation
i

.lo.

35,000 Republican combatants to Republican-controlled

territory trom behind forward poa~t1ona

-

'or

Netherlands ·

troops" and the"relea•e of.a "cson•1derable proportion
pr11oner1 held aa pri•oner• ot war~q

or

In regard to the Dutch

blockade on the islands, the Committee reported that a number
or important agreement• had been reached in principle; but
that it waa unlikel1 that auch agreement• would be erteotivel1
1mplemented'unt11 'a·pol1t1cal aettlaIJDnt had been raachedJ
1n consequence ot ·this s1 tuation,· 'no aubatant1al ·increase·
in the nepublic '• import and export· trade had taken· place •. ·
According to report•

or

the Connnittee•a m111tar1 aaaistant1,

the shortage ot medical supplies and, 1n •ome instances,
food conat1tuted a major probl~~·

~o~

the Repub~ic.

or

The

report alao noted that ditfering 1nterpretationa·ot the Renville
·_30secur1ty Council, ·orticlal
Supplement for July, 1948, Document

Records, Third Year,
S785a, pp. 11·12.

.

'
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Agreement and of. the pr1n~1ples which it contained wa~ the
cause of mu.ch misundarstan~ng
this gap in th~ positions

or

and d1sp~te.

In regard to

the part1~a, the Committee

stated.that ta1luro·.•. ·.to 1mke
s1gn1t1cant
progress in bringing
. .
- .
.
.
.

the ~rtie1

'

to en understanding operated

to creat9

an

•'..

~

Munwholeaome effect upon the atmosphero.n31

328th

lleetine,

,1 July

1949

that the

On l Jul1 Mr. Pillai or India auggeated
•·

Dutch refusal

.

~

'•

to consider tho Australian-United
States
.
.

working paper seemed to destroy t:he hope that

t_he ~ether-

landa had not reall7 intended to break oft negotiations when
.

~

.

. .

'

"

:·

they had
upon the
. announced "auspension".or
.
. ~
.
. -~ negotiations
. . . .
alleged publication
or. this
document.32
~.
.
.
. ' ~
.

,

.

,. .

;

.

The delegate ot . the. Ukrainian
.... S .s .n. 1 J11r. lianu1lalq,
attaolm d the work of the ..Comm!
. . ttee ·. ot, Good ort1ce1,
... .
..
. a ta ting
.•'

,

'

that 1t had not acted 1n the 1ntereata.ot the Indonesian
.

.

people, but . rather had. favored
the . 1ntereata.ot
Government•.
.
.
. .. ·. . .
. .
.
which were "carr,ing out
a policy or colonial
expansion."
.
.
.. .
.
.
.·

.

'

,,·

Mr. Manuilaky alao' accused the United
States ot aupporting
. .
.
.

'

the division ot Indoneaia in order "to penetrate more deepl7
.•

~

'

•

•

•

' -

i.

'.

:

•

•

into Indonesia and_ ~o wrest economic advantagea.trom the
Dutch!~3

Following this epeech, Mr. Taiang, the representative

orrie1~i

· Zlsee~tt:r
c~~~-ii, ..
R.ec~~ds·, Thi~d Yea~,·
Supplement ?or June, 1948, Document S7848/Add. l, pp. 122-147.
32secur1t~
Council, Oft1o1al Records, Third Year,
Number 91 (328th :.eetlng), l JUly 1048, pp. 5·7. ·

Th.1d.·,

33

.PP• 10-14.

•
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ot China,:renewed

hii:request 'that

the President aak the·

Committee or·aood Otticea~to transmit to the Council the
Australian-United States working paper.

The Chinese

proposal was put to a vote, but tailed ot adoption: the vote
on the measure was 8'in'tnvor, none against, with 5 abstaining.34

329th Meetin3, 6 Julx 1948
.

I

· Speakine at the 329th meeting,· MI-. ·Palar stated that

the Dutch were continuing their economic and political
wartare-against the Republic in an attempt to destroy that
Government.

The Indoneaian representative

Dutch blockade ·and questioned

described the·

whether' this

action could be

legally carried on by the Dutoh'·1n'~1ew ot the _tact.that
the Renville Aereement was in.toroe.~5

The representativea

ot Austral1a,·Ch1na, V.S.s.n.,·and Syria all indicated· ·
aupport tor a proposal requesting

th• Committee ot Good·

Ott1cea to rmko a report on the Netherlands blockade imposed

Mr. Taiang of China submitted a formal .

upon Indone11a.36

resolution calling upon tho Committee ot Good Otticea to
transmit to the Security Council •an early report on the
e.x!atence

or

restrictions on the domestic end international

trade ot Indonea1a and tho reasons tor the delay in the .
. :54 .

.

. · .!W• 1 'PP•

.
.
14-15, 34.

~5secur1ty Council, Otficial Records, Third Year,
Number 92 {329th Meeting), 6.Jiily 1948, PP• 10-15.
36Ibtd.,

PP• 16-19.
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1mplenentat1on of article 6 ot tho truce agreement."37
Council adopted this resolution by a vote

or

The

9 to none, with

2 abatentiona.~8

Breakdowq.!n Negotiations
On 23 Jul7 the Committee of Good 0tt1ces notified
the Council that, in view of the stalemate in political
negotiations, the Republican delegation had decided that
their presence in Batavia would serve no useful purpose
and, hence, the1 decided not to return to that city after
23 JulyJ onl1 those delegates required tor work connected
with implementation
Batavia.

or the truce agreemsnt would return to

The Netherland• repreaentative had stated that

the formation of a new cabinet in Holland
. . had ms.de . it
impossible to obtain an7 new inatructio~•· The Committee
concluded that discussions, which had been suspended since
the end of May, directed toward a political settlemnt

could

not be resumed "until one party or (the) other comes forward
With (a) complete and concrete programme tor (the) establish•
ment ot (a) United States ot Indonesia based upon 1ubstantial
concesaiona to (the) point ot view of (the) other part7."39

37Ib1d., P• 2a.

The text or the Chinese resolution

ma.1 be round on this page.
38Ib1d•t

-

P• 30.

39securitt Council, Offioial Records, Third Year~
Supplement for Ju 11948, Document S/QlS, PP• 69-90.

.
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Reports .2!l !h!, Qutch Blockade
In accordance with tho Council'a resolution

or

6 July, the Committee of Good Ott!coa
submitted a report
on
. .
.
the Dutch blockade on 24 Jaly,

The _repor~ cited the arguments

advanced b1 the Dutch for imposing _the blockad•·-•uch aa to·

limit illegal trade, to control movement
'

•

'•

•

•

•

'

or

J.

'

•

m111tarr suppliea, . ,

e.nd "to protect Indonesian producers
nnd consumera against
.
.
exploitation by middlemen Bnd foreign tradera"--and the
contentions of the Republican delegation that the blockade
'

I

'

was 1llogal.

• .

•

Thia. report reached substantially the eame ..

conclusion as that contained in tho Committee•s third interim

or

report; the Committee felt that, in the absence

an agree-

ment restoring the_ politic.al. ~d •c~nomic unit7 ot Indonea1a,
"the economic plight ot_Republ1can-controllo~ terr1tor1~s
cannot be subatant1all;r ameliorated
relax ex1at1ng regulations.•

until

a. way 1a tound to .

The report noted that such

relaxation "would require basic improvement in the attitude

ot the ~rt1es,n40
On 28 July the Motherlands Government submitted to
the Acting Secretary-General its comments on the report
of tho Committee ot Good Offices on trade regulations.

Th.11

communication stated that any shortage or materials in
.
.
.
Republican-controlled territories wa1 caused by faulty
.
.
Republican organization rlh.ich hnd not prevented Chinese
•

•

merchants trom draining
40ib1d.,

orr.
.

.~

•

'

•

'

'

I

'

>

•

~ •'

•

I

..

,~

••

large 'quent1t1e1 ot produce

Document S/919, pp. 90-106.
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through private channela.

The Netherlands Government stated

that the Republic itself had destroyed many foreign plantations and Chinese rice milla through their "sc~rehed-earth"
policy during the police action.

This destruction was, or

course, very detrimental to the foundations of the economic
syatem.41

The nest day the.lletherlands Government submitted

an addition to the above comment on the report or the Committee.
This addition pointed out that (1) the Committee•• report

might cause misunderstanding since it seemed to indicate
that the shortages of goods and lack or economic development in the Republic was caused by the Dutch trade regula•
tiona1 the Netherlands GoVernment felt that this was not
the casei (2) no blockade existed in Indonesia; the Dutch
maintained that the Republic used tht "blockade" to cover
up def1c1enc1ea in their Government'• organization and,
consequently, that the "blockade" existed only 1n Republican
propaganda.42

34lat

.!ru!

342nd Meetings, 29 July 1948

The Security Council resumed diacussion of. the
Indonesian question on 29 July.

Mr. Palar or·Indonesia.,

noting that political negotiations had been at a complete-·
standstill since the middle

or

June, maintained that the

Dutch had rejected.every atte~pt to secure a settlement.
Otficial Records,
Jutt1Council',
l948, Document S/926, pp.

41seour1
Supplement for

Third Year,
113-119.

42Ib1d., Document S/926/Add. 1, pp. 119-123.
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The Indonesian repre1entat1Te supported the report of the

or

Connnittee

Good Ott!ce1·which had labeled the butch

aot1v1ty 1n Indone11a a blockade.43.

r.tr. vo.n Klettens

answered the Republican charge• that the Netherlands wa1
deliberately attemptlng·to keep negotiations at- a 1tandst111
bf po1nt1ng out that the delay was caused• r1rat, by the
tact that a new government
lands as a result or

wae

being formed in the Nether-

·general ele'ot1on, and,

n'

·second, by

the res1ene.tion of the United States repr9eentat1ve on the
Committee or Good 0ft1ce1 because ot 111-health, 'The Dutch

or

delegate then dealt with the.problem

the Dutch trade

regulations b1 quoting several reterence1 on international
law Which defined ·the term "blockade•, and he concluded
that the trade regulation• did. not
r., (

;

. ' ,,

•

-...

categories. descr!bed.44
-.f

•

•

,

I

... ,

Following th11 excha~e,
~

r~t °' into
any or the
..

·,

•

'

the Chinese delegate submitted
•

a draft
resolution which ~alled upon th~ partiea "with the
. '.: , : ~ 1 ·' ~

ot the ~ounc1111 Committee ot Good 0tt1ces,

aaaistencs
•·

I

maintain
•

.'

,_

t.

•· •• ,

,

strict obs·~rvanoe

.'

,

.

•. ':

",

!

.

,

to

.,,

,.•

t

•'

.(

_:'

or

both the military and economic

•

"

•

..

·•

•

,,

',,

,

I

.

•

article1 ot ths 'Renville' 'l'ruoe Agreemont,.end to implement
,f

I

'f,,t

, '..

,

• ·.".

•

•

'

>

•

•

~

•

.,

.

early
and ~ully
the , twelve
'Renville' pol1t1cal pr1no1ple1
.
.
.
'
.
'-.

'

and

th~

ai~ additional principlea."45
J

••

43secur1ty Council, Otf1c1al Records, Third Year,
Number 99. (341st and 342rid Meetlnga), 29 .JuI7 1948, pp. 1-9 •.
44Ibtd.,
PP• 9•22.

-

45Ibi4•; P• 22. The text
ID87 be tound on this page.

or

the Chineae resolution
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At the 342nd meeting itr. Mal1k_quest1oned the
Netherlands'

contention

that their act1v1 t1. did not.
He also went on record aa oppo11ng

conatitute a blockade.

the Ch1neae resolution on the grounds that.1~."would

not ,

onl1 lead to no improvement and ensure no solution furthering
intereata ot .the Indonesian Republic ~d.

the ·legitimate

people, but would again be ,exploited b7 the Netherlands
Govemment

and;author1t1es to further their colonial

interest•••• .n46

The.Ch1neae reaolut1on was.then put to ....

a vote and was.adopted, the vote being 9 in favor, none
against, with 2 abstentiona.47

.!h!

Revolt ...: .

Communiat

Foll~wing

the breakd~n

and the

bet~een the Netherlanda

_..ot politlcai

negotiation•

R~publ1c~ the internal

11t~atio~ in Indonesia became v~ry pr~o~rious ~ · The
Indoneaian people were trustrated by the Dutch violation'
~

ot

,.

! ( • '

I

l

I

• •

,

• • •

l

the Renville Agreement·ana b~ the ta1lure ot tha United
.
.
.
.
...
States Government "to honor what Indonaaiana conaldered
to

b~

it•

i>romiae.. tb, ~vera~.

I

the implem~nt~tio~ or the

Two t~ctora in particular··

Renville pr1nciple1 •••• "48

pla;red major r~le~ '1n ·1~~-t.ig~tlng ·,

September,.1948.

the
•·

communist .revolt

ln

T

The f1rat ot these was the economic blockade

46Ib1dei PP• 29-34. ·
···.'7Ib1d.,

P• 38. : .:

48Kah1nI J!l? • .!!!,!• I p t 254 •
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imposed by the NetherlandaJ the privations caused by
a.~ortagea ot many ditterent goods, including toodatutta and
1JJ19d1cal supplies, made communist propaganda and promiaea '.
seem enticing • .'The second factor was the increased 1ntereat
which the Soviet Union evidenced 1n Indonesia and all or ·
Southeast AaiaJ th1e factor, or course, operated to push
the Indoneaian problem •till further "into .the arena

or

big-power confl1c ta. "49 ·,

.... The Cor:mnm.iot Party of Indoneaia initiated 1ta revolt
against the Government ot the Republic on 18 September 1948.
While'the etm

or

the attempted coup waa originally the.

overthrow ot the Republic, by 20 September the communists
had shifted their position by maintaining that _their action
waa only an attempt

to eliminate

."colonial

and teudal , .. · ~

elements~ trom the Republican Government. By 30 September
government troops had driven the communists trom allot

the

major cities which they had previously heldJ the communiata
were, however, able1to withdraw from the town• betore being
surrounded by eovernmont troops.

Such withdrawals were 1n

keeping with.the general po11c7 ot the communists to avoid
battle

and retreat to mountainoua terrain more auited to

guerilla wartaro~50 During t~e month o~ October guerilla
wartare took place at trequent 1ntervala until, on 28 October,
.•

I

,

~

I

the last m~jor communiat military torce waa captured

·•9v.

and' the

Thompaon and R. Adlott, "The Communiat·Revolt ..

1n Java,"?!£ Eastern Su:rvex, November 17, 1948, vol. XVII,
Number 22, P• 257.
•

·.

•

'

..

.

.

·:

.

.

.

·

1

', · 50a. M. Kahin, "The Cr11ia and Its Attermath,"

Far Eastern Survez, November 17, 1948, vol. XVII, P• 261.

· •

123
rebellion was. for all practical purposes, ended.
December,

·On 15

the emergency grant to Sukarno - ot "tull powers,•

which had.been granted on 15 Soptember,,term!nated and it
was not renewed.51
.There were aeveral reasons tor the tailure of the
communist revolt, the maJor.ons being the tact that the.
coup wa1 attempted betore the commun11ts were actually
prepared for auch an action •. Other rea•ons were:. (l)

attack-

ing the Republican leadera, part1cularl1 Sukarno, waa
tantamount to en attack on the Republ1o:1tselt, tor these
leader• s7mbol1zed nationalism for the rmas ot thet, Indonea1an
peopleJ (2) the pea1antJ7 was comparativel7 well ott tor
condition.1 had enabled them to wipe out a · .

1ntlat1ona17

large part

or

their 1ndebtedne1a1 (3) the oommuniats over-

eatimated the 1upport which the7·had trom labor and trom
within the armed torce1 ot·the Republic.

D1aaat1ataot1on

existed.in both ot the1e.groups.becauae of economic cond1t1onaJ
neither group was, however, willing to support a movement
to overthrow a government which ~as.tho.17mbol
nat1onal1am,52

4th Interim Report fd.. !h.! Committee
On

.2! ~

or

Indonesian

0.fficea

15 Uovember 1948 the Committee ot Good Otticea

submitted.to the Secur1t1 Council its tourth interim report~
. '
,:.

51Kahin·, · Nat1o~ai1~m nnd R~volution in Indo~eoia,
pp. 289-~00. Chapter IX of tiiii book, pagea256-3031
present• a clear picture of the events loading to the communiat
revolt.
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In this . report
the Committee noted that
.

no
. political

nagot1at1ons had been held under ita auspices since the
end of May; in addition, the Netherlands delegation had been
"reluctant" to consider the Australian-United States

working

paper and prior· to~ 10 September, on which date the United .:

s·tatea delegation hB.d aubin1tted a dratt proposal, ne1 ther
had ottered a'proposal tor an over-all
dispute.

settlement

or

Thia stalemate in political negot1at1ona

consequences

or

the

had tour

major 1mportanoei '"(a) 'A· deterioration

the· economic situation within

in

the Republic, and a dela1

in the economic rohab111tnt1on ot Indonesia aa a wholeJ

(b) 'An increase in political

d1tt1ciilt1ea within the

Republic : · ( c) An·· ·incroO.ae in poll tic al tens! on·be tween the
(d) ·An increasing atra!n

partiea;

on the truce; with the.

ever-present poss1bil1ty·or 1t•'general breakd0wn~n5:5
The Comm1ttee•i estimate

or

the a1tuat1on'·conoluded.w1th:

the observation that direct talks which were commencing
at'that time might Qrepreaent a serious and possibly final
attempt

or

the parties to!reach

an

over-all 1ettlement."

These direct talks' were thf>. result ot an ott1c1al

?:~ther-

land1 comnnmique dated 22 ?lovember which had announced that·.,
the NetherlQnds Govomment telt

to reach a t1nal solut1on.54·
.. .
!
.:

· that .. 1t ·might. be possible

,.

.s:

5~secur1t1 Council, Otficlal Records, Third Year,

Supplement for December 1948, Document s/1685, ·P· 2.

.l
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.

.

.

.

Special Report .2!l !h! Direct Talks Between !h! Netherlands
~~Republic
. The Committee of Good Otticea, on.12.December,.
aubmitted a special report.to the Security Council regarding
the direct talks being carried on between the Netherlands
and the Republic.

The report presented the official view.

ot both parties, each of which placed the·blame tor ta1luro.
to·reach an agreement on the other.

The Committee stated

that the collapao ot direct talks intensified an alread7 ..
aggravated 11tuat1on which threatened.to lead to complete'
abandonment

or

the truce and a resumption ot hostilities.

The report de•or1bed the propoaed establishment ot an
interim federal government b7 the Netherlands, which action
t

'

•

•

,:

,

(

'

'·

'

..

..

t

:

.. ~

•

4

•

:

"is apparentl7 to occur before l January 1949," aa an
~ '

•

._ ~

• ;.~ ,. .

·r ~

t . ..

' •'

. . , • " . ' .. : .

!..

'

.

,

. :

action which would strengthen the Republic•• opinion that
'.

a

the Netherlanda intended to establish unilaterally
. ~

'

.

United States ot Indonesia without the Republic.
•

..

The

t

•

Committee alao concluded that, since the Dutch had openly
stated that further negot1at1ona would be futile, almost ·
no chance existed
.
'

t~r a re~Wnptio~ of bona
. ..

'

By a letter dated 14 December

..

Mr;

'

rtde n~got1at1ons. 55
,..

.

•'

'

Palar urgod the

Security Council to meet immediately tor the purpose of
'
.
.
. considering measure's to prevent a worsening of the ai tuation
\

and to bring about a resumption ~r.·negoti~tiona~

The

55:rb1d., Document S/1117, pp, 122-12~. Appendix VI,
pp. 194-209, conta1na the Australian-United States working
paper which the Dutch absolutely retused to consider as a
basis for negotiation.
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. Republican Government believed the aituation constituted
a threat to the peace in view. ot the .special report or the
Comm! ttee_ ot Good Offices in_ which. that body reported
"that . 1t has no confidence
that even. the
present unaatia.·
.
.
·•

factor1

leve.l ot tr~ce enforcement can be mintained •••• "56

On ••18 s.. December. the Committee ot Good Ottice1 ·
.1

.

•

. aubm! tted t_o the Council. a report aupplementa17 to the one

ot.l~ December. -~h1a report merel7_contalned commun1cat1ona
Which had passed ~etween the repreaentat1vea ot the Netherlands and tha,Republio as the part1ea tut1le17 attempted to
create a baa1s upon which negotiations could be reaumed.57
Renewal .2! Host111t1ea

.

.

..

Ottices cabled a report to the President ot the Securit,'

t

\

Council atat1ng·that the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands
delegation had 1ntormed the United Statea representative
"that Netherlands

torce1 had already

.

.

. . .

'

commenced m111ta17

the 1tatua

operationa against the Republic and had creased

The Committee urgentl1

,guo line into Republ1oen.terr1to~."

reque'sted ·the Security Coun~·11to co~aider'· the ,out-bre'ak

or

.

host111t1es

. • ~

'

•

.

: .·

~ '

.

! '

.

.•

• '. ,,,

in· Indone.aiaJ the Committee also riot.ed that

thia resumption ot host1llt1ea
Renville Agreeimnt in that

waa· in

no notice

violation ot the _ ." .. - ..

ot r~pud1at1on_ot the

-

56Ib1d., Dooumont S/1120, PP• 210-211.
57Ib1d.,

DocumentS/1129 & Corr.

1,· pp. 215-224.

.

.

127

truce agreement by the Netherlands had been received by
the Committee ot Good Ot.t'icea ;.as· a whole

.5a ·

Because ot the reaumpt1on ot military- operations in
·-

t

'

•

Indonesia,
Mr. Je11up
ot the United States, ·by ·a letter
.
.
dated
I>ec~ber, 'requested that the President call an

19

emergency meeting ot the Securit7 Counoil.59

Dy a letter

bearing the same date, the Notherlands repreaent&tive
submitted a memorandum to the President setting torth the
reasons ~ich motiv~ted the'DU.tch to resume hoat111t1es.
In general, the Dutch laid the bla~
.

.

'

.

.

.

upon en "increasing

number of 1nt1ltrat1ona ot Republican armed groups and ot
acts ot ·violence

·Perpetrated by them against

Population in Uetherland1~controlled
Netherlands Governme.nt maintained

the Indonesian

terr1tocy.~. •" ·The ·

that it had notified

the

Committee of Good ·otiicea ot 1ta intention to terminate
the Truce ·.Agre.ement ~ thus 11biding by art1~1:e 10 ot that
agreement~E30

~

;

"(,'·•

The next day the Netherlands repre~~ntative transmitted to the President of the S~curity Council the·co1:1monto

ot the Netherl&nds delegation'on the special report or the
Comm1ttoe ot Good Ott1ces.

Thia report objected to thG

•tatementa in the CQmmittee•a report pertaining to the
Probable results ot the eatabl1ahment ot an Interim Federal
·
58Ib1d., Document S/1129/Add. l & Corr. l, PP• 224-228.
Thia documenr-a110 contains a list of Ropubl1aan truce
•1olat1ons aubm1tted by the Netherlands delegation.
59Ibid., Document S/1128, P• 21,.

-

60Ib1d., Document S/1130, PP• 228-231.
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Governmsnt by the Netherlands; the Nethorlands, ot course,
telt that the report should have pointed out "that the
Republican point

or

the. spirit

.R.~nvill,~ pr1n_c. 1ples and that the

o£. the

.view is oppo~ed ~o the letter and

Republican violations ot the truce continue at an overincreasing rate."~l
,0

•••.

The. League or .A.~ab St~tes

appealed to the Sec~! ty

Council, by a ca~legram to the President ot the Council
dated 21 December, to order_the Netherlands to halt their
military operations in Indoneaia.62

On the aame da1 the

Netherlands representativo traMm1tte.d. to the Prea1dent
a report containing

ad~1t1onal .1ntorma.t1on c~.erning

the situation in Indonesia •. Thia report contained the text
.ot a apeech made . by.the Netherlands Minister
tor
Foreign
..
~
.
Attalra on 19 December in which . he 1tated that the Nether•'•

landa Government had:demonstrated that it was willing to
co-operate 1n t1nd1ng_a wa7 to giv~ freedom and sover~ignt7
to Indones1~, but th~t the Republic refused to accept the
other Indonesian States as equal partnera.

The rest

or

the report.dealt with the ~ailure ot the Republic to.adhere
to the Renville ~greemon~ and.to the number

ot the truce agreement

or

violations

by Republican troopa trom 1 January

to 14 DeceMber 1948.63

-

61Ib1d.,

Document S/1131, PP• 231-241.

62tb1d.,

Document S/1135, PP• 246-247.

-

63Ibid.,

Dooumont s/1136/Rev. 1, PP• 247-285.
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Reports from the Committee .2!_~

Offices

In responae to a request trom the Securit7 Council,
the Committee or Good Ottices submitted another report,
dated 21 December, on the Indonea1an situation. 'Thia
report contained the following conclusion11

(a) the

Netherland.a Government had railed to not1r1 the Committee
that Holland had repudiated the Truce Agreement and thus
had tailed to compl7 with article 10 ot that Agraement;
(b) there was no action on the part

or

Republican troopa

which might have legitimatel7 precipitated the Netherlands
action; (c) negot1at1ona under
the auapicea ot. the Committee
.
we~e not adequatei1 ut111zedJ the direct
talks. preceding
.
the Dutch military action.could
not . . b~ con11de~ed to be.
.
negotiations since t.heJ ' consisted . onl7
of Netherland•
d~manda
'
.
.
..
.

...
).

.

.

tor acceptance or their point or view en all important
iasuea; (d) in commencing m111tar1 operations, the Dutch
Government violated "its obligations under tlit Renville

.

Truce Agreement."64 The following da7 the Committee aubniitted
another report to the Counc11J tor th:J most part, this
communication dealt with a description

or

the Netherlands

attack on Jogjakarta on 19 December and on Kaliurang on
20 December.

The report noted that commun1cat1ons had been

broken between Kaliurang and aa'tav1a tor • tour-day .period.65
On 23 December the Security Council received another report
64Ib1d.,

DocumentS/1138,

pp. 287-294.

65Ib1d., Document S/1144, PP• 295-296.

••

iso
trom the Committoo

of

Good Otticea~· The Committee informed

the Cotmoll that most or the Committee •a military

observ~·ra·

were returning to Batavia 1n compliance with orders rec.eived
trom Netherlands military commanders •. The Acting Chairman
ot the Netherlands delegation had informed the Committee
that, ainoe the truce agreement was no longer binding, the
m111tat7 observers• task had come to an end.66

380th ~

~89th Meetings, 22 December 1948
In re1ponse to the request ot the United States

representative the Security Council resumed consideration
ot the Indonesian question at it~ 388th meeting.

itr. van

Roijen, Netherland• representative, stated that,the policy
'.

.

~

'

ot his Government, though it had been
hampered b7 a lack
ot..
,.
'

,.._

•.

cooperation on the po.rt of ext~emist groups in the Bepubl1o,
"1a and rennins the promotion ot ti» freedom ot Indonesia
1n order to create a sovereign federation

or

Indonesia

I.

linked in voluntary and equal partn~rship with the Kingdom
or the Netherlands in. a Netherlanda-Indoneaian
union."
-~
.
The purpoae of Dutch mil~tnry action was to eliminate
.
.
irresponsible and extremist elements in portions or Central
Java and SunBtra.

The rest of l~. van R.>ijen'• speech,

which consumed the entire meeting,.•~• concerned with a
h1stoey or the happening• in Indonesia ainoe the signing

or

the Re~v1lle Agreement, with empha11a upon what the Dutch

----------------------------------------------------------66Ib1d., Document S/1146 and Corr. 1, pp. 297-298.
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conaidered to be the failure or~th•:Republic_to cooperate
in implementing th1• agreement.67 At the a!'ternoon meeting

or

Mr. Palar of Indoneaia presented the views
ment concerning the Dutch m111taey action.

his Govern•,

He maintained

that, 1n actuality,, the Dutch policy was a "deliberate
continuation of its economic end political warrare--a.!'ter
the signing of tho truce

agreement w1 th. the_ Republic--.

or

carried out in outright violation

that agreement."

The Indonesian representati•e rererred to.the Dutoh economic

or

rostr1ct1ons, the establishment

new atatea in West Java,

Madura. East Sumatra, Pasundan, ~d_South

Sum~tra, and to

or

Dutch demands that their terms be accepted as evidence

the intention ot the Netherland• Goverriment to eliminate
.the Republi~. 6S

United States,

Follow1.ng. this speech, Mr. Jessup ot the

after noting

'·

the seriousness ot the a1tuat1on,

atated that hi• Govornment railed to tind an7 just1f1oat1on
the renewal

tor
.

further

· order

or

m111tar7 operations -in Indoneaia.

.

stated that his Government telt

or

1 August 1947 was •till

binding

He

that the cease-tire
and that the

<

Netherlands had violated this order by taking arimd·action.
In view ot the taot that the situation in Indonesia could

easily th.reatcn i~temat~onal
.

.

.

peace, the United States
\

'

Joined w1 th
Colombia and Syria in .submitting
.
.
resolution to th~ Council.69

This resolut.1on,

a draft
atter

.noting

67secur1 tI Ooun.c11, 01'f1clal Records, Third Year,
Number 132 (388th and 389th Meetings), 22 Deoelliber 19481
PP• 1-31.
68Ib1d., PP• ~1-42.

_.,

69Ib1d

PP• 42-49.
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that the outbreak ot host111tie1 waa in contliot with the

cease-tire order ot l Aug\ist, ordered tho parties to cease
hostilities 1mmad1ately and to withdraw their armed forces
to their respective sides or the demilitarized zones which
had been established under the Truce Agreement ot 17'Janu&r7
1948.

The resolution also instructed the Committee or Good

orticea (1) to report to the Security Cowicil on t.he events
which had taken place in Indonea1a's1nee 12 December, and
(2) to aasesa re1pons1b111t1 tor the outbreak

390tb ~

or

hoat111t1ea.70

39lst Meetings, 23 December 1948 · ·

or

Mr. Hsia of
. , China was
.

'

the
opinion that
the
'.·..
. ..

Secur1t7 Co?11c11, in view. ot .1t1 past a~~1ons, was competent
to deal w1 th the renowed outbreak o~- hos t111 ties J. he also
pointed out that a real partnership ~d cooperation between
the Natherlands and Indonesia was no.t likely to be estnbl1shed
bJ the employmont ot.torce.7~

C~lonel Hodgson of Austrai1a
.
presented a history of the
events in
Indonesia,
. '.
.
.
. emphasizing
'

.

the raot that the N_eth~rlands had conduot~d negotiations
which had not been. held wider the o.uap1ces
of the Committee
.

or

Good Offices and had . dermndad
of Neth!rlands
..
·. acceptance
. ·.
.
terms. The Australian representative proposed an amendment
.

-

.•

.\

\~

",

•

J

.

..

I·

to the joint draft re solu~1 on. subm1 t.ted by ths United States,

Year,·

70seour1ty Co~c11, Official Records, Third
Supplement tor Deceni>er l948, Document S/1142, PP• 294-295.
71secur1ty Couno11, Official Records, Third Year,
Number 133 (390th and 39lat Meetings), 23 December 1948,
PP• 1•5.
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Colombia, and Syria.
paragraph

This amendment would delete the laat

which instructed the Committee to report

that had taken place since 12 December.

on eventa

The Australian

delegation felt that the Council alread1 poaaea1ed aut't1o1ent
1nt'armat1on end that responsibility should be asseaaed b7
the Couno11 on the basis ot this in!"orimtion. The.amend•
ment turther oalled tor (1) the 1mrmd1ate release ot the
President

-or

the Republic and other political prisoners.

who had been arrested since 18 Dece~er,

and (2) t.b.e ,

Committee ot Good Ott!ces to observe;and report

on com-

pliance with the Council'• instructions ~nd to aee that no
reprisals or punitive action be taken against 1ndiv1duala.?2
.. At the ~9lst

or

meet1~g the Representatives

Syria and

India both condemned the Dutch tor resorting to the use ot
military torce and urged the Securit7 Council

to

take

ir.nnediate action to atop the host111t1e• in progresa.?3
Mr. Malik of the U .S .S .R • declared that in ol l the
time. that the Indonesian question had been before the
Council, that body had not yet dealt with the problem
t1rmly and errectivelyJ the ~ov1et delegate again charged
•

that the Co111J1ittee

-

o£

f

'

:

•

Good Ott1ces merely operated to

protect the colonial interests or the Netherlands. Mr. Malik
p·laced the reapon11b111ty for all
upon

the. Netherlands pol101 ttor

or

the trouble in Indonesia

colonial oppre111on, terror

72Ib1d., PP• 5-1?~· The text or the Australian
amendment may be round on pagea 15-16.
73Ib1d., PP• 18-29.

••

134
and brute force applied to Indonesian patriots, ot shameless oxplo1tat1on and inhuman oppreas1on of the local

.

population ••• •"

Ile then stated that.the U.S,S.R. dele-

gation could not support the Joint _draft resolution aince
(l) they telt that tho or.der to with~aw

armed tor~ea

"should be addressed only to the Notherlands aa the
aggressor," e.nd (2) the last clause calling.for the

or

Committee
•

'

Good Offices to a11e11.responaibilit1 created
•

•

'

.

'

..

I'.

.......

..-.

impression
thB t "'- the Col.lllcil does
not. ~ know
.
.
.
. .
~ which
11 the attacking Pf!lrtr, who_began operat1~na against whom
ttthe false

'

'

and which agreenenta were broken."74
. .~

392nd Meeting, 24 December 1948
At the opening ot' tho 392nd ~et1ng, -

submitted~

r.tr.

?.talik ·

.

-

resolution which \'OUld (1) condemn Nethorlnnds
•

aggression; (2) r~quiro the immediate cessation

•

1

or

,

mili-

tary operations e.nd the withdrawal ot Dutoh'troopa to.the
positions T/h1ch they had occupied prior to the renewal

or

m111ts.ry operations; (3) require the 1mned1ate treeing

or

the President of the Republic. ..and . other
Republican. political
.
. .
leaders arrosted b7 the DutchJ and_ (4) provido tor tho
creation

of

a· commi•s!on of,t~_Secur1t1 Council which

would be compo~~d_or all the States members of the Council
and requ1re.th~S. comm11sion to supervise the fulfillment

••
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ot ceaaation or militarr operations and tho withdrawal or
..

troops.75

Ths French delegate, ifr. Parodi, expreaaed

the.opinion' that, in spite or the tact that the action
,,

'

_•

I

•.

'

'

.

-

..

taken by the Netherland.a Government wa1 "brutal and shocking,"

the Security Council was without competence

in regard

to th• ~ituation.76

Mr. van Ro1Jen spoke in· opposition to the joint
resolution on the groundathat

'<i)

a ceasatio~ ot. host111t1ea

would restore the chaos which had exiated pr~viou1ly, ·
(2)

the Committee ot
1

Good Office• had no j\irisd1ct1on over

an internal 'confi1ot. and was not competent to asle11 re1pon11bil1ty tor the

'cour••

drawal ot Dutch troop•

of 'event•,'and (3) the with-

110uld allow terrible

·act• ·or

repriaal against th• population or the evacuated areas by
. ..
' undisciplined torcea. · The Netherlands Govemment also
ma1nt~ined its poai tion that· the. Securit7 Council

did not.

have 'jlir1adict1on.in this matte:r~77 The Bel.Stan 'repre~
1entative wa• also or ·th• opinion that the question or ·
competence waa not 1et·iettled and that the Security
Council aotuall7 did not have legal jurisdiction over the
75securitY Council, Ottic1al Rec.ords, Third .Yea:r
Number 134 (392ndMeetlngJ, 24 December 1948, pp.· e-s. '
The text o£ the So~iet.~e1olution may be found on page 3.

-

76Ib1d., PP• 7-12.
77 ., .

..

Ibid., PP• 13-24. ~. van Ro1jen alao referred
to a document which presented the Dutch view of the economic
reatr1ct1ons imposed upon Indonesia. Thia document may b•
found in Security Council, Official Records, Third Year,
Supplement tor December !948, Document S/ll57, pp. 315-319.

••

Indone11an question. 78 ·
The joint resolution was then put.to a vote, paragraph
by paragraph.

Atter being voted on in th1• mnner,

the

amended text was voted on as a whole and wa1 adopted by a
vote ot 7 to none with 4 abstaining.

Th& adopted resolution

called tor.a cessation or hostilities, ·the immediate release
of the Preaident ot the Republic
and other political
pr11onera
.
.
arrested since 18 December, and i~struotiona to the Committee

ot Good ott1ce• to report t~ the C~cil on the event• which
had takBn place a1nce 12 Dece~er

and_to report to the

Col.Ulcil on th• complianc~ of the parties with the above
provi11ona.79 Th• Soviet reaolution waa alao put to a
Tote, paragraph by parag~aph, but was reje~ted in it1
.•

entirety.so

.•.

Mr. Ritchie, repre1entative
t

.-

••

~

! ·. \

,

'

i

.

t'
1

•

.,

or

1 ..

. ,.

·,.

Canada, presented

-

resolution
the
Committee
. . instructing
.
.·.
. .
. ......
.
"'"

a dra!'t

(

.•

or

Good
Otficea
'

to aubmit a report recommending practicable 1teps which the
.

,

.

,

.

, , l

,

r·
•

•

•

•

I

··•.
·•

~

.

.

,

Security Counc11,~1ght take in or~~r to eatabliah peaceful_
oond1t1on• in Indoneaia.81
....

..... '

e

, ,.

'

• :

·_,.

,Aa
-·.

~ •

th• proposal 1eemed amb1guou~
;_

..

•

to a number or the Members ot the Council, th9 repreaentativea

or

Australia, Syria, and the United States all

79Jbid., PP• 30-38. The text ot the amended
resolution-me:y be
. . found on pagea 37-38.

.

· eo Ibid.~ PP• 39-42.

61Ibid., P• 42. The text of the Canadian reaolution
may be tound in Seouritx Council, Oft1o1al Record1, Third
Y~ar, Supplement for December 1948, Document s/ll49, P• 298.
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introduced amendment• tor the purpose

or

clarity1ng it.82

Neither the amendmanta nor the dratt resolution itaelt
wa1.adoptedJ the vote on the reaolut1on waa 6 1n·tavor,
none against, and 5 abstentiona.83
Reports !£2.!?! !h.!.

Comm1ttee

91

Good

Offices

The Security Council received reports rrom the
Committee

or

Good Offices dated 25 and 26 December.

The

first or these report• r.JSrelr contained the letters which
the Committee had sent to the delogritiona or the Netherlands
and the Republic, respectively, requesting the partie1 to
cooperate with the Committee and ita m111tary.a11istnnt1.
The letter to the Netharland• Gov~rnment aleo requested.
that Government to provide the President ot the Republic
£nd his Govoniment with all tac111t1es necessary to issue
directions from Jogjakarta or any other city that they
might chooae.84 The report aubm1tted.on 26 Decent>er
outlined the.major events which had taken place in Indonea1a
s1noe 12 December.

The Committee concluded that (1) nego-

tiations :presupposed that neither party would attempt to
\

cooroe the other by use

or

arimd torcea and that each

waa.

willing to oompromiae with the reasonable viewpoint ot.tbe .
82Ib1d~, PP• 49-52.
83Ibid•, PP• 56-57,
84seour1ty Council, Oft'icial Records. Third Year,

Supplement for December
307.

1948, Document S/!154, pp. 305-

t

I

1~8
other, (2) the Indonsaians would be reluctant "to accept a1
~~any

negotiations in which again they start wlth

an area under their control diminished as a result

or

the

resort to arimd torce ••• ," and (3) aince the demarcation
line no longer existed, it vould not be possible tor the
Committee's military obsorvera to distinguish between .
internal security measures and hostilities between the
partiea.85
~93rd Meetinz, 27 December 1948

The representative of the Netherlands opened the

a brief atatemsnt to.the etrect that

393rd meeting with

the.action in Java hnd.pra~t1cal17 end~d~~cept tor cl~shea
.

-

l

,

•

with "irregular arnBd bands," that the· goal ot Netherlands'
policy was still
.

federal

,·

interim

.

the establishment ot ~ all:Indor"esi.an
• .

•

t_"',

.. . •

.

'

.

.

~

~

...

.

.

~ •

•

Government, and that fourteen prominent

Republic.ans 1~ Batavia had been rele'ased.86

The policy

or

the Netherlands toward Indonesia and the hBndling. ot the
. .

'

.

Indonesian question by the Security Council was assailed
by the Ukrainian dele$ate, Mr. Tarasenko; he then submitted
'

a dratt

resolution

.

.

which called

tor thft 1nrred1ate withdrawal

ot Netherlands troopi to the positions which they had occupied
prior to the renewal
85~'.,

or

m111tar1 operations.87

Document s/1156,

pp. 307-315.

86seour1ty Council, Official Records, Third Year,
Number 135 (393rd Mestlng), 27 December 1948, pp. 1-~.
87Ibid.,
'
PP• 3-7.

mar be round on page 6.

The text

or

the Ukrainian resolution

•·

1:59
Mr. Malik questioned the desire

ot the Netherl.9inds to·

ceaae'host111t1esJ according to the Soviet delegate, the
statements or Mr. van Ro1Jen constituted "a direct refusal
on the ·part o£ the Netherlands Government to ceass hoat11•
1t1ea against the Republic or Indonesia."
situation,~·

In view or thi• .. ,

Malik. sub~1tted.a res~lut1on which noted

that
the Netherlands Government bad not
ended military
. .
'
'

::

,

"

operations against t~e Republic and .order~d "r:rl.11tar7
operations to cease within twent7•four hour• ot the adoption
ot the present resolution."88

Ur. El-Khouri or S7ria and Mr. Desai of India both
noted that the President or th• Republic had not yet been
releaaod and the latter delegate telt that armed torce1

.. .

~

.

.

'

should be withdrawn to tho linea_ occupied prior to the
renewal ot m111t.ary operations .a9., These. opinioll~ .~ere
followed
'

bJ a lengthy

<

I

•

or

. Uni tad State•
· Following

speech b7 Air• Malik, who accused the

'

this

•

•

<•

b.e1ng oppoaed to the wi.thdrawal

'

or. troopa.90

speech, both the Ukrainian resolution_ and the

,

Soviet proposal were put to a voteJ both were deteated, the
former b7 a vote ot,6

by a vote

or

in favor and 6 .abstentions,
the latter
. .
.

4 in tavor snd 7 abstentions.

Mr. Palar, in

the concluding apeech o! the day, charged that the ,Netherlanda was u11ng delaying tactic• in order that their m111ta.17'

ea Ibid.,
·

ma7 be

.
PP• 7•8.

round on page a.

-

89tb1d., PP• 9·13.

-

90Ib1d., PP• 24-35.

The text

or

the Soviet proposal

.

'
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objectives might be achieved in defiance

or

the Securit7.

Couno11.91

395th Meeting, 28 December 194~
In the interim between d1acuaa1ona ot the Indonesian
question at the 393rd meeting and at.the 395th meeting, the

.

'

.

Ch1neae delegate submitted a dratt resolution tor consideration b7 the Council.

Thia proposal noted that theNether-

lands Government had not released.the President ot the
Republic and other political prisoners in accordance with
the Council's resolution of 24 December and called tor the
release

of

those perso~s within twent7-tour

hours

after the

ado~t1on or the resolution.92
, ,

·.

'

I

..

The earl7 part'ot the debate at the 395th mieting
.

'

dealt with the failure of the Netherlands to release·
.

'

.

.

political prisoners; the delegations of Syria, Indonea1a,
and China.wanted an 1nmed1ate decision taken on this.subject
while the Netherlands representative requested a delay until
the tollawing morning pending receipt
inform~tion from hi• Gov~rnm~nt,93

or

authoritative

The Soviet delegate

supported the Chinese resolution, but felt that it did not
go tar ono~~ Mr._ Malik maintained that the Securit7

-

91Ib!d •• PP• 35-39.
92secur1tx Council, Official Records, Third Year,
Number 136 (3g4th and 395th t;etinga), 28 December 1948,
P• 48. The text of the Chinese r~1olution ma7 be found on
page 51.

•'

93Ib1d., PP• 48-54.
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Council should not only demand the release ot political
prisoners, but should also demand that the Netherlands
Goverrunont cea1e hostilities and withdraw ita troops trom
Republican territorr.94

Mr. El-Khouri of Syria proposed

changing the wording in the t1r•t

paragraph ot the Chineae

resolution in order to take cognizance~

the tact that

fourteen political pr1aonora had been releaaed, but not
the President and h1a Cab1net.95

reaolut1on waa adopt•d bJ a vote

The amended Chine••

or

8 in tavor, with 3

abatentiona.96
The Couno11'.then cons1dered· the Colombian dratt
resolution which called tor the consular representatives
in Batavia to submit to the
Council a complete
report
.
.
.
covering tho observance or the ~ease-fir~ end ~ondit~ona
,.

'

-

,

I

•

in areas under m111 tary occ_upation or trom which tr~op1
might be withdrawn.

Thia resolution had been submitted

I

aa a working paper at the 393:d meeting; it was advanced as
a draft resolution when the Ukrainian proposal failed ot
adoption.

The Colombian repreaentst1ve emphasized that
~

. ·. .

'

.

this resolution waa not intended to circumvent tt_ie Committee
ot Good Offices,

but. nsrely

to overcome the ob ject1onm ot

those who telt that the Committee•a terms
94Ib1d.,

-.-

pp• 55-58~

95~.,

P• 65.

-

P• 67.

96rb1d.,

or

reference did

••
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The repreaentatives ot

not include ·such an operation.97

tho Soviet Union and ·or the Ukrainian

it

Colombian resolution aince

s.s.R.

oppoaed the

did not demand withdrawal of

troop1 and since they tel t that 1 t ·would be pre judicial to
Mr. Jessup of the United States

the Indonesian people.98

or.rared an amondoent slightly al taring the style of the· ·
wording ot the resolution which was.accepted by the Colombian
delegatet.99' The proposal was adopted

by ·a

vote or 9 in

favor with 2 abstentions.100

..

Report·.2!:·.ih! Committee

.2! Good Offices

In accordance with the Security Council's resolution

ot 24 December, the .Committee
.
:

or

Good Offices submitted a

report, dated 29 December,
dealing with.the
extent
.
..
'

or

compliance with the cease-fire order and the release
political prisoners.

or

This report contained letters of

enquiry on compliance with the Council's resolutions which
had been sent to the parties by the Committee and tho replies

trom the parties•

The Indonesian delegate had replied, in

dated 28 December,·that he was unable

a letter

contact with·either thG Republican Government

to imke

or

the

.,
97Ib1d., PP• 67-68 •. The text of. the Colombian
resolution may bo found 1n Securit7 Council, Official Records,
Third Year, Uumbe_r 135 (393r~ !!ee~ing), 27 'necomber l948, p , 21.
98Ib1d., PP• 69-73, 76-78.
1--'

'

•I

99Ib1d., P• 79. The amended text ot the Colombian
resolut1on-mii1 bo found on page 80.
lOOibid., PP• 82-63.
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Republican delegation as they had been interned and he had
received no 1ntormat1on·about them.

By a letter of the

same date the Netherlands delegation informed the Committee
that fifteen Republicans had been released on 24 December;
as to the letter ot enquiry, the Netherlands delegate
•tated that ho would not be able to g1Te a tinal reply as
there was not tiv~ to consult the Netherlands Government.
In the remainder of the report the Committee noted that,
aa or 26 December, they were in contact with only one party,
the Netherlands; in addition, the Netherlands Government had
not authorized the return ot military observers to the tield
and had withheld

permission

which would allow the Committee ·

to operate aircraft, with the consequence that the Committee
was unable to obtain first-hand information on the military
a1tuat1on from its own representatives.101

396th Meeting, 29 Decembe~ 1948

At the opening

or

discussion of the Indonesian

question on 29 December, Mr. van Roijen presented to the
Council a declaration of the Netherlands Government.
declarnt1on

included the toll.owing pointst

This

(1) Uathor-

lands forces in Java would cease hostilities on 31 December
1940 at the latestJ cessation of ho~t111t1es in Sumatra
would require two or three more days because of a "special
e100rgenc7 situation."

It would still be necessary to

••
lOlseourity Council, ·Official Records, Third Year,
Supplement for December 1948, Vocumant s/1166, PP• 319-~24.

144
continue action against disturbing elements.· (2) The
Netherlands Government would litt the restrictions on
freedom

or

movement from "a number

or

prominent personalities"

1t such persons agreed to retrain trom "aot1v1t1es endangering public security."

(3) 'l'he Netherlands Prime ?Unister

was to leave for Indone's ia w1 thin k tew days.

( 4) The

Netherlands Government had granted "all possible tao111t1es"
to the military observers and their starts and was prepared
to grant similar tac1lit1ea to members

Commission.
Roijen

or

the Consular

In connection with the third point, Mr. van

added thnt with the arrival~

the Netherlands

Prime Minister in Indonesia, consultations tor the establishment

or

an all-Indonesian

federal

interim

governmsnt could

begin.102
!fr.

development

Palar expressed extreme disappointment 1n the

or

the d1aouse1ona and the dec1aiona taken on

the violations of the truce a~reement b1 the Netherlands.
He also stated that be.bad received a telegram trom the

Indonesian representative in Singapore reporting that the
Secretary-General o! th• Miniatr7

or

Education and the

Secretary-General ot the Ministry ct Intormation hnd been
murdered by the Dutch.

In addition to this, the Nether-

lands Government, according to Mr. Palar, had issued

a

statement which was in completo defiance ot the Secur1t7
Council resolution.

In view ot these tacts, the Indonesian

102secur1t~ Council, Official Records, Third Year,
Nwnber 137

(396th :eating), 29 December l94S, PP• 26-27.

I '
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representative

reserved his position unt1l,the Council

would take the·necesaar1 ateps to deal with the s1tuat1on.l03
w

Mr. Falla of the Un1ted·K1ngdom, 1n view ot the
statement made by the-Netherlands representative, telt that
the Council should rerrain trom turther action until its
tirst imeting in 1949.l04

~he Indian representative. how-

ever, was very critical of the Netherlands statement,
holding 1t to constitute an attitude.or detianoa
.
to the' reaolut1on
ot the Secur1t7 Council.

in regard

Mz-.,Deaa1 felt

that the problem betore the Seeur1ty Council had changed
trom the dispute between the Netherlands Government nnd
the Government ot the·Republic of Indonesia to a problem
. 1nvolv1ng the Netherlands Government on the one hand and
the Secur1 ty council

on the other·.ios

Mr. El-Khouri pointed

out that the Dutch statement meant that "tho Hetherlands
will order a cease-tire when the operations are completed
and when the Indonesian Republic haa been completely wiped
out."

Aa to the second portion

or

the Netherlands statement,

the Syrian delegate maintained that the Dutch intended to
deprive the Indonesian leaders

or

the rir,ht "to engage 1n

politics or to work tor the interests or their country."106

Mr. Malik supported this position with a great deal or
vehemence. declaring that the Netherlands waa an aggressor

---

10~Ib1d~. PP• 27-28.

-

104Ib1d;,

.

PP• 28-30.
I

105rb1d~, PP• 30-33.

-

l06Ib1d.,

PP• 33-~4.

I
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who refused to pay any heed to the Security Council end

the United Nations.107
Mr. Jessup, arter noting that no further resolution
was needed to point out that the Netherlands had tailed to
comply with the Security Council resolutions, advocated
postponement ot turthe~.ac~ion on the part of the Council
.

.

.

until the first meeting in Januar7, 1949, YJhen additional
reports trom the Committee ot Good Offices would be available.lOS

The meeting closed with both the Ukrainian

s.s.R.

and the SoY1et delegates condemning the Seeurit7 Council,
allegedly led by the United Kingdom and the United States,
tor sanctioning Netherlands aggression by tailing to adopt
the resolutions· proposed

by·. the

U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian

-_.,

. lO?Ibid,,

108Ib1d.

-

109Ib1d.,

or

the

s.s.R.l09

PP• :S4-:S7.
PP• :59-4:1.

PP• ••-47.

representative•

.

'

CHAPTER V

INDEPENDEUCE

-

Reaction to Dutch npolice Aotionn
In the interim between 29 December 1948 and
7 Januar11949, the date ot its t1rst meeting in the new
year, the Securit7 council rooelyed communications from
several ot 1ts.~~mbera as well as reports from both the
Consular Commission and the Committee of Good Offices.

On 31December1948

the.Indian delegation notified the

Secretar7-oenoral th.at the United Kingdom Prime Minister
had roqueated the Indian Government to "grant tac111t1ea

and sate conduct" to Dutch aircraft carr11ng the Netherlands.Fr1me Minister and his partr to Indonesia.

Since

the Indonesian question was under the active consideration

ot the Council, the Indian Government felt it necessary to
ask for the council'• approval before taking such action.
Arter consulting General Mcllaughton,· President ot the
Security Council tor Januar7, the Secretary-General advised
the Indian Govemment
On 3

to grant aare conduct.l

January 1949 the Government of'rakistan, in a

letter to thti President
'

of the ·council,
1

•

•

expressed disapproval

I

1secur1ty Council, Official Reoords, Fourth Year,
Supplement for 3anuary 1949, Document s/1176, P• 3.
147
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ot the failure of the Security Council to halt Dutch
activity in Indonesia •. As a minimum action the Security
Council should require (1) the withdrawal ot Dutch troops
to the positions which they had occupied before the
resumption or military activity, (2) release ot Republican
leaders s.nd restoration
and

(3)

or

resumption

or

their treedom and authority,

negotiations under the auspices

the Committee ot Good Otticea •2
By a letter

or

or

·

the same date the Uetherlands

Government, through its permanent representative to the
United Nations, suggested to the Security Council that,
;

in order to avoid contusion and misunderstanding, problems
which were being directly discussed_ by the. Securit1 Council
should not be.handled simultaneously

by

nexecutive organs

1n Indonesia of the Netherlands Government and bJ the
Committee ot Good Offices."
that visits

by

This letter also pointed out

the Committee's military obserTera to certain

areas might 1nvo1Ye a great deal . or. .p·e~aonal
. danger for which
the Netherlands Government felt obliged to disclaim reapon..

.

~

\

,

a1bil1ty.3
The Consular Commission submitted a report to the
Securit1 Council on 6 January: the purpose of this report
was to point out the. need for t~ther cla~itlcation of the
relationship

or

the Commission and the Committeo ot Good

Document S/1179, PP• 3-4 •
.
. . ..
~Ibld., Document S/1180, pp. 4-5.
2~~,

-

_,

••
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Ott1.ces,

particularly in regard to the disposal

ot

military obaervera.4 By a letter ot the same date the
Belgian Government, in view

or

the tact that its term as

a Member ot the Secur1t7 Council had expired, requested
that it be allowed to participate in the discussions of the
Council on the Indonesian quest1on.5

Report

.2! ~Committee

,g!. ~

Offices

on.7 Je.nu8.l7 the Committee of Good Offices submitted
a report to tho Security Council 1n accordance with tho.t
-body's resolution ot 24 Deceooer 1948.

The Committee,

attar reviewing the course of events sinoe 1ta last report
on 29 December 1948, reached the tollow1ng concluaionat
(1) the cease-tire order had not been complied withJ
(2) the order issued to the Royal Netherlands-Indonesian
Army in pursuance ot the cease-tire order could not be
considered as an order to "cease hostilities torthw1tha"
(3) the Committee had no ttrst-hand 1ntorr.at1on aince its
m111tar7 observers were still immobilized; (4) the Committee
requeated that the Security Council detine the tunot1ons ot
that body as opposed to those vested in the Consular
Commission; (5) the d11appe_erance of the truce d8atroyed
the tunot!ons exercised by the Conrnittee as an instrument

ot

negotiation;· ·consequently~ the Comm! ttee brought to the
4Ibtd.,. Document S/1190, PP• 17-18.
5Ib1d., Document S/1192, P• 18.
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attention ot·the Council "the problem or its present and
ruture status."6

397th Meeting, 7 January 1949
The Securitr Council ccntinued discussion ot the
Indonesian question on 7 January at its first meeting

or

new year.

Before opening debate, the President, General

McNaughton

or

the

Canada, in the absence of an1 objection

trom the Members, invited the representative of Belgium
to participate in the discussions or the Council.
.

Mr. van

.

Ro1jen then briefly summarized the evf'.lnta which had taken
place since the. last imeting of the Council, including
the
.
issuance

or

what the Uetherlands termed to be a cease-tire
.
..

order and the treeing of a number or Republican political
leaders.

'

The Netherlands delegate stated that, since their

release might "endanger public security," Sukarno, Hatta,
Sjahrir, and Salim were released trom enforced residence,
but were limited to the island

or

Bnngka.

Mr. van Roijen

also noted. the arrival of the Netherlands Prime Minister,
Mr. Drees, in Indonesia ~or the purpose of instituting
consultations leading to the.establishment ot en allInd~nesian t~deral interim g~~ernment.7

Mr. Palar ot

Indonasia drew the council's attention to the (1) reports

-

6tb1d., Document S/1189, PP• 6·17.
-

7seeur1t~Counc11, Of~1c1al Records, Fourth Year,
etlng), 7 January 1949, PP• 3-10•

Number 1 1397th
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ot the Committee

Good Offices which stated that the

of

had v.1olated the Renville Agreement,· (2) Nether•
.
.
lands cease-tire orders which countenanced continued

Netherlands

military operations against guerillas, in other words the
bulk or the Indonesian army, and (3) tact that the President
ot the Republic as well as several other meobers of that.
Government had not been released •. The Indonesian representative advocated the withdrawal

or

Dutch troops to .the previou.,,

truce lines.a
General Romulo supported the latter.contention ot

Mr. Palar.

Tbe Philippine representative maintained that

the cease-tire order could not bo implemented as it existed;
he held that w1th~awal. ot troops was the onlr measure which
would ensure observance of ~hat order.9; Sir Benegal_Rau:ot
India brought to the attention ot the Council the tact .
that the Prime Minister

or

India had invited titteen countries

or the Southeast Asia area to neet 1n New Delhi to d1scuas
the Indonesian problem;_ in calling this conference, ?l.r. Hehru
had dsscribed the Dutch action as "the most naked and
unabashed aggression and the use of armed might to suppress
a people and a Government."

Sir Benegal Rau also questioned

whether continued Marshall Plan a!d to the Netherlands
could be. just!tieu in viow

. 9Ib1d.;Pt>.
8Ib1d.,

-

o:

the!JO activities in Indonesia:10

PP• ·i0-17.
..

11-25;

10Ib1d., PP• 28·31.

t
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.2! .!!!! Committee£!

Reports

Q2.Q!! Offices

,gn M111tai:x Observers

.!!ll!.! Visit !!!h Republican Leaders
The Security Council was'1ntormed b7 the Committee
of Good Otticea,·

through a report dated 8 Januar7, ·that

arrangement had been made for Rtha dispatch ot the m111ta?-7
observers to various areas

in Java and Sumatra beginning

on the morning of 9 January."11
Comm! ttee

subm1tted

Three days later the

to the codneil 'copies

or correspondence

between itselt and the Natharland3. delegation re'garding a
visit by the Committee to the President and other leaders
'

.

.

.

The Natherlands delegation stated that

ot the Republic.

•·

"competent authorities

are now 1nvest1gatirig tho poss1b111t1

ot acceding to this requostJ" the report noted that final
arrangements

had n.ot been comple.ted.12

Burma submitted
discussions

or

The Gov~rnment ot

an application to part1o1pa.te
the Security

1n

the

Council on the Indonesian

queat1on on 11 January and this requast was granted at the
398th meeting~13 ·

~98tb Meeting, 11·Janua;:y 1949·
•.

The United States representative,

Mr. Philip Jessup,

stated that his Government considered the Dutch m1lita17

llsecuritI Council,· Official Records, Fourth Year,
Supplement for Januar11949,

12~.,

Document S/119!, P• 19.

Document S/1199, pp. 46-47.

l~seourity Council, Ott1c1al Records, Fourth Year,
Number 2 (398th Meeting), 11January1949,
pp. 1-2.
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activity 'to be completel1 unjust1t1ed and in conflict w1 th·
the Renville AgreementJ he telt that the Secur1t7 Council
should place more reliance upon the reports ot 1ta own
egenCJt the Committee ot Good Ottices, than upon those
trenam1tted by the Netherlands· Government, one or the
parties to the dispute. ·The United States·· delegate, atter
chargin~ the Metherlands

w1 th ta!lure

declared that

~negotiations;

to enter into

l?.£n! · ·

the first.steps toward an

ultimate settlement ot the Indonesian problem should

or

include (1) t1x1ng of a definite date tor the holding
elections throughout all Indonesia tor the purpose.or

eatabliah1ng foundations tor a United States or Indonesia,
tixing ot a definite. date
tor.· the~ transfer
or.
.
.
.
sovereignty trom .the Netherland~ Gavernme~t to the GOYern-

and

(2)

.

•

-~

.

•. '

r. .e

\

.

mant . of the United States ot Indone11a.~
•.

Mr. Jessup maintained that the
...

;.

• .

.

••

:

•

,

'.

~

~

;

u.s.s.R.
i

"; ~-

.

'

In conclusion,
was actually opposed

'

•

•

•

'

;

;

•

to an independent Ind~nes1a, prer~rr1ng instead a government
controlled by the communist party~l~ ,

~,

After Mr. Moe of Norwa1 had made his initial speech
on the Indonesian
.
. quest1on--1n which. he expressed the
opinion that the arguments of both sides were at least partially
correct but that the Dutch military action was not just1t1ed
and that the D!lintenanoe
.
,

or

~~wand
.

order
b7 the troops ot
.
•,

'

either part1 Bhould be auper-r1sed b7 the Committee

or

Good

Offices with the Security Council as trustee--Mr. Malik

••
14 .

-

Ibid., PP• 2-10.
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once agQ1n cr1t1o1zed the resolution adopted by the Council
and accused the United States and the United Kingdom ot
baoldns the "colonial interests.• ae·a1so tm1nta1ned
that the Dutch military action was supported by Marshall
Plan aid, concluding that the only solution to the problem
was to (1) condemn the Netherlands aggression, (2) demand
immediate cessation

or

hostilities and release

political leaders, and (3) withdrawal

or

or

Republic

Dutch troops trom

Republican territory.15
Reports !!!.. ~

.!!!

Committee Conoerninf.'; Republican Leaders ..!!!!! .

M~11tary Observers

,.

The Committee.or Good·Ottices submitted two reports
to the SecuritJ Council on 14 January.

Th& first ot these

communications 1n1"ormed the Council that arrangemnta

had

been made tai• the Committee to v1a1t the V1ce-Pres1dent,
the Chairman ot: the Republican delegation, and the Minister

ot Eduoation on·th• I1land ot Eangka on 15 January.16 The
1ooond

or

these reports concerned reports trom the Committee's

~111tary observers in the field.
that

These observers reported

(1) roads, bridges, and propertr had been end were

being destro7ed

on

a much larger scale than Netherlands

m111tar7 authorities had anticipated, (2) almost all

or

the

pp'. 13-25.
16secur1ty Counoilt Ottioial Records, Fourth Year,
Supplement for Je.nuary 1949, Document Sfl2ll, P• 48.
151bid.'
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bridges ln the rormor Dutch demilitarized zone had been
destroyed, and (3) the number ot Dutch troops available
wa1 1nautf1c1ent to prevent guerrillas from performing acts
ot sabotage and to maintain law and order 1n the towns.17

400th Maetin~, 14 January 1949

On 14 Januar7 Yir~ van R~ijen undertook the task ot
.

.

answering the various charges leveled against his Govern•
mentJ these charges were, for the most part, in regard to
the termination of hostilities, the release

or

political'

leaders, and the granting of tac111ties to the Committee ot
Good Oftices and the Consular Commission.

He denounced

accusations concerning these subjects as ver7 biased and
lacking in object1v1t7.
not be

~bl~·

withdrawal

'

'

The Netherlands 'delegate "would

t~'aoquiesce" in an1 proposal calling for·

ot

Netherlands troops to the former status guo

lin~tJ the a~g-..iments followed the same' general pattern aa
'

earlier speeches on this subject, asserting fear or

extremist elements and ot reprisals against the population

or

areas formerly occupied by the Dutch.

On behalf

or

his Government, Mr. van Roijen stated that (1) the Netherlands Governinent "trusts that a toderal interim government will

be

instituted within one month from the present

date," (2) free @;eneral elections would be held as

100~

as possible, and (3) a round-table conference would be held

••
17Ib1d., Document 8/1212, P• 49.

·~
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between the representatives of the Netherlands and of
Indonesia tor the· purpose or creating a draft ·statute tor
I·.

'.

the Netherlands-lndonesian·union. The Netherlands Goveni.

'··.

.

ment also declared that it would take every posaible
measure
...
to bring about the transfer ot sovereignty c'hlring the year
.

~

.

'

1950. Following this rather lengthy statement, Sir Alexander
Cadogan ·or the United Kingdom maintained that political
prisoners should be released, but that Dutch troops should
not be withdrawn.le
In his initial speech on the Indonesian question,
Mr. Alvarez of Cu'ba outlined
the position
of . his Govem•
.
.
.

men~ as calling tors. (1) withdrawal

or

Netherlands torcea

to their positions a~,det1~ed by the ~rue~ agreenent except
in areas where the Comm1 ttee

or

the supery1s1on of 1ts m1litar1
maintain law and orderJ

Good 0ft1~ea ma,., under..
observers, use them to

(2). release

.and reinstatemn~

of

the President ot the Republic and other political prisonersJ
(3) the holding or.tree elections bef~re l July 1949 to
create a sovereign constituent assembly; (4) withdrawal ot
Dutch arrmd torces .rrom the Republic "on the day that
announcement ot the forthcoming elections is made, and that
withdrawal should be completed titteen dare before the
elections take place1"·and (5) withdrawal of troops from
other territories ot the United States
.

.

.

or

Indonesia betore

.

18secur1 ty Council,· Offic 1al Records• Fourth Year,

Number 4 (400th Meeting), 14 January

l949, PP• 2-18.
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irr. Hood ot Australia pointed out

24 December 1949.19
that, in view

or

the guerrilla act1v1t7 and the lack ot

co-oper~~tlonw1 th the' ~tch
'

'

on the part

I

'or

the people· ot
'

'

Jogjakarta, Mr. van Ro1jen•s statement that "lite 11 ·

nearly back to normal in the former Republican areaa~
was misleading

to

•ar·

th~ 'ieast.20 ·

·">I

"

Report

-or the Committee Concerning.... Republican Leaders
.

....,._

._

Tho Committee. ot Good. Ottices.. transmitted a· report
the visit ot the Committee to the Republ1crm

conoemlng
leaders

on the island of' Bangka' on 16 Januarf... During .. -

this meeting the Vice-President and others informed the Committee that the High Representative of the Crown had
indicated that he •no longer recognized·eith&r th& legal
existence or the Republic nor the ot.f1c1al status ot its
servants."

The Republican leaders

on Bangka aleo requested

that the7 be v1s1ted·b1 the three members of the Republican
delegation in Batav1a.21

19Ibi1., PP• 18-21.

-

20Jb1d.,

PP• 26-29 •.

2lsecur1ty Council, Official Records, Fourth Year,
Supplemant for Jtuluary 1949, Dooument S/1213, PP• 49-52 •.
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40lst Meetin5, 17 January 1949
At the 40lat meeting ot the Counoll,·Mr. Palar
expressed the opinion that none

of

the arguments advanced

by the Netherlands delegate could refute the eyidence
contained in the reports ot the Committee of Good Offices.
He also pointed
out that
.
. Mr. van Roijen's atatenents concern,

.

'

.

1ng the existence of •tranquillity and peace0 in Indonesia
-•
In regard to the Netherlands pledge

were quite erroneous.
'

.

.

.;.

or a transfer or sovereignty during 1950, ~he Ine.onesian
representative declared that,. _1n actuality, the Netherlands
wishes to establish an Indonesian union in which the baaio
essentials ot sovereignty_woul~_be

secured by the Nether-

landa.22
The position ot the Indian Government was outlined

by Sir Benegal Rau under five 1lJajor points:
.

.

'·

'

.

(l) the pol1t1-

cal
leaders or the Republic
should
be. released end
their
.
.
._. -.
.
'

'

authority to conduct negotiations re-est~blishedJ
I

•

o

(2) the
'

Security Council should take.•. more active part in implementing
its reeolut1ons, possibly
or the
. throur.h the reconstitution
.
Committee or Good Offices in a Commission of the Security
Council; (~).armed

or

authority
'

torcee should be withdrawn and the

the Republic _re-established as soon as poasibleJ
'

'

I'

'

(4) "definite dates should be t1xed for the plebiscite and
tor the transfer of complete sovoroignty to.the Un1tod States of

••
Number 5

22secur1lt; Council, Official Records, Fourth Year,
(40lst eting), 17 January 1§4§, PP• 2-9.
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IndonesiaJ" and (5) the economic blockade on Indonesia
should be 11tt.ed so that the Republican Government might have·
the neceasaey .financial resources tor operating a govern- · ·.·
ment during the interim period.23
.. .
402nd Meeting, 21 'January 1949

In view

or

Mr. van Roijen•s statement that the
•

•

J

\.-

-~·

~ ",

f

..

/-

.-.

Netherlands Govo~nt still ma1nta1n~d its position that
the Security Council was not competont to consider the
Indonesian question, Mr. Nisot ot Belgium.noted that the
Council had rejected _the Belgia~ propos_al that the. question

or

competence be _put before the International Court.

expressed the opinion that, since the co~petence

or

He

the

C~unci~ had not been ~er1t1ed, that body should contemplate
no measure without .first making cer~ain, by reference to
the Court, that it is competent to tak~ such action.24
Following this speech, Mr•. Alvarez

or

c.uba aubmi tted, on

behalf of the Governments of Chi~a, Norway, the United
States, and Cuba, a Joint resolution desi~ned to tac111tate
a "Just and lasting
solution"
to the Indonesian problem
.
~
.
while "observing due respect tor the fundamental rights ot
'

.

both part1os."25

This reaolu~1on embodied
the following
.
. ,,.

major provis1onss

(1) the Government of the Netherlands

.

24seour1ty Council, Official Records, Fourth Year,
Number 6 ( 402nd Mee ting), 21 January 1949, pp. 2-5.
25Ib1d., PP• 5-6.

-·

.
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was to discontinue military o,p~rat1ona_1mmed1atel1, while
the Goveniment of the Republic was to order a halt to guerrilla
wartareJ both parties were to co-operate in restoring peace
and maintaining law and orderJ (2) the Netherlands Government was called upon "to release .1mmod1atel1 and uncond1t1onall1"
all Republican political prisoners arrested aince 17.December
1948, to provide tor th&1r return to Jogjakarta, and to
provide the rac111ties neceasar1 tor the functioning ot the
Republican Goveni!ll)ntJ (3) negotiations between the parties
were to be entered into immed1atel7 on the basis that an
interim federal governmont should be established not later
than 15 March 194~, elec~ions ot repreaentatives to an
Indonesian constituent assemblf should be completed by
l October 1949, end the transfer ot sovereignt7 should take
place as soon as possible and not later than 1 July l950J
(4) the Committee ot Good O!f1ce1 was to become th& United.
Nations Commission tor IndoneaiaJ this Commission was to
assist the parties in implementing this resolution and would
have authority to "consult with representatives ot areas
in Indonesia other than the Republic" and to observe the
elections to be held throughout IndoneaiaJ _the Commission
was to assist in restoring the civil administration

or

the

Republic and to submit regular reports to the Security
Council wh1lo the Consular Commission was requested to.
facilitate the work ot the United Nations Connn1ss1on through
the use of m111ta?7' obeervers and other start tac111t1es;
and (5) the Secretary-General was requested to provide the

.

'
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Commission with the necessary statr, funds and other
fac111t1es and the Governments of· the ?letherlands and ot
the Republic were called upon to "co-operate tully in glv1ng
effect to the prov1s1ons·or this resolution."25
After this resolution had been introduced, ifr. Jessup
presented the reasons which had motivated his Government to
Bhare in 1ts sponsorship.

In general, these reasons consisted

of the tacts that (1) the United States believed that the
Security council should continue to concern itself with the
Indonesian question, (2) despite their legal inequality,
there were atill two parties to the dispute and both must
be put in a position from which bona

!!2.! negotiations could

be carried on, (3) the Secur1t1 Council could not approve of
the results or the second Dutch "police action," (4) negotiations
should be assisted by an agency of the Security Council, and
(5) an1 workable settlement
be the result

or

or

the Indonesian problem must

•n agree?l'l)nt between the parties to the

diapute.27
The Soviet Government took a very critical view ot
tho joint draft resolution.

~~.Malik-maintained that th11

resolution "tully sat1st1es the aggressor, is acceptable to
hia protectors and abettors and ignore~ entirely the legitimate
interests of the Indonesian Republic and its people."

BJ not

ordering an immediate withdrawal of Dutch troops and by
26Security
..
Council, Off1c1al Records, Fourth Year,
Supplement for January 1949, Document s/1219, PP• 53-56.

27security Coun~ll, Official Records, Fourth Year,
Number6 (402nd Moetlng), 21 January 1949, PP• 6-10.
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demanding a cessat1on·or guerrilla warfare on the part

or

the Republic, th1s resolution would allow the Netherlands
."to annex the Republican· territor7" which the7 had occupied

as a result of their military activit,-.

The onl7 difference

between the Committee or Good Otf1ces and the United Nations
Commission tor Indonesia was the change 1n name; the new
·body would still serve to shield the attempts of the Nether•

land.a to press.Indonesia back into colonial atatus.28

____

............ Conference
The New Delhi
Between 20 Jenua.17 end 25 January a c onterence of

the representatives of Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon,
Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, met in New
Delhi, India, to discuss the Indonesian situation.
addition to these representatives, tho Governments

In

or

China,

Nepal, I~ew Zealand, and Siam sent obse~vers, to the Conference.
A resolution adopted on 22 January b7 this Conference was

transmitted to the Security Council along with a letter
.from the Prime Minister ot India.

.Mr. ?1ehru pointed out

'

'

that the sympathy ot the above-named nations was with the
Republic, the Governments

or

Ilurma, Ceylon, India, Pakistan,

and Saudi Arabia having already deniod,the.Netherlands
Government facilities

or

transit b7 land, sea, or air.

The

resolution adopted by the Conference on Indonesia stated

---

28Ib1d., PP• 15·19.

.

'
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that tho second Dutch "police _action" const1tuted"a flagrant
breach of tho Charter ot the United Nations and det111nce ot

the ettorta of tho Security Council" and made the following .
recommendations to the.Security Counoilr

(1) all political

prisoners should be imtmdiately treed and the Republican ... ~
Government should be allowed to function treely; (2) the,
residency of Jogjakarta should be return~d to.the Republic
and the parts of Java, Madura, and Sumatra which had been
held. br the Republic on _l.8 December 1948 should _be· restored
to that Government b7 15 March 1949;

(:5)

?{etherland_s forces

ahould be withdrawn imrned.1.ately trom the residenoy of
Jogjakarta and gradually from the rest ot the te:rr1tO?'y
held by the Republic . on 18 December 1949, such withdrawal ...
to be completed under United Nations supervision by 15 Maroh
1949; (4) all economic restr!ot1ons imposed upon Indonesia
by the Netherlands should be rescinded 1mzmd.1atel~ and the
Republican

Government should be provided 1Dll!lec1iately with

all necessary tacil1ties tor communication with the outside world.29
Report

E.!.. _the
Sy

a

Committee .EB

!h!

M111te.rx S1tuo.t1on

.

report dated 24 JAnuary, th~.Committee ot Good·
• '!.

-·

Ott1ces submitted an.nnal7sis ot ~he military situation in
Indonesia to the Security Council.
29seour1ty

£oun~11, Otfieial

Supplelll)nt for January

According to th1a report,
P.eeorda, I<"ourth Year,'

1949, Document s/1222, pp. 56-59.
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the Republicnn forces had adopted a nscorched earth" po11c7
and guerrilla tactics, with such effectiveness
mentor

.

that the establish•

law and order in terri'tories formerly controlled by the

Republicans was not yet possible; in general, the situation in
such territories was very unstable. Because or the guerrilla
tao.tics

of the Republic,

the Netherlands

troops could n.ot

cease hostilities despite· the tact that orders had beon
given to that effeotJ since

the

Republican Government had

been prevented trom .t"unot1on1ng, no authority existed to
implement the "cease hostilities" order in regard
guerrilla forces.

to the

The report also pointed out that "occupation

ot large t'owns and important installations" had been the
objective ot: the ~tch

army, and, when the .Dutch co~nder•

1n•c.h1er issued. the order. to 'cease host111tea,' "practically
.

all the obj~ctivea

.

.

.

had been taken."

30

·

.
30lb1d. 1 noeumen t S/1223, PP• 60-62. See G. 1f. Kahin,
"Resistance in Indonesia," Far Eastern Surve1,-Februar1 23,
1949, Vol. XVIII, PP• •5-47. In a report from Betavia, dated
22 January 1949, Mr. Kahin stated that the purpose or the
Dutch military- action ot 19Deceni:>er1948 was the imposition
ot a "speedy settlement of the Dutch~Indoneaian dispute
along lines dictated by the Dutch." The Netherlands talt
that the capture of tho principal Republican leaders and
cities would cause native resistance .to collapse; the
ferocity of guorrilla warfare and even the attitude of the
population in Dutch-occupied Jogjakarta illustrated the
tallaoy ot this beliet. The reports of lack or collaboration
was corroborated by Mr. a. J. Muller,. head ot the Dutch
Economic Administration in the Jogjakarta district; Mr. Muller
reported that a maximum of only 150 of approximately 10,000
civil servants rormorly working in his district had agreed
to work tor the Dutch. The Dutch had also been counting on
the collaboration or "a large numberu ot Republican leadera ·
onoe Jogjakarta had been occupiedJ not on~ or the leaders in
the city agreed to work for the Dutch and the ~ctivit7 or the
Dutch arm:r--the shooting or an adviser to Prime Minister Hatta,
a torroor cabinet member, and a high oft1c1al or the Ministry ot
the Interior as well as numerous c1v111ans--d1d nothing to
promote collaboration.
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Report ,2! !!'.!.! Committee .2!! ~

Status

£!. ~

Republ!ce.11 Leaders

The next day the Committee ot Good Ottices submitted
a report to the Council dealing with "arrangemsn~a fort.be
transportation of roombers ot the Republican Mission to
Lako Success and the present atatus of the Republican leaders.•
In.regard to the P.oas~bil1ty ot receiving authorizat.bn tor
the Republican repre~entativea to go to Lake Succeas, the
Committee repor.ted that the Netherlands Government had
reached no decision concerning clearance and tac111t1ea
and, consequently, the Committee could not make any arrange•
ment tor the trip.

On the question of the status

or

the

Republican leaders, the Committee transmitted a letter,
dated 24 January, 1'ro~ the Secretary-General ot the Republican
delegot1on.

Thia letter_ stated

that Sukarno and Salim,

.

interned on Sumatra, were _"confined under arned guard to a
relatively small military area," while the leaders on the.
island of aangka had freedom or movement on the island but
had been instructed not to engage in an1 polit!cal act1v1t1
other than that "in line with the polic1

or

th8 Netherlands.n

The Secretary-General also emphasized the taot that numerous
obstacles stood in the.way

~r

communications between Republican

leaders and the Republican delegation

and the Connnittee ot

Good Ott1ces. 31,

-

3lrb1d., Dooument 8/1224, pp. 62-65.
.

'

.

.
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403rd Meetinz 25 January 1949
The 403rd meeting was devoted to discussion or the
Joint draft resolution submitted b7 China, Cuba, Norway,
and the United States.

Sir Benegal Rau indicated several

modifications which he thouetit necessary tor.mks the
resolution workable and to bring it into conformity_ with the
New Delhi resolution.

He first suggested that the withdrawal

or troops be accomplished betore a apec1tied date, 15 March
l949J in the second plaoe the Indian representntive emphasized
the necessity

or

"at least tour or five months or settled

government" in order to make certain that the plebiscites
would be held under proper condit1onsJ thirdly, Sir Dene~al
Rau pointed out t.ha t, since the Republican Government would
have virtually no economic resources •as a result ot the
Netherlands aggression,• the United Nations Commission
ahould make recorrumndations as to what economic resources
ahould be provided in order to ensure the proper functioning
of the Republican Government; all restrictions on 1nter1sland trade and on trade between the 1slsnds and foreign
c.ountriea should be abolished, w1 th .. tha exception

or

those

at;reed upon by the Netherlands Government and tha Republican

Government.32 .
The primary motive
'
. .

or

'

the
Norwegian Government in
.

·sponsoring the joint resolution was, according to its.
32seour1tI Council, Official Records, Fourth Year,
Number 7 (403rd ifuetlng), 25 January 1949, pp. 3-8.

.
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representative, Mr. Moe1 to find a solution ror the Indonesian
problem.

The solution ombod1ed in.the resolution was based

upon compromise, and necessar111 so as there were two parties
to the dispute in Indonesia. Since a great deal or mutual
mistrust existed. 1t would be necessal97 to establish the
United Nations as a trusteo of the actions or both parties.
Finall1, V..r. Moe stated that his Government could not accept
the contention that t~ Republic of Indonesia

no

longor

existed, since its stato or disorganization had been caused
by the Dutch military action.33

The representative ot the Ukrainian

s.s.n ••

Mr. Taraaenko,

stated that the joint resolution and the plan outlined b1 the
Netherlands representative were both designed "to stifle the
Indonesian Republic and to restore the old colonial order 1n
Indonesia."

He maintained that the United States and the

United Kingdom end, under their leadership, the tnt1Jor1ty
ot tho Council "opposed the defence of the legitimate r1ghta· .
of the Republic and made themsolves parties to the encouragemont

or

the aggressor.

n34

404th ...........
and 405th Meetin~s, 27 January 1949

At the next meeting ot the Council Mr. Palnr,
atter referring to an article in the~~

Timea which··

carried a statement ot an official Dutch spokesman to the.
3~ Ibid.,

...............

PP• 8·12 •

~4Ibid.,
PP• 17-20 •
..............

.

'
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ettect that the
expenditures in Indonesia
would be mainly
'
..
'

"carried by heirs ~f the former Netherlands Indies Government,"
maintained that
the heart
of the Indonesian problem was that
.
.
ot economic domination; the Indonesian delegate interpreted
this news item as evidence that the
Indonesian
people
were
.
.
.
'

'

to be toroed to pay tor. tho . Netherlands
military- action.
.
..
.
'

-,

In view of this feeling, Ur. Pale.r felt that. ~he joint
resolution was not strong enough. to relieve
the doubts in
.
.
Indonesian minds as to the intentions ot the Netherlands
•
..
Decause ot this, the representative .or _the. Republic urged
the Council to embod7 the pr~nc1ples
New . Delhi
.
. ot the
.
resolution 1..~ th~ j~int dratt
r~solution
by . means ot amend~·
.
...
\

ments.~5

Mr. Hood ot Australia also advised the Council to

give careful consideration to the proposals ot the New
.•

\.

.•

:

.

*

'

•

Dolh1 Conference and to revise the joint dratt resolution
accord!ngly.35
At the 405th meeting, Mr. U So Nyu.n ot Burma suppor~ed
the posi t1on taken by the Australian deleeate
1

;

•

;

J

•

•

and l!k"wise

•

'

It

advoonted the !ncorp~rat1on ot the principles ot the New
.

.

.

Dolh1 Co~ference into the Joint dratt resolution.3'1
• ~

•

••

,.

• •

'

• '.,

.•

!

•

Mr. van Langenh.ove ot Belgium cautioned aga1ns t the adoption

of amendments to tho joint resolution which would give that
document ·a threatening chsracter; the Council should, rather,
.
'

· 35s~cur1 ty Cou."'le11, Officiel, Itecords; Fourth Year,
Number a (404th end 405th Meetings), 27 January 1949,
PP• 2·13•

.

-

30Ibid·.

-

I

pp , 13-20 •

37Ibld., PP• 21-29.

.
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avoid extremist positions, such as those consistentl7
advocated by the U.s.s.R.,.and attempt to formulate a trulJ

constructive aolution.38
In view ot the debate carried on before the Council
and the.receipt of the Hew.Delhi resolution, Mr. Ts!ang ot
'

China placed before

the Council several

'

!

amendments

to, the

joint resolution; these amendments were sponsored jointly
by the Governments of China, Cuba, Norway-, and the United
,'

'

States.
state

I

~

:

'

•

~

•

The wording in paragrap~ 2 was. revised so as to

that 'the official•
of the Government
or the Republic
.
.
.
.
·.

,.

'·.

should tako over the administration ot "the Jogjakarta area"
rather than merely "th~ city of J~gjakarta."

He also

referred to sev~ral amendimnts which were designed to
I

.

..

:

clarity the moaning ot the resolution, but embodied no
substantive change.~9
The Canadian delegation also submitted an aroondment
which was designed to improve and clarity the wording

or

the joint resoiution, but contemplated no substantive
change 1n the .. resolution.•0 .. In respon~e to an inquiry by
<

,

,

.

.l

.

•

•

the representative of Indo~esia, Mr. van Roijen stated that

-

38Ib1d., PP• 29·31.
.

. 39Ib1d., PP• 32-33. The text ot the amendments
submitted byehina, Cuba, Norway, end the United States ma7
be found in SecuritX Council, Official Records, Fourth Year,
Supploment {or January 19~9, Document S/l23~, pp. 65-66.

40Ib!d., PP• 33-34. The text ot tho Canadian
amendrmnt may be found in Security Council, Otf1e1e.l Records,
Fourth Year, Supplement t<Jr January 1949, Documont S/12321
P• 66.

•·
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he had not received any f'urther intormation regarding a
trip to Lake Success by one or more members of the Republican
delegation.

41

406th Meeting, 28 Ja.11uan 1949
At the 406th meeting ot the Council, r:r. Malik

or.

the Soviet Union, after stating that the so-called
"Anglo-Anerican bloc" had consistently aided with the
"ag~ressor," submitted a resolution calling tor the 1mnsd1ate
withdrawal

or

Dutch troops to their positions as apec1f1ed

by the Renville Agreement. 42 · Before a vote was taken on

the joint resolution, Mr. van Roijen, commenting on the
New Delhi resolution,' stated that the fundamental mistake
made by those' nations which'.condemned the Netherlands was
thilt

they identified Indonesia with'the RepublicJ the

Netherlnnds, ot course, cons id.eretd the Republic to. be a
.

43

.

m1nor1 ty entity•
··
The joint draft resolution was then put to a vote,
paragraph by paragraph.

The Soviet amendment tailed to

secure the necoasary att1rmat1ve vote of seven members and
thus wa3 not adopted.

The rest

or

the joint resolution, as

42seour1t' Council, Official Rooords, Fourth Year,
Number 9 (406th A eilng), 28 January 1949, PP• 3-6.
43Ib1d., PP• 6-19.

.
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amended by its sponsors and Canada, was adopted.44

410th Meeting, 16 Februarx 1949
The only discussion

or

the Indonesian question

during the month ot February concerned a report from the
United Nations Commission dated 15 Februo.ry.

This report,

which was discussed on 16 February, embodied a recommendnt1on
that the data on which the Cotr1r.11ss1on was to report under
the Council's resolution ot 28 January be postponed trom
15 Februar1 to l March.45
Mr • .Malik considered that approval ot.thia
recommendation would put the council in tho position

or

"faith.full7 pursuing tho policy ot encouraging thOS$ who
were guilty of unprovoked aggression against the Indonesian
Republic."

Mahmoud Ber ot EgJPt agreed to the postponement,

but expressed disappointment in the tact that the Commission
did not

l!llke

an7.report to the Counc11.46

The United

Kingdom and Canadian representat1Tes supported the President's
proposal to grant the postponement. After another short
comment by Mr. Malik, in which he accused the British
delegate or alwar• being readr to speak in defense or the
Netherlands Government, d11cu1a1on was closed and the
44Ib1d~, PP• 20-33. The text or the amended Joint
resolution-as-adopted may bs found in Security Council,
Official Records, Fourth Year, Supplement for Februarr
1949• Document S/1234, PP• 1-4.
45 Seourit~ Council, Official Raoords, Fourth Year,

Number 13 (41btfi :eetine), l~ Pebruary 1949, pp. 1-2. The
text of the Commission's report mar be found on page 2.
46Ib1d., PP• 2•4.

.
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President stated that the Commission would be notified
that their recommendation had been aecepted.47 ·.

United Nations Commission!.!!£. Indonesia

Report_!!!~

The United Nations Commission submitted a report
to the Security Council dated l March 1n compliance with
'

·.

the ·council's.resolution

"

(

...

·or 28 January.· The Commission

reported that, although the Netherlands had been g1Ten
time "to adjust itsel.t' politically,". not only- had no :

·agreement been reached on the establishment of a federal
interim government, bUt also no negotiations had taken place

as required by the resolution; 1n addition, the Commission
reported that the Netherlands Government had not "complied
with t,he basic preroqu1s1tes of t'urther action under the
roaolut1on."

The Netherlands had, however, declared that

thoy would call a round table conference at the Hague on

12 itarch; this conference, to which all parties interested
in the Indonesian dispute would be invited, would deal with
the problem ot "an accelerated transfer ot sovereignty"
as well as the creation ot a federal interim government.
The Commission stated that it had no authority to attend the
conterenoe at the IIar,ue; einoe the Commission viewed this ..
invitation as a substitute tor the provisions or th&.
28 January resolution, ~t re~erred the matter to the Security
Council and requeated that that bod1 instruct the Commission

.

'
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as to the poa1t1on it should ta~e 1n regard to the
invitation.

The report concluded by stating that it was

conscious "ot the progresa1vo deterioration

or

the situation

in Indonesia and ot t~ augmented danger to world stability
which must result.n48

Reports

.En!h! Proposed Round Table Conference
'

'

By a·letter dated 2 Aiaroh, the Netherlands Government 1nt'orimd the Security Council ot its plans to call a
.

.

round table conference which would be held at the Hague
"at

the

.

,

earliest possible date, preferably on 12 March 1949."

The purpose ot this conference
the transfer ot aoveroignty,

TDUld

(2)

be to (1) accelerate

establish a Netherlands~

Indonesian Union, (~) dratt t1nanc1al, economic, and military
arrangements pertaining to such a Union, and (4) institute
a federal interim government and other arrangements tor the
interim period. All interested parties had been invited to
the conference, including the President of the Republic,
the Chairman ot the Federal Consultative Assembly, and the
United Nat1o~

commission

tor rn:donesia.49

The United Nations Commission submitted a supplenentary report dated 7 March in accordance with the Council's
28 Januo.ry resolution• This report

containe.d a le ttor from

48seour1ty Council, Ofr1c1al Records, Fourth Year,
Supploment for March 1949, Document S7l270 & Corr. 1, pp. 8·29.
49Ib1d,, Document S/1274, PP• 35-41.
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Sukarno to the lfotherlands Government concerning the
1nv1tation

to attend the· round table

.

con!"erence. While'

..

or

stating that he agreed with the idea
transfer

of sovereignty

Sukarno pointed.

nnd'the

an accelerated

purpose or the conference,

out that th&.·resporis1b111ty tor such

decisions as would be arrived

at

the conference

by

~can only

be assumed by the Government or the Republic of Indonesia
fully

exerc is~n~ ~ts

thori ty. in 1 ts terri tor1. and seated

ai

in Jo!jakarta."50
on 10 March the Commission subm1tted
mentary report

which also. con~ained ~ommunioations between
.

'

the parties

a second supple•

and t~.e United_ Nation~. fo~1as1on •. No further

information was available .concerning the ' Netherlands position
,
regarding the round table. conterence J . the ~etherlanda
~

I

delegation

'

•

'

•

assured the. Commias~on.th.at 1.t ~ould keep that

body- info med about sny. new dovelopments. 51. The next day_

the Commission transmitted

a third supplementa17 report

I

,

',-.

•

to tha security Council. This r~port containod
from the Chairman of tho.Republican
clarified
table

the Republican position
This letter

conference.

delegation
in regard

stated

a letter

,

which further

to the round

that the decision

on

the Netherlands 1~v1tat1on would have to be left to the
Republican Government "when it is re-estnblished o.nd ftmct1on•
•

ing freely

-.

.

•

'

j

•

.

.

-

.·.

at Jogjakarta;" there should, however, be no dela7

50Ib1d.,

Document S/1270/Add. l & Corr. l, PP• 29-32.

. 511!?!!!•• Document S/1270/Add. 2 & Corr.

i , PP• 32-34.

.

'
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1n implementing the Securit1 Council resolut1on·1n regard

or

to the release

political pr1sonsrs, tho restoration

or

the civil administration of.the Republic, the re-establish•
mant'ot·the Republican·aovernnent at~Jogjakarta,
cessation

or

and.:the
. J .

hostilities in Indoneaia.52
.

't

••

' ,,

4l6th Maet1n$ 10 March 1949

consideration ot the

The Security Counc1_1res~d
Indonesian question on 10 ~~h·

At the opening of the

meeting, the President informed the Council that,
~

•

.

.

t, .

1

•

.

upon a

,

request trom the Indonesian delegation,
he had
asked~ sate
.
.
...
;

or

conduct for a member

the Indonaaian delegation tor a

visit to the Republican leaders
; ,. ~
the Netherlands

on . tho
island ot BangkaJ
.

,

'

.

Government had .informed
.
. . the ..President

that

'

.to the. Ind~n~sian .req~at.53

they had no obje·~·t1o~
:

~

·~

,.

Mr. van Roijen declared that the Netherlands Govern•

ment could not, at that time, return the Republican Government to Jogjakarta
.

..

t

for sever~l ~asons,

'

.

.

(1) such action
~~d . ' give rise
.

ones beingi

.

.

to tear on the

ot Indonesians outside ot the Republic th~t the Republic

part
.

the more important

:

,

would become the_ do~~nat1ng power ;n ~ndon&siaJ (2) .reprisals

-

-

and other disturbances would be.the result of the restoration
•

•

•

•

.-

•

-,

'•

I

ot the Republican GovernmantJ and (3) tho restoration of the
'

.

·'

'

I

52Ibid., Document S/1270/Add. 3, PP• 34-35.

...

53sec~1

Number 1914lSth

ti Council, .orrtcial R~~~ds,· .F-o~;th Y~s.;,,
feetlng), 10 March 1949, PP• 2-s.
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Republican GoverntD9nt "would entail the restorat1on·or
influence
elemnts

the;

of precisely the saDB militarist and extremist
as have tor three years been the ··main atumbling-

block 'in negotiations

with the Republ1cJ".1n connection

with

this statement~ Mr. van Roijen particularlj emphasized the
danger ot communist elenents

taking· over

the Re.publican·.·

Govenunent it it were immediately restored to Jogjakarta.

The Netherlands delegate then discussed the proposed round
table oonterenoe as a means of oTercoming the dangers
inherent in the immediate restoration

or

the Republican

Government and requested the Council to allow the United
Nations Commission tor Indonesia· to take part in the
conference. 54 ·
·' General Romulo maintained that

to obse~e

the Dutch had tailed

the Securit7 Council resolution·or 28 January

and, further, that the proposed X'Ound table conference would
be able to' consider

onl1 those proposals which would be. ·

acceptable to the Netherlands• 'The Dutch, b7 amending their
.

.,

.

constitution and inserting provisions on the proposed Netherlands-Indonesian Union, had defined unilaterallr

what ther

wanted the Union to be, "regardless ot the desires. ot the
Indonesians•"

The repre:\entat1ve

or

tho Ph111ppin~a stated

that this Dutch counter-proposal was tmrely another attempt
to circumvent the Security Council and to ignore its

.

dec1s1ona.55

-

54Ibtd., PP• 3·12.
5S~.,

'

'

PP•· 12•19.

'
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Mr. Palnr pointed out that the Netherlands proposal
:

!

.

~

. ,.

.

would be ver1 attractive if :.the Indonesians could have
On the basis ot past

confidence in the Netherlands.

experience and the reports of tbs.Se~urity Council's Committee
ot Good Offices as.well as the reports ot the United Nations
Commission, the Net.h.erlands.could hardl1 expect such confidence.
The Indonesian delegate also aocused the Dutch or using
"naz1 methods" in Indonesia and he cited as evidence several
letters written by Dutch soldiers and printed in Dutch
newspaper•; these letters described torture methods which
were used to obtain intormation. According to Mr. Palar,
the objective

ot

the Netherlands 1n calling the round table

conterenoe was tour-told 1n naturea
Security Council resolution

or

(1) to dis~egard the

28 3B'l.uar,-, "demote the

United Nations Comrn1as1on tor Indonesia and avoid the.
withdrawal

or

Netherlands troops and the reator~tion ot the

RepublicJ" (2) •to reduce the Indonesian problem trom its
international level to a domestic one where the Netherlands
will have final d1scret1onJ" (3)
/

.-

"to

avoid dealing with the

Republic as the other party in the d1sputeJ" end (4) "to
degrade our gallant troops to the status
In the-last speech or the day,

of rebels."56

Mr. Austin of the United

States, while supporting the idea of a round-table conference,
maintained that his Government still considered the implementation

or

the 28 January resolution to be necessary for the

solution ot the Indonesian problem.57
56Ib1d., PP• 19-30.
57Ib1d., PP• 30·35.

.
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~17th Meeting, 11March1949
The President

or

the Council, Mr. Alvarez ot Cuba,

opened the 417th imeting b7 intorm108 the Council· that
Pakistan had requested permission to participate in the.
discussion ot the Indonesian problem.

As there waa no.

objection, the request was granted.59
Sir nenegal Rau was ot the opinion that, .in view ot
their past conduct, the Dutch would have to undertake
positive action toward the pe~ceable solution ot the

sane .

·

Indonesian problemJ mare promises on the part or thi. Dutch
could not be expected to restore confidence in the objectives

ot

the Natherlands aovemment.

Such positive

action would

have to include restoration of the Republican Government to
Jogjakarta.

Sir Benegal ~au also read a telegram received

trom Batavia which requested that he call the attention ot
the United Nations Commission to "atroc1t1ea ot Dutch
troops in Jogjalmrta as a reprisal

or

recent attack ot the

Republican Arm:r.n59
The selgian representative~ Mr. van Langenhove,
stated that,:.1~ regard to .treei~g the peoples of Indonesia,
the Council could issue no injunction since the Charter did
.,

not cont'er such power upon that.body; he asserted.that, in
regard "to the settlement or the substance or a question,
.
58secur1ttx Coune11,·0tf1o1al Records, Fourth Year,·
Numbor 201417th~etlng), ll.Maroh 1§49, P• 2. The text
ot the letter trom.the representative ot Pakistan '1181 be
tound on this page.

-

59tb1d., PP• 2-7.

.
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the Counoil cen only make recomnsndat1ons.ft

In general,

the Belgian delegate felt that the Netherlands proposal was
a major step towards settling the dispute and that the
Republic was being unreasonable

in demanding the restoration

ot their Government in Jogjakarta.60 The representatives ·
of both China and Canada auggestsd that·· a prel1m1nar1 conter-

ence be called in Indonesia tor th~ purpose or ettectivel7.
implementing the cease-tire crder and to decide on the timo
and oond1t1ons under which the conference could take place.
Mit. Ta1ang also telt that, unless the t1ght1ng was halted

and the Republican Government restored, the United Nations
Commission should not participate in the round table
e onterence. 61

410th llfeetln~, 14 Maroh 1949
14 March, Abdur Rahim ~n

On

of Pakistan outlined

the position of his Government.on the Indonesian problem.
'

'

'

The Government of Pakistan . telt that the
Netherlands
m111tar1
.
.
'

;

'

'

action had been'in de~iance °!_the Council's orders; further,
.

.

.

.

•.

,,,.

,.~

.

""

"'"

.

.

.

1t felt that the action which the Council had taken ~as
.

.

,

'•

·.,

...

'

.

. ; ...~ ~

\

not only inadequate, but had also been taken in too hesita•
• .

.

ting a manner.

·.•

.

'

:

~. ,,.

c

:. '

'

'"l

..

...

,

:

~-

·'

;,.

•

The P~ldatan1an ~elegate declared that the
'

'

'

restoration.of the Republican Government to. Jogjakarta was ..
absolutel1,nece1sary, aa was_ the withdrawal ot Dutch troops

6~td.,

PP• 7•13.

61Ibid., PP• 16·22.

.
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from Republican

ot

territory.· Consequently,

Pakistan felt

that the proposed round table conference,

particularly its composition,
· Mr.

the Government

was unsat1itactory~62

Palar ot Indonesia tm1nta1ned that the Dutch·

concept ot a transrer'ot" sovereignty "concerns-thB transfer

ot something which ·has ··nothing to.do·
. with. ·sovereignt1J" ene
ot the tiajor reason's tor this contention was the tact that,
under the newlf amended Netherlands Constitution, one'ot
.
.
the tune tions ·of the proposed Netherlands•Indone•1an

.

Union

would be to "guarantee juridical warr~nts and a good govern•
mant. in Indonesin,

both bas1~ tuna tiona of sovereignty.

The. reprosontat1Te

of Egypt attacked

that

tt63 '

eleinont in the ··

Netherlands which still clung to the·ideals of a colonial
sy-stem~ While agreeing with th~ Belgian contention

the SecUl'ity Council ·has no·· power to· ordain

or

a new state, Mahmoud Be1 declared that'the

Indonesia "has been.and.still

is there,

the

that

existence

Republic

or

whether some

reactionaries like it or not.a64

Mr. Malik once again accused tha United States ot
giving encour,agement
1ta actions
'

their
•

influence
c

>

by

in the Security Coun~ilJ. he_ condemned
'
.. both the

United States
.

t<? ~he aggressor, the.Netherlands,

and the .united King~.onifor all~gedl7
.

'

to bring about the rejection

or

using

:

. ,

the Soviet

62seo~1ti Couno11, Oftioial Records, Fourth Year,

Number 21. (418th !eetlng)'

-14 March 1049, PP• 2-7.

63Ibid., PP• 7-11.
64'Ibid.,
.
PP• 11-17.

-

.
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proposal tor the withdrawal ot Netherlands_ troops.
representative of the

u.s.s.R.

The

charged that the proposed

round-table conference was nothing more than an attempt on
the part of the Netherlands

Government to create "a cover

tor the aggressive nction of that Government and an attempt
to legalize the state of lawlessness resulting trom Netherlands aggression in Indonea1a."65
The Government ot the United Kingdom telt that
the proposed round table conterence should be atudied in
an unbiased manner, despite existing teel1ngs caused b7 the
non-oompl1anoe

or

the Netherlands with the Securit1 Council

r~solution •. It also telt, however, that the Council should
do eyerythlng possible "~award e1tablishing with the least
possible dela1 the conditions whic,h will make it possible
tor the Government of the Republic

or

Indone11a to agree

to participate in the round table eonterence proposed
b7 the Government ot the Netherlanda."~6

419th Meeting, 16 March 1949
The representative ot Norwa7 expressed agreement
with the stateimnta made by the Chinese and Canadian
delegateaJ he telt that the "preliminarr problemsn concerning
the cease-tire and the restoration of the Republican oo~ern•
ment to Jogjakarta should be settled before considering the
65 Ibid., PP• 18-21.

--·

-

66Ib1d~, PP• 21-23.

.
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major problem regarding the transfer

or

sovere1gnt7 in a

rol.llld table conterence.67 Thia point ot view was also
supported by Mr. Chauvel, the French delegate, who stated
that the problems whioh concerned only the Netherlands cmd
the Republic should be settled under the·ausp!oea

or

the

United Nations Commission before holding a round table
conference in which the.Federalists would also participate.68

Mr. Alvarez

or

Cuba was concerned about the failure

ot the Netherlands to implement the 28 January resolut1onJ
he declared that complete compliance with this resolution
should be neeedsa17 betore any additional methods would be
utilized 1n attempting to aolve the Indonesian problem.
The Cuban delegate al•o telt that caretul c~n~1derat1on
ought to be given to the role.which the United Nat1ona ·
Commission would play in any round-table conference in·
order to prevent any att•M!>t to by-pass previous resolutions

ot the Seourit7 Counoil.69

Mr. Hood of Australia agreed

with the conclusions ot the Cuban representative, but was
surprised that

10

man1 members or the Couno11 were pertectlr

willing to consider a DBasure "which ie tantamount to the
invalidation

or

1ta o;irn reaolution."70

67seeuritD Co11nc11, orr1eial
Number 22 14i9tbeeting),
68Ib1d • .f
69Ibtd.,

-

PP•

4•6.

PP• 6-8.
70Ib1de1 PP• e-12.
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In answer to arguments put torth by Mr. J>alar in an
earlier meeting,· Mr. van Roijen declared that the transfer

ot sovereignty was

to be Areal, complete,· and unoond1t1onal1"

in addition, he stated

that the anendments to the Netherlands

Constitution embodied only "the principles of the Nether•
lands-Indonesian Union which were agreed upon and laid down
in the L1nggadjat1 Agreeme.nt."

ConsequentlJ', these amend•

ments could not possibly be interpreted in such a way that
they would prohibit.the trilnsfer ot oanplete and unconditional sovereignty. 'll ·~-' ·
Mr.' Tarasenko, ot ·the ··Ukrainian delegation,· stronglJ
opposed tho proposed round t~ble conference •. He once again

accused the "colonial powers" ot using the.Secur1t7.Council
to cloak Netherl.8.nds aggression in an aura

or

legal1t1•

Since he considered the round table conference to be only
a deception, the Ukra1n1an·repreaentat1ve opposed not onl1
thG suggestion that tho United Nations Commission be allowed
to participate in that conference, but also t~e Chinese
proposal that it participate in a prel1m1narr conference
on the Indonesian quest1on.'2

420th ?.!eet1ng, 21 March 1949 ·

After
reviewing
the various
points or view which
.
.
..
.
had been expoun~ed rogarding_the restoration or the Republican
'

Goyernment to.Jogjakarta, Mr. Sen
71

.

Ibid., PP• 16-25.
72Ibid., PP• 25-28.

or

India declared that the

.

184
respons1b111t1 tor the cont1nuat1on'ot host111tiea,'which
was ondangering the peace ot South East Aaia, rested upon
the Netherlands Government.

Mr. Palar then.pointed'out

that the Dutch were attempting to deatro~ Jogjakarta·and thus
make it physically impossible to restore the Republican
Government to that city.

He sumzmrized t.he position o~ his

Govsmment" as tollQW81 . (1) 1DlJDldiate implementation

or

the 28 January resolution should be aocompl1shedJ (2) a
prol1m1nary- conterence could be . held under the· auspices ot ·
tho Unitad Nations Commssion, but such a conference, and the
restoration ot the Republic wh1oh would follow, should last

no more than fourteen

daJSJ

(~)the United Nations Commission

should report izmoodiatel7 on the situation in JogjakartaJ

(4) attar the restoration ot the Ropubl~oan Government,
'•

·•

I

•

that Government "should
be able. to . participate
.
.
.
.
. lawfully
in whatever conferences
or negot1&t1ons . are provided tor in
.
the Council's re~olution or are deemed necessar1 by both
.

parties and the United Nations Comm~ssion tor Indonesia;n

(5) a report on the military situation in _Indonesia,
including those areas. which were ocoupie~ b7 the Netherla~da
bo!oro 16 December 1948, should be rm.de as soon as possibleJ
.

..

. .. .' :

'

i

..

and (6) an 1mmed1at~
investigation should be made, . by . any
.
.
..
competent international organ, on_ the _reports oi: ai;ooities.'13

.Mr. van Langenhove
ot Belgium, 1n answer to those
.
.
who demanded a literal appl1cnt1on ot the Council's 28 January
73s~cur1t~ Council, Official Records, Fourth Year,
Number 23 (420th ~eotlng), 21~:arch1949, pp. 2-16.

•·
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reaolut1on, stated that the Council's competence had never·
been verified or.established since the matter had not been
submitted to the International Court.
the tact

that

He also alluded.to·

it would be extremely d1tt1cult for the ·

Republican Government to bring to an end the resistance'
movement since, in the past,

that Government had advooated

•war to the b1tter end."7'

The Egyptian delegate, Viabmoud

•

J

Fawz1 Bey, concluded the day'• speeches by pointing out that
the only logic~l procedure would be to allow the leaders
ot the Republic tn contact their people before holding the ·
round table conterenc•. 75 · ·

42lst

.

Meeting, 23 March 1949

.

..

.

~

.

",1

'.

As no nsmber or ,the Council objected, the President
I

stated that he 'would send~
Commission requesting

.

.

telegram
to the United . Nations
.
information on the general situation
.

in Jogjakarta. Since a goQd deal of the Council's time
had . been tak~~ up by·. va171ng
interpretations
or. his suggestions,
.
.
.
. .
:

.,

'

General McNaughton_of Canada formally atated his proposal
•

comernin~

:

a ~r~liminarr

.

~

'!

conference.

to

the United Nations Commission_
implementing

.

•

Th~s proposal d1J'.ec~ed

(1) assist

the parties

in

the Council's ceaee•tire order ~nd in restoring

the Republican Govornmont to. Jogjakarta, and (2) assist the

.

.

'

parties in reaching

-

an agreement on the time end e ondi tiona

74Ibid., PP• 19-24 •

.

-

'

75Jb1d., PP• 24-28.

.

'
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tor holding the proposed round table oont'erenoe.

In addition,

the proposal stated that, if an agreennnt was reached, "the
holding or a round table conference end the participation or
the United Nations Connn1ss1on in such a conference would be
consistent with the 28 January resolution or tho Counc11."76
?dr. Sen ob jectod to including the natter or deciding

.

the time and conditions of-a round table conference in the
agenda

or

a prelimino.%7 meeting.

Mr. Hood

or

Australia

agreed with this point or view, na1nta1n1ng that the Republican
Government would have to be restored to Jogjakarta before it
could be expected to consider an1 such conterence.77

The

Soviet delegate attacked the whole idea of holding a
conference, either the suggested pre11m1narr conference or
the proposed round table conterence.

)Tr. Malik im.intained

that the Security Council should reaffirm its demand tor the
imned1ate and unconditional release

or

the Indonesian pol1·

tical leaders and, 1n response to the "~rowing demand ot
tho peoples ot·As!a," order the immediate withdrawal of
Netherlands forces from Republican territorr.78 At the
request

or

the Scwiet delegate, the Canadian proposal was

put to a voteJ it was adopted by a vote
France, Ukrainian

s.s.R.,

and the

or

u.s.s.R.

8 to none, with
absta1n1ng.79

76seour1t-i Council, Official Records, Fourth Year,
Number 24 (42lateet1ng),
23 March 1949, PP• 2-6. The
text oft~ Canadian proposal may be tound on page 5.
771big., PP• 11-18.
79Ibid., pp• 18-21.

-

79Ibid., PP• 25-25.
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,..

.....

.

Report E! !h!?. Extent 2!, Datmge !2 J'oa;jakerta
On

,

26 March the United Nations Commission submitted

a report on the alleged damage to the o1t1

or.

Jogjakarta.

The Commission reported that the danage to the city was not
serious enough to "interfere in anywa1 with·the re-establish•
ment of the Republican Government .Ln JogjakartaJ"

the report

stated.· however, that it would be necessary for the Netherlands to furnish "noceasar1 tac111t1ea" because ot ,a lack
materials and equipment~ part

or

or

wh~ch had been destroyed

or removed aa a result ot·th~ Dutch·m111tary action or

,.

18 December 1948, which
would
•seriously hamper an ettect1V•·
.
. .
.

'

tunct1on1ng ot the Republican adm1n1etrat1on."80 ·When

'

.

,,
;

this communication waa brought to the attention ot the
Security Council, Mr. Malik maintained truat the report

w~!.

contradictory since. it had declared that no serious damage
had occurred, yet there was a laok or materials and equip-

ment necessary- for adm1n1~ter1ng a government.Bl

.!!! Interim Repor~ .!?!. !h!

United Uations Connn1ss1on

The first interim report of t~· United Nations
.
.
Connnission was submitted to tho Security Council in a letter
dated 4 August.

ThiB report covered the·period trom the

BOSecur~ c ouno11, Official Records, Fourth Year;·Supplement"!or
~

ch l\l49,
.

.

.

p -. ia.

.

. 8lsecuritn,Counc11, Official Records, Fourth Year,
Number 25_l422nd eting), 28 March 1949, pp. 1-3.

,,
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establishment or.the Commission on 28 Janue.17 to 3 August.~
In accordance with the Security Council directive
adopted on 23 March, the United Nations Commission made
contaot both with the Netherlands.Govemment and.the Government ot the Republic tor the purpose

or

setting a date tor

the beginning ot discussions under the auspices
Commission.

or

the

Mr. van Ro1jen arrived in Batavia on 12 April

and discussions were opened in that city on 14 April.8:5
The question of the. restoration ot the Republican
Government to Jogjakarta was one ot the most important issues
considered dur!ng·the newly-opened discussions.

The Republican

delegation submitted a plan which "envisaged tour consecutive
phasea to bring about the return of.the Special Territo17 ot
Jogjakarta to the administration ot the Republio."

On

21 April Mr. van Roijen stated that the Netherlands Govern•
ment was willing to agree to the reatorat1on'.or the
Republican Government to·Jogjakarta on two conditions:
(1) the Republican Government should order "ita armed adherents
to cease guerilla warfare and co-operate in the restoration

or

peace and the Dllintenance of law and order," and (2) a

binding oOlllllitment must be made "concerning the time and
co~ditlon~ for the holding of the Round Table Conference at
The Hague."

On

7 May the Chairman of the Republican dele-

gation, in a formal statement, accepted the Netherlands
82seour1ty Counoil, Official Reoorda, Fourth Year,

Special Supplermnt Number 5, P•

-

83Ibid.~ PP• 5•7.

1.

.

'
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conditions and Sukarno and Hatta agreed·to urge the adoption

ot such a policy following the restoration or·the Republican
GovernmentJ the Chairman ot·th& Netherlands delegation,·
in view of the Republioan statement; agreed, on behalf ot·
his Government, 'to the return of the-Republican Government
to Jogjakarta.84
A jo1nt.si.ib-comm1ttee was set up "to make the neceaaar1
'

investigations and preparations preliminary to the return ot
the Republican Government to Jogjakarta:" this sub-committee
went to Jogjakarta on 11 May.

In compliance with Nether-

lands dena.nds, anyone who wished.to leave Jogjakarta

betore

that city was turned over.to Republican authorities was·
allowed to do so.' This evecuatlcm was completed on 9 June
and Netherlands authorities est~mated that.approximately
30,000 people had lett the Res1d$noy o~ Jogjakarta.as
In accordance with plans worked out between the

parties and with the assistance ot the Commission'•
military.advisers, the evacuation ot Netherlands troops

trom Jogjakarta
30 Jurie.

started

on 24 Ju.~e and was completed on

The withdrawal was accomplished without en1

hindrance or serious incident.

On 6

July, Sukarno, Hatta,

and the o~her.members ot the Republican Government.returned
to Jogjakarta;

the' tirst

meeting

was held on 13 July• 8G ·

·-

S4Ib1d.,

PP• s-12.

asrbid.,

P~ 12.

-

86Ib1d.,

;>.

13.

, ··

or

the Republican Cabinet

.

'
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A second sub-committee waa aet up under the auspices
or the Commission to study possible ways in which the ceasefire e.nd the cession ot guerilla warfare could be brought
about.

Informal d1scuss1ona were held between·the parties

and on 22 June ?.fr. van Roijen announced. that

had been reached.

an agreement

Following the agreement ot 22 June, .t'urther

1n!ormal consultations were heldJ

on 3 Augwst oease•host111t1es

orders were issued simultaneoual7 by the Governments or the
Netherlands and ot the Republic.

These orders were. to be

ettect1ve in Java as of midnight on 10/11 August, end in
Sumatra as of:m1dn1ght on 14/15 Augu1t·.a7

. Though discussions had been held on the subject,
no .final agreement had been reached on. th• release

or·.

political prisoners •. On 1 August the parties agreed to
consider "the establishment

of a joint sub-oommittee under

the auspices of tha Coumission to adviae upon and to
accelerate the release of political prisonera and prisoners
of war,n88
Informal discussions between the parties on the
qusst1on

or

holding a round tabla conference were initiated

on 19 April and, on 7 Ma7, resulted in an agreement on the
time and conditions

or holding auch a conterence.89. This

agreement called for the conference to be convened.bf

87 Ibid.,. PP• 14-17.

-

-

88Ibtd~,_pp. 17-21.

-

09Jb1d.,

P• 23.

.

'
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l August, it

possible, and tar the conference to be completed

within two months after the date ot convening.

The participants

undertook to rat1ty the agreements reached by the conference
within six weeks after its close and sovereignty was to be
transterred to the United States ot Indonesia "before the

or

end

1949."

Tho participants in this conference were to

cons1at of representatives ot the Netherlands Government,

.

.

the Government of the Republic ot Indonesia, tho Federal
..

Consultative Assembl7,_ and_tho United Nations Commission
.

~

.

.

tor Indonosia.90 On 22 June . the representatives
of the
.
'
.

.

.

Netherlands, the Republic, and the areas in Indonesia other
•

l

•

'

.

•

than the Republic formalized the agreenDnt discussed above.
..

. -

'

.

'

The Chairman of the Netherlllnda delegation stated that
his . Government approved . the agreement. and
the.. Chairman
.
.
:

or

the Federal Consultative Asaembl7 also endorsed the agreement.
,

,

The Chairman of the Republican delogation declared that the
agreeme"nt would be a part of the policy "t_o be urged upon
•o

,•

•

~

'

'

the Government of the Republic

•

or

'

restoration to Jogjakarta ••• •"
Rep.ubli~~ Government approved
In conclusion,

•

.

Indonesia after its
l

Arter its restorat.1on, the

thG

ag~eement. 91

the Commi_as.~on•s 1st Interim Report

atated th.at the following objectives ot the Council's
directive

or

23 March had been ach1oved:

(l) the Govern•

ment ot the Republic had been restorod·to Jogjakartaf

90rb14., Appendix X, PP• 74-76.
9lrb1d~, PP• 23-24.

.

'
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(2)

an

agreement had been reachod on

a

cessation

or

hostilities

and both parties had issued cease-hoat111t1ea orders to their
troopsJ and (3) the time and conditions tor the rowid table··
conference at The Hague had been agreed upon.92

448th ~~eting, 27 September 1949
At the 448th and the 449th meetings the Security
.
.
CoUn.c!l dealt with. (1) the problem ot' the payment of.
travelling expenses and aubsiatence allowances to alternate
representatives on Security Couneil Commissions, and
(2) a request trom the Consular Commission at Batavia that
the United Nations assume tuture costs o£ military observers
in Indonesia.

A French resolution which called

to?!' the

rotJ!'oactive payments ot such expenses.was adopted by a
vote ot 7 to 1, with~ abstentions.· The rest'of the ~et1ng
was devoted to speeches on the queetion raised bf the
Consular Cocm1as1on •. In general, the United States supported
the Consular Commission's proposal, while the
the Ukrainian

u.s.s.R.

and

s.s.R. oppos.ed 1t.93 . At th~ 449th meeting, a ·

Cuban proposal to transmit the Consular Commission•s J!'equeat
to the Secretary-General was adopted by a vote ot 9 to 1,
with

l

abstention, the

u.s.s.R.

and the·Ukrain1an S.S.R.

being opposed to the meaaure.9~.
92.!!?!!i•• P• 29 «>,

93secur1t~Couno11, Ott1o1al Records, Fourth Year,
Number 44 (44ath
eting), 27 Septent>er 1949, pp. 2-20. The
text ot the French proposal ma.1 be tound on page 10.
·
9•seour1tneCoune11, Ott1c1al Rooords, Fourth Year,
Number 45 (449th
etlng), 5 October 1949, pp. 2-10. The text
or the request rrom the Consular Commission may be tound in
Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Supplement tor
~eptember, October, Hovember, end December 1949, Document ~p.l.

.

'
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!h! Round Table Conference .!! .!!!! Harms
The Round Tll.ble · Con!'erence was convened at The Hague

on 23 August and continued 1n session until 2 Noveni>er •..
According to the report ot the United Nations Co'Cnlission,
· the con.rorence was "eminently- successful" and, as a result
or the Oonference, a new era in the relations ot the peoples
or Indonesia and the Netherlands was beginning.95

The

achievements ot this Conteronoe may be summarized 1n four
main categories.

Political~

Constitutional Issu~s
,.

As a result

5

•

or

the
Round
agreement
,
.
. Table
. Conference,
.
. ·'
'
'
was reached on. (1) a provisional constitution
tor
the .
.
.
Republic of the United States of Indonesia, (2) the Charter,
,_..

the

tor th~ Tran~f~r of S~verei~ty;. (.3) th~ St.atute ~t
,

'

•

•

l

?letherlands .. Indonesian Unlon, (4) an
. agreement in the matter

or

foreign relnt1ons, (5} an agreement on transitional
"

,

1

,.

measures, (6) an agreement on
the right
.

• ·.·

or

·

r

·-.

selt-determination,
.

and (7) en agreement concerning nat1onal1t1 and c1t1zensh1p.96
','

'

I

The provisional constitution provided for the creation
ot a federal state in which the sovereign authority ~ould be
.

·,

.

.

vested in a government
composed
ot a President
and ·. Minister•,
·'·
.
.
together with a House of Representatives and a Senate.

The

95secur1tY Council, 'orricial Records,· Fourth Year,
Special Supplement Number 6, PP• l, 37 •.

-

96Ibid., PP• 15-20.

.
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Senate was to be composed
•

or

two
representatives
trom each
c
•
, .

of the participating
territorieswhile
the House
ot
.
.
.
. .
- .
Representatives was to consist ot
med>erawith the
. ~ 150
.
~
.

.

number

or

members representing the Republic being -~qual to

one-halt.the total. number~ of . ?Tl)mbers trom the other
.
·territories ·or Indonesia. The Chinese, European, and
Ar~bian m1norit1 groups were.~C'.)_ba represented b7 a.minimum

ot 9, G, and~ membe~a respe~tivelr.97
The Charter.of the _Transfer

or

S?vereignty provided

that the Uetherlands . Government
"unconditionally
..
.
.
.
.
.
. . end
:

1rrovooably tre.n~ters
complete sovereignty
over. Indonesia
.
~'
. .
.

.

to the Ropublic
of .the Unite~
States of.Indonesia and
.
.
. .. therebf
recognizes said Republic
.or Indonesia
.
. of_ the United
~ States
.
. .
.
'

,.

'

'

.

;

as an independent and_aoveroign State;" the transfer

or

sovereignty
was . to ' take place
no ~ator~ " than
.
.
. . 30 . December 1949.
'

'

In regard to the problem of.the r~s1denc1

or

~r

New ~u1nea,

tho Charter
stated that the status guo would
. .
..
be maintained
in that terr1tory,.w1th
the provision
thnt
.
.
.
article 2

.

.

within a year atter.the.transter_or sove~e1gnty the political
status

or

New Guinea would
be determined
by~ negotiations
.
.
.

between the now Republic .and the Netherlands.98
The Statute of the. Uetherlands"'."Indonosian Union was
designed to promote the commo~ intere~tS of the two partioSJ
co-operation was to take place pr~mar117 in the tields of

-

97Ib1d~, Appendu VI,· ~P• 5:5-71.

98Ib1cJ~, Ap~ndix

..

VII, ~. 91-92.
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ot foreign relations, detense, and finance, and also in
matters ot an eoonomio and a cultural nature.
in the Union were to be tnken "in agree~nt

All deo1s1ons

between . the .two

0

•

Partners;" a conferonoe, composed ot three . 'ministers

ot

each party, was to ~e held at least twice a year and more
often if the partners deemed it necessary •. The Union
Statuto also provided for a Union Court
.
. ot Arbitration
.
.
. .
which was to be composed or six members, three to be app~inted
,-

by each party; doois1ons were to be taken by a majority vote

and, in the case or a tie, the Court was authorized to call
upon the Presi~nt

of thD International Court or Justice

or

another international authority to appoint a person ot
another nationality ~o sit _as a ~pecial member o£ the Union
Court with the right to.vota .• 99
An agre~mGnt was also concluded concerning .foreign
'
.
.
.

relations between the two parties.

Under this agreement,

tho parties were to aim at co-ordinating their foreign

policies and they agreed not t~;conclude
..,

any treaty or

perform any "juridical aot in international intercourse,.
which involved the interests ot the other party without
first consulting that party.100
The Agreement on. Tran1·1t1onal Measures stated
the division

or

the Republic o.f the United State a

or

that
Indonesia

into component states should be accomplished by a Constituent·

-

99Ib1d., Appendix IX, PP• 95-101.

.

'
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Assembly with the stipulation that a plebiscite be held
among the population ot the territories to determine whether

they wished to form a separate component state.

It a component
.

'

state railed to ratit7 the tino.l Constitution, that state
would be tree "to negotiato ~bout a special relationship
towards the Republic· ot the.United

St~tes·or Indonesi~:~d
In add! tion,

the Kingdom of the Netherlands•"

or

lands agreed to promote Dembersh1p

the Nether•

the new Republic in

the Unitod Nations.101' This agreement settled the problem
.

.

ot self-determination of areas outside ot the Republic which
had been so important to the Netherlands.
A separate agreement was o cncluded concerning

.

\

.. ,

.

problem of nationality ond ·citizenship.

In general, those

who, becaus~ · ~r ·the 'trans.fer of sovereignty, possessed

persons
•

the

i

given

dual citizenship were

•.

the right to elect either.Nether-

lands or Indone aian n~tl~~li t.1~l02 .

-

J

•

j

,..

•

..

.

F1nano1al and Economio Problems
In this field, th• parties were agreed that the
Republic should assume 11ab111t1e1.as well.as rights
upon the transter ot sovereignty.

A ditfel'f)nce ot opinion

arose, naturall1 enough, over the extent to which the Republic
should take over the debts ot Indonesia.

-

lOlibtd.,
.

-

l02Ibtd.,

As the parties were

Appendix XI, PP• 102-105 •
Appendix XII, PP• 105-109.
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unable to reach agreement, though both made considerable
concession, a "Debt Commission" was given the task ot proposing
the amount of the debt to be a asumed by the Republic, giving
due consideration to expenditures
.
. which it might. attribute
to military action.103
The proposal of tho "Debt Commission" in regard to
the domestic debt was accepted by th~ parties; upon the
transter

or

sovereignty, the R~public would assume
'

"responsibility tor both interest and amortization in the
mnount ot 871 million gu1ldGrs and tor the debt.to. third
countries
. ' in the amount of 420 million guilders.~-

The

Republic also nasumed (l) respon51b111ty for "ce.rta~n items
of the external floating debt," amounting to a maximum

or

2G8.5 million guilders, and (2) obligations assumed, with
.
.
regard to Indonosia, wider.the Dretton Woods Agreement.
The Debt Agreement also reduced the."external debt duo to
the N~therland~ by 2 thousand million Nethe~lnnds gu1ldera.nl04
The parties agreed.to promote vo~untary cooperation
1n foreign oonmsrcial relations through consultation and

continuous contaot; a "most-favored nation" clause applying
to "Netherland& nationals, corporate bodies, products, ships,
...

.

..

.

and other objects"

l04Ib1d.

,.

P• 21.

On

third countries were to enjoy ··

in ·p~rt1~t~~t1on

l03Ib1d.,

!

was included in th~ Debt Agreement.

the other hand, nationals·~
"equal rights

.

in t;ade with Indonesia and

.

'
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in that country's economic activities and development."105

M111tary Affairs
Separate agroementa were concluded in regard to the
withdrawal ot Netherlands naval forces, land·torcea, and .
air foroes •. The Netherlands nav1 was to be withdrawn from '.
Indonesia within one 1ee.rJ upon the·request

or

the Republican

Government, however,· the Netherlands was, tor a limited
period

or

time, prepared "to lend aid in.the detenco ot

Indonos1a at sea and.1n,tho·bu11d1ng-up.ot the nav1 ot the
Republic ot the United States ot:Indonesia.n

The Nether•

lands Government also agreed to turn over to the Republic
a number ot ships and naval aircraft. Atter the transfer

or

sovereignty, the naval base at Suraba1a was to pnss 1mmed1atel1
into Republican hands end other naval. establishments
be graetUall7 transterred to the navy

or

were to

the Republic. All

naval bases, however, were.to continue·to serve ships ot
both tho nav1 of the Republic and the.Ro1al Netherlands
Nav7.l06
The Ro1al Netherlands Anrr/ was to be withdrawn trom
Indonosia "within the shortest possible. tima;" until the
time of suoh withdrawal, Nethorlands troops were to be .
1051.E!!!~·PP~ 23:.2s:

Appe~dlx XIII,

PP• 109.. 122,

contains the text ot the-t1nano1al and economic agreement
reached at tho Round Table conterence.
·
lOGibid.~·,PP~ 21-2a·.

Appendix xv' PP• 128-135,

contains the-te'xt or the agreenent concerning Netherlands
naval forces in Indonesia after the transfer ot sovere1r;it7.

'•
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assembled in areas designated bf mutual agreement.

Within

these areas, the Dutch would bo wider the comnnnd of their
own officers and have treedom of movement; in order to leave
the designated areas, however, Dutch troops would have to
obtain a pass which had been approved by a m111tai-,- author1t1

or

the Rep.iblio.

The Royal Netherlends-Indon~sian A~· was

to be reorganized into the ar'lr!'f of the Republic ot'the United
('

.

States ot Indoneata,107·

The agreement regarding.Netherlands air forces
stated that the "parties should aim

at withdrawal,· or

reorganization, of Netherlands Air Forces

in

Indonosia

within six months ~tter the transfer ot aoverelgnt7,n· Ths
Netherlands Govemment

expressed its willingness to.aid th8

Republio in building up, ~raining, and equipping an Indonesian
Air torce bJ supplying personnel, materiel, and technical
e.dvice.108
, An agreexmnt was also reached concerning co-operation
between the Netherlands end the Republic in thG field ~f
defense •. Each partner was to be responsible tor the defense

ot 1 ta own terr1 tory I any jolnt regulations adopted bf a
Union arGml were to be implemented by each
l07tb1d.,

PP• 28-29.

or

tho partners

,\ppendiX XVI,·PP• 135-145,

contains th~xt or the agreement regulating Netherlands
land forces in Indonea1a·after the transter ot sovereignty.
lOOibid., PP• 29~30. ·The toxt of the agreement·
regarding t~etherlands
air forces in Indonesia may be
tound in Appendix XVII, PP• 145-146,
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within their own juriadiction.109

Cultural _!!ll! Social Artair~
The partners ~greed to aet up a· joint colil!llitteo
composed

or

roitrteen member3, seven to be appointed bJ'

each partner, to promote knowledge

or

each other's

and t.o exchange information in the cultural field.
agreement envisioned an ·exchange'

or

culture':
·The

professors, teachers,

and experts as well as of books aind'per1otl1c~la.
The Government or the Republic. agreed to accept
into 1ts service all civil government ott1c1als who were
employed by the Government or IndOnes.ia at· the transfer

ot sovereignty.

The Republican Government also agreed that,

tar a period or two yen.rs, 1 t would "retrain trom taking
any measures which would unfavourably affect the logal position

ot these government officials who have Netherlands nationality,
and who will have been taken over trom the service of the
Government

or

Indonesia."110

In concluding 1ta report,

the United Nations Commission 1n1'ormed the Council that it
would continue to carry out its tunctions and observe the
implementation ot the agreements reached at the Round Table
Cont"erenco.111
109Ib1d.,

-

. . .

PP• 30-31·...

llOibtd., PP• 31-33.

-

lll!bido

.

P• 37.
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455th Meetinr;, 12 December 1949 · ·
On 12 and 13 December the Securit1 Council considered
the spocial report ot. tho United Nations Commission on the
Round Table Conterence.

In the initial speech of the day,

General McNaughton of Canada brought to the Council •s attention
a draft resolution which the Canadian
delegation had submitted.
.
.
This resolution noted
tho.special . report
on the Round Table. . .
~
. .
Conference which the United Nations Commission had submitted,
'

welcomed the "forthcoming oatabl1s.hnlent of tho Republic of
the United States of Indonesia as . an independent, sovereign
.
atate .. " commended the Commission for its part 1n settling
)

:

the dispute, and requested the Commission ato observe and
.

.

assist" in the implementation ot the agreements reached at
'.

.

·'·

the Conference. General McNaughton stated that hia Government noted particularly the "outstcnding contribution made
by the Council's representatives in Indonee1A,•ll2

Mr. van Roijen echoed this opinion of the United
Nations Commission, but declared that his Government still
maintainod their original att.1.tude in reg~rd to the c~mpetence

or

the Council to deal with the s1tuat1onJ he expressed

regret thet the question ot oompetenc.e had never been
submitted to the International Court ot Justice. After

••
112secur1ty Council, Offioial Reeor~s, Fourth Year,
Number 51 (455th.Meetlng), 12 December !g49, pp. 2-3 •. The
text of the Canadian re&olution may be found in Security
Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Supplement tor
September, October, November, and December 1949, Document
S/1431, PP• 13•14.
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in.forming the Council tbs. t the Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament hed approved· 'the res~ita

of the Round Table

Conference, the Netherlands representative· stated that he,
personally,~ felt. that :the Neth~rlands a~~ I,;idones1·a·'wer8
.,

..

"about to enter upon a new par1od or friendship and
'

"'

..

co-operation."11~
Mr. Pnlar laid much.importance on the fact that, aa
a result ot the Round Tablo Conference, absolute and cocplete
sovereignty v.ould be transferred to the nevi Republic.

Ile

pointed out that none of the concessions which the Indonesian
'

'

dolegat1on hnd made at the Conference would ln nny way
restrict the Republic's 8overeignt1. 'The Indonesian delegate
.

.

.

'

supported the Canadian draft resolution, snd urged that the
United lfations Commission assist

in the settlement or the

status of New Guinen.114
The representstive of the Ukrainian
much more pessimistic view
Conference.

or

s.s.R.

took a

the results or the Round Table

Ho maintained that th~ Dutch wero· still waging

war upon the Indonesian people "who re.ruse to submit to the
Dutch occupiers and to the Hatta clique, which has betrayod
the interests

or

tho United Stutes

its peoplo." ·Mr. Galagan then attaokod

and

supporting.the Dutch

the United KiDGdom, accusing them

in "a
.

or

co~se of armed aggression against'
.

the Indonosisn people; he i'ollowed this attack w1 th a history3•7•
114tb1d., PP• 7-13.
l1:5Ib1d.,

-

pp~
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or

the Indonesian dispute in which he purported to show how

the United States and the United Kingdom had supported
Netherlands military operations.· The Ukrainian delegate
ma1ntainad that the· United Notions Commission was onl1 a
tool

or

United States policy and that the· composition ·

ot the Round Table Conference "determined in advance the
character ot the United States ot Indonesia and of the
Netherlands-Indonesian Union as a new political torm ot
alaverr ror the Indonesian.people."

colonial

In view ·

ot this situation, the Ukrainian delegation submitted a

dratt resolution calling.tor (l) withdrawal of Netherlands
troops to th~ poa1t1ona which the1 held prior to December
1948, (2) the release of Indonesiari political prisoners

an investigation or

and

the activities ot Netherlands authorities

"which have taken the term ot brutal terrorism; murder, and
persecution

ot the demooratio leaders

or

the Indonesian - .

people," (3) creation or a United Nations Comm1as1onwhich
would be composed

or

states members ot the Security Council,

(4) instructions to this Comm1ss1on to submit to the Council
within three months proposals tor the settlement ot the··
Indonesian problem; (5) the United Nations Commission for
Indonesia to be diasolved.115
The representative~

or

Pakistan and China both praised

;

the work ot the United Nations Commission and supported the
Canadian resolution.116 ll5Ibtd.·,
PP• 14-27.
The text of the Ukrainian
resolution
may. be found on pa ge 27.

ll6Ib1d., PP• 28-32.

••
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456th Meetinz, 13 December 1949
Sir Senegal Rau ot India and Mr. Blanco ot Cuba
supported the Canadian resolution and extended oongratulationa
to the representatives

or

the Netherlands and

or

the Republic

on the successful conclusion ot the agreements at the Round
Table Conforenoe.117 Mr. Taarapkin ot the

u.s.s.R.

attacked

the agreements which had been reached at the Conterenco on
the grounds that, tcr the Indonesian people, "these agreements aignit7 thoir return to their former colonial slave17
unde~ new and moro subtle legal torms" and that, under these
agreements, "Indonesia's freedom and independence are being
· saor1t1oed to the pol1 tic al and e oonomic interests ot a
bloc

or

Colonial Powera, namel7 the United States ot America,

the Neth.!)rlands, the United Kingdom and othera.nllO
ThG representatives of Eg71>t llnd ot Belgium expressed
satisfaction in the outcome ot the Round Table Conterence
and support tor the Canadian dratt reaolution.119

Mr. Gross

ot the United States felt that the agreements reached at
The Hague "ahould be regarded as a substantial contribution
to the adyanoement ot the purposes and principles
Charter."

or

the

In reply to the charge• ot the Soviet delegBte,

117seour1t~ Council, Ott1o1al Records, Fourth Year,
Number 52 (456th_b etlng), 13.Deoember 1949, pp. 2-5.

ll8Ib1~., PP• 5·12.

-

ll9Ib1d., PP• 12-15.
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ttzt. Gross stated that the delegates of the U.S.S.R. and

or

the Ukrainian 8.S.R. were attempting to twist the m:lan1ngs
of the agreenents reached at the Round Teble Con!"erence

and that the Soviet Union had been attempting to thwart the
ettorts ot the parties to reach agreement and to smear the
Indonesian loaders.120
Following several other speeches which, except for
one by Mr. Ga.lagan of the Ukrainian S .s .R., all· expressed··
sat1staot1on with the results

or

the Round Table Conference,

the resolutions before the Council were put to a vote.' 'I'he
CQnndian resolution was defeated by a Soviet veto,; the vote
being 9 1n tavor and 2 against.

'l'he Ukrainian resolution

waa rejected by a vote ot 2 in favor and 9 against. ·The
President declared that the defeat or the Canadian r~solution
had no effect on previous Council resolutions concerning the
activities

or

the Comm1ssionJ consequentl7,.that body would

remain 1n Indonesia under its existing terms of reference
to observe the 1mplensntat1on oft~ agreements concluded
at The Hague.121

.!h!. T~ansfer ,E! Sovereignty·
On 14 Deoember the representatives of the Govenunent

ot the Republic ot Indonesia and of the regions associated

l21Ib1d~,
-

l20Ib1d., pp. 15·21.
.

PP• 33-35.

.'
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with the.Federal Consultative Assembly met in Batavia and
signed an agreenent indicating that their governments
accepted the Constitution of the Republic ot the United
States ot Indonesia which had been formulated at the

Mr. Sukamo was unanimously elected

Round Table Conterence.

as the tirat President ot the new Republic and, on 20 December,
the first cabinet was appointed with Mr. Hatta as Prime
Minister.

At the aaxm time a special delegation was appointed

to receive the transfer
ot the Netherlands.

or

sovereignty ~rom the Government

On 27 December sovereignty waa trans-

ferred to.the Government ot the Republic ot the United:·
States

or

Indonesia 1n a tormal ceremon1 held at Amsterdam;

nt the 1ame time the High Representative ot the Crown in
Batavia transferred administration to the Sultan ot
Jogjakarta, who had been appointed acting Prime Minister
tor the oocasion. With the transter ot sovereignty,
administrative and m111tarr responsibilities throughout
Indonesia were, 1n accordance with The Hague agreements,
taken over b7 authorities

0£

the new oovernmen t •

On

28 December President Sukarno arrived in Jakarta trom
Jogjakarta and assumed control ot the da7-old Republio,122
.

,

•

122securitI Council, Official Records, Fifth Year,
Special Supplemont Number i, PP• 16-!9.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

· When the s 1tuation in Indonesia was brought to the
attention· ot the Seeuritr Council in Januarr, 1946, and
again !n July, 1947, a new step was taken in the t1eld ot
international organizationJ tor the t1rst time an international organization, the United Nations, was dealing.with
the problem

or

a colony seeking to becomo independent or

its mother count%7• While one ma1 be critical ot the
prooeduro and the methods which were used by the Securitr
Council, such an attitude must be tempered with the realization of the enormous difficulties which.exist when a
new type of problem is considered for the first time~
In addition to the tact that the problem was a new one, the
United Nations itselt was an organization ot only recent
creation, and this undoubtedl7 accounts tor even more
obstacles !n the path lead!n~ to a tinal solution to the
Indonesian problem.

The very tact that the Indonesian dispute

did pose a new type of problem would seem to add to the
importance of a study of the dispute and

or

the measures

used in searching tor a solution to the problem.
During the treatment ot the Indonesian dispute b1
the Security Council, a number or pt9oblems arosoi sot!8 of
207
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these wore resolved to the sat1staot1on
ot all parties
. ...
. . .
•.

..

'-

concernad while othars contin:uall1. recurred to plague the
Council.

One

or

the most basic ot the latter problem:s

involved tho .legal question ot tho compotence or the Securit7
Council to deal with the Indonesian question.

This question

was actually a man1testat1on.ot o~e or the basic problems
of all international organization, the problem ot d1stingu11h1ng

between the respective jurisdictions ot an international
organization and or a state which is a nnmber or that
organization •. A related problem arises in the determination
I

•

..

'

'

ot the Council's competence in such a situation, namely,
who is to determine the competence
or an international
bod7
.
..
in a given situation, the international organ1za~1on by the
simple expedient

or

taking action, the member state by

unilateral declaration, or an international judicial
authoritJ•

In the treatment of the Indonesian question,

it would aeom that the tirst alternative was utilized; it
would be foolish to assert th.at the Security Council took
the act~on that 1t.~d

if that body did.not bol1eve itself

competent to take such action.

Whilo there was no concrete

declaration made.by the Security_Counc~l ~n the l!lltter
competence, obviously a majority~
.

~r

the members .believed
. .
.

that that body was competent to deal with the situation.
It is,

or course,

true

that

the Coun~~l
.. rejeoted a Belgian

proposal to submit the question ot competence to the International Court of Justice.

For the most part,
. those who

abstained from vqting on the proposal (Australia, Draz11,

, ..
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China, Colombia, Syr1~, and the U.S.S.R.) did so because

the7 telt

that submiaaion ot the issue to the International

Court .would merel1 dola1 and hinder. the Sec~1t1

Council in

considering a matter with which th&f telt the Council was
competent to deal.

or.the t~ur nations which voted tor the

Belgian proposal (Belgium, France, United Kingdom, United
St~tes), onl7 the United States had not, at some time,
deola~d

that the Indonesian disput~ ~id not tall within

the Jurisdiction

or

the Security Council •. It an answer had

to be given as to the Secur!t1 Council's competenoo in the
Indonesian dispute,

it would seem that

one r.ust admit that

th9 Council was competent in that it a,~se~ted jur1~d1ct1on,
ev~n th~ugh no conorete answer was given to the legal or
theoretical question.
Another very basic question arose in connection with
the problem

or

the competence o~ the Securit7 Council, that

of. the legal status of the Republic of Indonesia

prior to

the transfer of sovereignty in December,.1949 •. The Netherlands, ot c curse, c onsistentl7 maintained that the Republic
was not a state in international law and, hence, the
Indonesian situation tell within the.domost1c. jurisdiction
of the Netherlands.

Most o~.the ro1olution1 adopted by.the

Securit7 Council were worded so aa to give no concrete answer
to the problem) tho Security Council took action under the
provisions ot the Charter ~egarding the nm.intenancG ot
i

international· peace and security, and several speeches given
before the Council indicated that the action taken by that
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bod7 waa aimed only at bringing about a cessation of
hostilities

and not at

conferring upon the Republic a

status to which it was n~t already entitled~· At least
....

partial ret'utntion ot the Dutch contention that the
Republic was' not 'a state in !international law is embodied
in the L1nggadjat1 Agreement ot 25 f4arch 1947.

Under

this Agreensnt the Netherlands recognized "the Government

or the Republic o.f Indonesia aa exercising..!!!, facto
authorit7 over Java, Madoera, and Sumatra."l Following
the signing ot this Agreement, a number

or

other nations,

including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia,
and India, extended~

.facto recognition to the RefA.lblio •

Thia problem, as well as the problem ot the c~mpetence
of the Council, received no concrete answerJ the Whole
field of the et.feat or recognition and the distinction
between .2!, .faoto and~
'

elusive point of the law

Jure recognition "ie a somewhat·

or

recognition."

2

In the handling ot the Indonesian dispute a number

ot problems arose in connection with the methods and
procedures to be used to bring about a ce~sation ot
hostilities.

In the discussions carried on in the Secur1t1

Council, this problem embodied another·procedural problem,
that

or

the withdrawal ot the armed torces

or

the disputants.

::I

.E!.!:

1soebandr1o, "De Facto Status at Linggadjati,w
Eastern survey, yol. XVII, Februarr 11, 1948, P• 30.

-

2Ib1d.
·II
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For the most part, the U .s .s .R. and the Ukrainian S .s .R •.

supported proposals calling tor the withdrawal or the troops
or the Netherlands and, in

SOZD9

inste.nces. or both ct the

parties. The Netherlands ani its supporters, Belgium,
Frence, and, to.a somewhat lesser extent, the United Kingdom,
opposed troop withdrawals on the grounds that such action
would lead.to ropr1eals and retaliator1 action against the
population of areas from which Netherlands troops would
be evacuated. As with most of the other disputes which
the Security Council handled and the attendant cease-tire
orders which were 1ssued,.the problem ot bringing about a
ceaaat1on of host111t1ee did not produce a clear-cut example
as to how cease-hostilities orders may be implemented.
The obvious det1c1ency 1n an undertaking of this kind is.
or course, the leek or an 1nternat1onalpolice force or
m1litar7 unit.which could supGrYise a ceaso-tire etteot1vely.

"'

In the absence ot auch a bod7, sanctions other than the use
I

of armed force may be applied through the states which are
moni>ers ot the United Nations.

Several countries of the

Southeast Asia area did appl7 sanctions 1n connection with
the Indonesian dispute by denying to the Netherlands the

right of transit across their respective territories.
This action, however, was not taken at the request

or

the

Security Council 11nd, consequently, 1t cannot serve as an
example of the application ot sanctions through the United
Nations.

r
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Another procedural 'Problem which was solved with a
great deal less trouble involved extending an invitation
to participate 1n tho d1scuas1ons or the Council when 1t
was considering the Indonesian question to the repreaentat1vea

or

Burma·,· Belgium, the Philippines, and Pakistan.

An invitation was,·or course1·extended to the Republic or
Indonesia, and later to the Netherlands when that country's
term on the Secur1t7 Council expired.
invited

to

Australia was alao

participate in the Council's discussions and

to continue to aerve aa a nember of the Committee or Good
Offices even though her term on the Security Council had
expired.

The Netherlands opposed extending an invitation to

the Republic because they telt that such an invitation
would carry tha implication that the Security Council
·was recognizing the Republic; the 1nv1tat1on was extended,
but the question of the legal status ot the Republic was
not answered until the transfer or sovereignty took place
in December, 1949.
The treatment of the Indonesian dispute by the
Security Council supports the contention that disputes
between nations are not to be eolved merel7 through the
creation

or

elaborate ttach1neryJ

th•

parties to the dispute

must poeseas a genuine desire to tind a solution to their
problem as well as a willingness ·to accept a compromise
solution which involves concessions from both parties.
For th13 reason, it would be extre~ly

difficult to make

a comparative evaluation ot_ the services of the Consular
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Commission,

the Committee ot Good Ott1ces, and United Nations

Commission tor Indonesia.

The

Consular Commission was set

up primarily for the purpose of reporting to the Security
Council on the situation in Indonesia and.was,

by

its ve17

nature, quite limited as to the amount of:ass1stance·it
could otter the parties in the settlement of the dispute.

An additional weakness of the Consular Commission was
exposed in the Soourit7 Couno11 d1scuas1onsJ namely, while
colleot1vel1 it represented the United ?Jations, ind1v1duall7
the members of the Consular Commission represented different
nations whose policies might d1tfer from those
United Nations.

or

the

The composition of the Consular Commission

also caused controvera1 over the reparta which it rendered.
As Mr. Kahin pointed out, 'the Consular Commissionhad a

more pro-Dutch composition than the 3ecur1t7 Council since
.Belg1wn, France, and Great Britain were r~presented on the
Commission whereas Russia, -. Syria,

Colombia, and Poland

were not.3

The Committee of Good Offices and the·United
Nations Commission tor Indonesia repres~nted tho Uuited
Nations in Indonesia tor all except th• very early part

ot

the

dispute.

The ment>ership of the two bodies was the

same, the difference.lying in their respective powers.

The

Committee of Good Offices was, quite obviously, limited in
the role which it could assume 1n a1d1n3 the negotiations
between the parties.

The United Netions Commission was

granted additional ,powers, including the power to nake
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recommendations to the parties as well as to the Security
Council.· While th~ reconstitution ot the Committee ot Good
Ott1ces as the United Nations Cor.nn1sa1on tor Indonesia
undoubtedly aided
very d1tt1cult,

in

tho final settlement, it would be

tO evaluate with any

·1r not impossible,

degree ot exactness the specific

contributions

which the

Commission made toward the final settlement.
seam that

such torees

a~

increased

pressure

It would
by the United

States on the Neth~rlands and continued Republienn resistance
played at le.ast e.s r,reat a pert

ot

the

1n

the ultimntc

settlement

dispute.

· · · \Vh!le the value of tha work ot the Security Council
in regard to the Indonesian ·dispute 'cannot be assessed with
any dagroo or exaotness, it seem~ qu1te·apparent that the
Council did contribute substantially to the settlement ot
the problom.

Throu~h the work ot its Consulr.r Commission,

Comm1tteo of Good Otfioes, and ·united lla.tions Commission
tor

Indonesia, ·the Security Council mnde the tacts

or the

situation ava1leble to the members ot ths Council and to
the peoples or the world.

Through the debates carried on

in the Security Council; the Indonesian question was given
publicity; following submission of the Indonesian dispute
to the Security Council, the activities ot the two disputants
were carried on in tho spot11eht or world opinion, end it

seoms that this toctor exercised a moderatinz influence
upon the parties.

In the coursa

or

the debates in the

Security Council', the two parties to the dispute in particular,
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and the other members ot the Council 1n general, were forced ..

to discuss their points or view and to listen to er1t1o1ams
ot their respective points ot viow.

It would seem ta1r to.

oonsider these factors as having served a valuable and
substantial part in the tinnl solution

or

the Indonesian

problem.
In regard to the attitudes of the major powers
toward the Indonesian dispute, the Dutch "police action"
of December, 1948, seems to have pla1ed a rather important

rote•

Prior to that ti me a number of nations had been

favorable to the point ot view

or

the Netherlands: following

receipt ot the reports or the Committee

or

Good Otticea,

the attitude of the Security Council as a whole clearly
indicated disapproval

or

the action taken by the Nether-

lands Oovemment. The New Delhi Con.t'erence 1 which was
called by Prine Minister Nehru of India tor the purpose ot
considering Netherlands aot1v1t1 in Indonesia, and the
resolution adopted b7 the conterenoe was indisputable
evidence that the countries of the Southeast Asia area
were strongly_sympathetic to the cause ot the Repiblic
ot Indonesi&J as noted above, several

or

the countries.

which participated 1n the conrerence had denied the right
of transit to the Netherland••
In general, Belgium and Fronce sided with the
Netherlands, particularlr on the question or the competence

ot the Council to deal with the Indonesian questionJ
consequentl7, when Belgium's term on the Security Council
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expired,

the Uetharlands

lost one ot its·atrongest supporters,

though Delg1um cont1nuod to aorve on the Cotn!11ttee ot.Oood
Ottices and on the United Nations Comi:iission tor Indonesia.
The United Kingdom was directly concerned with .the situation
in Indonesia.for a longer period of timo than any ot the
other 1lEmbers

of

tho Security Council with the oxaeption ot

the Neth.Srlands.

The Dritish, quite naturnlly, leaned

toward the Dutch point of view, thoUgh not to as grGat 9.n
extent as did nolgium and Prance; in 1946 they had exertod
pres::mro

upon the

Republic, but thi!
withdrawal

or

ffotherlnnds

to roach an' agreement with the

was tor tho purpose. of tnc111tat1ng the

British troops from Indonosia.

the 1n1t1nl stagea

or

At least in

the Counoil•s del1b~rat1ons,'Oreat

Br1tn1n seemed to regard the Indonesinn dispute as a matter
which tell within the doi:testie jurisdiction·or Holland, but
she did not Clll.intain this position in the later staGes with
cleo.r-cut sto.temen~ as did Belgium end Frn.nce •
Tho U.S.S.R. nnd the Ukrainian S.S.R. followed a
strongly anti-Dutch and sllogedly pro-Indonesian policy
fro~ January, 1946, r.hen the Ukrainian delegnto brought to
the attention of the Council tho presence ot Dr1t1sh troops
in Indonesia, until the transter

1949.

or

sovero1gnty 1n Pocember.

Tha representatives o~ these two countr1ea also ·

maintained a consistent policy in reg~rd to the nct1ons and
stands taken by the United Kingdom and the United 3tntes;
tho Comr.n.mist doleg&tes periodically attacked the two
western nations 'as the supporters and abettors of "?rctherlanda
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aggression." At one point 1n particular, however, the
Communist bloc seems to have been inconsistent. During·
almost all of the debates in the Security Council the

u.s.s.R. took
larl7, or the

or the
Republic. , With
the part

Indonesians and, more particuthe successful conclusion

or

the Round Table Conference at The Hague, the Canadian delegation introduced a resolution expressing satisfaction
with the results of that ConferenoeJ th& Ukrainian delegation
opposed this resolution and, in the course

or

the discussion,

referred to the "Hatta clique" as having "sold out" the
people or Indonesia to the Dutch; 7et it was Hatta who,
along with Sukarno and Sjahrir, had !\lrn!ahed.the leadership for the Republic when.the

u.s.s.R.

so vehementl7

attacked Dutch polic7 in Indonesia and praised th&
Indonesian leaders for their stand against the Dutch.
The United States delegation, during the earlier
consideration or the Indonesian question, seemed to be
s1mpathetio toward the Republic's desire tor independence,
and 1et seemed quite careful not to antagonize th• Netherlands by taking too positive a stand. At least a partial
explanation or this policy may b• round in the tact that the
United States was, at that time, actively pushing the
development ot a European Army and a plan tor the un1t1cat1on or Europe.

Quite obviously if the Netherlands,

beoau3e of United States activity in the Secur1t7 Council,
aotivoly opposed this prosram,·the results could ver7 well
have been extremel7 detrimental to that portion of United
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States policy.

The United States, both through their

representatives on the Security Council and through their
representatives on the Consular Commission, the Committee
of Good Offices, and tha United Nations Commission tor
Indonesia, was very active in sesking tor a peaceful solution
to the Indonesian dispute. Following the second Dutch
"police action," however, United States policy seemed to
beco~e firmer, more clearly deai.nd1ng that the Dutch settle
th& dispute by negotiation rather than by resort to armed
force.
At least two suggestions

mar

be advanced for the

improvement of the hn.ndlin~ of disputes by the Security
Council.

The first ot these would involve the creation or a

permanent taot-tinding body which would

be

prepared tor dis-

patch to any part or the world upon the request or the Security

Council. Such a bodr would serve the Security council in much
the same way that tho Peace Observation Comm1as1on !Unctions
1n relation to the General Assembly. With its present
'

organization, the Security Council, upon taking cognizance
ot a dispute, J:IUst create some special

body

tor thB purpose

ot securing 1nt'ormat1on concerning that dispute. Such a
situation poses the second difficulty 1n Security Council
procedure, that ot the length ot time generally required
tor the Council to take action on a problem. While
it would ba very d1tf1cult, it not impossible, to limit
equitably the amount of time consumed by speeches, the
process could caioeivably be spoeded up it accurate

,!
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1nf'ornnt1on on a dispute

could be mo.de available

to the

Council with grea.tor speed than 1t has been in the past.
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